{"title":"Social Categories are Natural Kinds, not Objective Types (and Why it Matters Politically)","authors":"Theodore Bach","doi":"10.1515/jso-2015-0039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2015-0039","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract There is growing support for the view that social categories like men and women refer to “objective types.” An objective type is a similarity class for which the axis of similarity is an objective rather than nominal or fictional property. Such types are independently real and causally relevant, yet their unity does not derive from an essential property. Given this tandem of features, it is not surprising why empirically-minded researchers interested in fighting oppression and marginalization have found this ontological category so attractive: objective types have the ontological credentials to secure the reality (and thus political representation) of social categories, and yet they do not impose exclusionary essences that also naturalize and legitimize social inequalities. This essay argues that, from the perspective of these political goals of fighting oppression and marginalization, the category of objective types is in fact a Trojan horse; it looks like a gift, but it ends up creating trouble. I argue that objective type classifications often lack empirical adequacy, and as a result they lack political adequacy. I also provide, and in reference to the normative goals described above, several arguments for preferring a social ontology of natural kinds with historical essences.","PeriodicalId":37042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Ontology","volume":"2 1","pages":"177 - 201"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jso-2015-0039","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66896919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Collective Attitudes and the Anthropocentric View","authors":"Mattia Gallotti","doi":"10.1515/jso-2016-0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2016-0005","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The anthropocentric view holds that the social world is a projection of mental states and attitudes onto the real world. However, there is more to a society of individuals than their psychological make up. In The Ant Trap, Epstein hints at the possibility that collective intentionality can, and should, be discarded as a pillar of social ontology. In this commentary I argue that this claim is motivated by an outdated view of the nature and structure of collective attitudes. If we aim at a good theory of social ontology, we need a good theory of collective intentionality.","PeriodicalId":37042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Ontology","volume":"31 1","pages":"149 - 157"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jso-2016-0005","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66897160","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Tension in the Natural History of Human Thinking","authors":"Henrike Moll","doi":"10.1515/jso-2015-0043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2015-0043","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Michael Tomasello has greatly expanded our knowledge of human cognition and how it differs from that of other animals. In this commentary to his recent book A Natural History of Human Thinking, I first critique some of the presuppositions and arguments of his evolutionary story about how homo sapiens’ cognition emerged. For example, I question the strategy of relying on the modern chimpanzee as a model for our last shared ancestor, and I doubt the idea that what changed first over evolutionary time was hominin behavior, which then in turn brought about changes in cognition. In the second half of the commentary I aim to show that the author oscillates between an additive and a transformative account of human shared intentionality. I argue that shared intentionality shapes cognition in its entirety and therefore precludes the possibility that humans have the same, individual intentionality (as shown in, e.g. their instrumental reasoning) as other apes.","PeriodicalId":37042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Ontology","volume":"2 1","pages":"65 - 73"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jso-2015-0043","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66896498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Precís of A Natural History of Human Thinking","authors":"M. Tomasello","doi":"10.1515/JSO-2015-0041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/JSO-2015-0041","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A précis of Michael Tomasello, A Natural History of Human Thinking (Harvard University Press, 2014).","PeriodicalId":37042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Ontology","volume":"2 1","pages":"59 - 64"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/JSO-2015-0041","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66896927","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A History of Emerging Modes?","authors":"Michael Schmitz","doi":"10.1515/jso-2015-0054","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2015-0054","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper I first introduce Tomasello’s notion of thought and his account of its emergence and development through differentiation, arguing that it calls into question the theory bias of the philosophical tradition on thought as well as its frequent atomism. I then raise some worries that he may be overextending the concept of thought, arguing that we should recognize an area of intentionality intermediate between action and perception on the one hand and thought on the other. After that I argue that the co-operative nature of humans is reflected in the very structure of their intentionality and thought: in co-operative modes such as the mode of joint attention and action and the we-mode, they experience and represent others as co-subjects of joint relations to situations in the world rather than as mere objects. In conclusion, I briefly comment on what Tomasello refers to as one of two big open questions in the theory of collective intentionality, namely that of the irreducibility of jointness.","PeriodicalId":37042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Ontology","volume":"2 1","pages":"103 - 87"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jso-2015-0054","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66896951","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Two-Step Theory of the Evolution of Human Thinking","authors":"Glenda Satne","doi":"10.1515/jso-2015-0053","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2015-0053","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Social accounts of objective content, like the one advanced by Tomasello (2014), are traditionally challenged by an ‘essential tension’ (Hutto and Satne 2015). The tension is the following: while sociality is deemed to be at the basis of thinking, in order to explain sociality, some form of thinking seems to be necessarily presupposed. In this contribution I analyse Tomasello’s two-step theory of the evolution of human thinking vis-à-vis this challenge. While his theory is in principle suited to address it, I claim that the specifics of the first step and the notion of perspective that infuse it are problematic in this regard. I end by briefly sketching an alternative.","PeriodicalId":37042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Ontology","volume":"2 1","pages":"105 - 116"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jso-2015-0053","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66897294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Replies to Guala and Gallotti","authors":"B. Epstein","doi":"10.1515/jso-2016-0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2016-0002","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article responds to comments by Francesco Guala and Mattia Gallotti on The Ant Trap. In the replies, I address the relation of new advances in cognitive science to the study of collective attitudes, clarify distinct questions we might ask about grounding and about anchoring in social ontology, defend various forms of pluralism about grounds and about anchors, and discuss the type-token distinction as it applies to social entities.","PeriodicalId":37042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Ontology","volume":"2 1","pages":"159 - 172"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jso-2016-0002","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66897080","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Epstein on Anchors and Grounds","authors":"F. Guala","doi":"10.1515/jso-2016-0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2016-0003","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The distinction between anchors and grounds is one of the most innovative contributions of The Ant Trap. In this commentary I will argue that the distinction suffers from an ambiguity between tokens and types. This leads Epstein to endorse pluralism about anchors and grounds, a position that is not justified in the book and to which there are plausible alternatives.","PeriodicalId":37042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Ontology","volume":"25 1","pages":"135 - 147"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jso-2016-0003","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66897147","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Joint Intentionality","authors":"Ladislav Koreň","doi":"10.1515/jso-2015-0047","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2015-0047","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract According to the shared intentionality hypothesis proposed by Michael Tomasello, two cognitive upgrades – joint and collective intentionality, respectively – make human thinking unique. Joint intentionality, in particular, is a mindset supposed to account for our early, species-specific capacity to participate in collaborative activities involving two (or a few) agents. In order to elucidate such activities and their proximate cognitive-motivational mechanism, Tomasello draws on philosophical accounts of shared intentionality. I argue that his deference to such cognitively demanding accounts of shared intentional activities is problematic if his theoretical ambition is in part to show that and how early (prelinguistic and precultural) capacities for joint action contribute to the development of higher cognitive capacities.","PeriodicalId":37042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Ontology","volume":"2 1","pages":"75 - 85"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jso-2015-0047","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66896560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Précis of The Ant Trap","authors":"B. Epstein","doi":"10.1515/jso-2016-0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2016-0001","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article summarizes The Ant Trap: Rebuilding the Foundations of the Social Sciences. The book develops a new model for social ontology, applies it to groups and collective intentionality, and criticizes various forms of individualism. Part One of the book presents two traditional approaches to social ontology and unifies them into the “grounding–anchoring model” for the building of the social world. Part Two shows that individualism is mistaken even for basic facts about groups of people, challenges prevailing views of group intention and action, and illustrates how to approach facts about groups in general.","PeriodicalId":37042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Ontology","volume":"2 1","pages":"125 - 134"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jso-2016-0001","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66897021","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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