Journal of Social Ontology最新文献

{"title":"Collective Emotions and Joint Action","authors":"M. Salmela, Michiru Nagatsu","doi":"10.1515/jso-2015-0020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2015-0020","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In contemporary philosophy of collective intentionality, emotions, feelings, moods, and sentiments do not figure prominently in debates on the explanation and justification of joint action. Received philosophical theories analyze joint action in terms of common knowledge of cognitively complex, interconnected structures of intentions and action plans of the participants. These theories admit that collective emotions sometimes give rise to joint action or more typically, unplanned and uncoordinated collective behavior that falls short of full-fledged jointly intentional action. In contrast, minimalist theorists pay some attention to affective elements in joint action without much concern about their collective intentionality. They refer to an association between low-level synchrony in perceptual, motor, and behavioral processes, and increased interpersonal liking, feelings of solidarity, and cooperativeness. In this paper, we outline an account of collective emotions that can bridge this theoretical divide, linking the intentional structure of joint actions and the underlying cognitive and affective mechanisms. Collective emotions can function as both motivating and justifying reasons for jointly intentional actions, in some cases even without prior joint intentions of the participants. Moreover, they facilitate coordination in joint action.","PeriodicalId":37042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Ontology","volume":"19 1","pages":"33 - 57"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jso-2015-0020","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66896885","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Critical Theory and Processual Social Ontology","authors":"E. Renault","doi":"10.1515/jso-2015-0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2015-0013","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The purpose of this article is to bridge the gap between critical theory as understood in the Frankfurt school tradition on the one hand, and social ontology understood as a reflection on the ontological presuppositions of social sciences and social theories on the other. What is at stake is the type of social ontology that critical theory needs if it wants to tackle its main social ontological issue: that of social transformation. This paper’s claim is that what is required is neither a substantial social ontology, nor a relational social ontology, but a processual one. The first part of this article elaborates the distinction between substantial, relational and processual social ontologies. The second part analyzes the various ways in which this distinction can be used in social ontological discussions. Finally, the third part focuses on the various possible social ontological approaches to the issue of social transformation.","PeriodicalId":37042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Ontology","volume":"2 1","pages":"17 - 32"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jso-2015-0013","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66896765","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Legal Facts and Dependence on Representations","authors":"J. Almäng","doi":"10.1515/jso-2014-0027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2014-0027","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Barry Smith has recently argued against John Searle’s thesis that institutional facts exist because they are represented as existing in a certain community. Smith argues that institutional facts can exist even though they are not represented as existing and that institutional facts can fail to obtain even though they are represented as obtaining. In this paper it is argued that Smith’s challenge can be met for a certain class of legal facts. I argue that in order to solve the problem posed by Smith, we must distinguish between three different kinds of institutional facts and between three different kinds of representation which sustain their existence.","PeriodicalId":37042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Ontology","volume":"8 1","pages":"1 - 15"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jso-2014-0027","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66895728","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Groups as Agents","authors":"K. Ritchie","doi":"10.1515/jso-2015-0031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2015-0031","url":null,"abstract":"Deborah Tollefsen’s Groups as Agents provides a clear and concise summary and analysis of contemporary debates on group agency and develops a novel approach based on the ways we interpret groups. The first four chapters focus on group belief (Chapter 1), group intention (Chapter 2), group agency (Chapter 3), and group cognition (Chapter 4). Each Chapter starts with general questions to frame the discussion (e.g. Are groups agents? What is it about a phenomenon that makes it an intention or a belief?), then sets out the major views in the area and critically examines each. There are two ways Tollefsen frames the discussions that are particularly interesting and will prove illuminating to all readers, from the novice to the expert. First, Tollefsen considers the ways joint intention and agency relate to group intention and agency. The former cases usually involve two individuals in close communication. The latter involve particular sorts of groups. The sorts of groups focused on in the book are structured, have decision-making processes, and can persist through change in membership – groups like corporations, governments, educational institutions, and research teams. There are obvious differences between you and a friend deciding what to make for dinner and a corporation modifying their business plan. Do these differences mean distinct theories of intention and agency are required for interacting pairs and large organized groups? Tollefsen carefully examines views of joint intentional action to see whether they can be applied to the actions of corporate groups. On accounts developed by Bratman, Miller, and Searle, joint action involves the intentions of individuals.1 On these theories, groups themselves are not the subjects of belief or intention. So, the accounts cannot be carried over to groups while allowing for genuine group intentionality or agency. In contrast, the accounts given by Gilbert and Tuomela allow for groups to be the bearers of attitudes. So, such accounts could be applied to groups themselves. Tollefsen argues, however, that even if a theory cannot be directly applied to yield group intentions or action, “the performance","PeriodicalId":37042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Ontology","volume":"2 1","pages":"173 - 175"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jso-2015-0031","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66896910","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Mental Disorder and the Indirect Construction of Social Facts","authors":"R. van Riel","doi":"10.1515/jso-2016-0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2016-0008","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, I argue for two claims, (i) that on a common conception of the second order property of being a mental disorder, some facts about mental disorders are the result of social constructions, and (ii) that the way facts about mental disorders are constructed differs from the received view on social construction. The difference is examined, a novel type of social construction is identified, and it is suggested that there are numerous other types of social facts that are constructed in a similar way.","PeriodicalId":37042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Ontology","volume":"9 1","pages":"27 - 48"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66897254","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Rational and Social Agency: The Philosophy of Michael Bratman","authors":"Olle Blomberg","doi":"10.1515/JSO-2015-0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/JSO-2015-0002","url":null,"abstract":"This anthology consists of ten essays that engage with various aspects of Michael Bratman’s philosophy of action, framed by a brief introduction by the editors and a substantive response to the essays by Bratman. The first four essays by Richard Holton, Alfred Mele, Kieran Setiya, and David Velleman are related to the core of Bratman’s planning theory of intention, whereas the next four essays by Jay Wallace, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord and Michael Smith, Elijah Millgram, and Christine Korsgaard deal with issues concerning self-governance, autonomy and identification. The last two essays, by Margaret Gilbert and Scott Shapiro, focus on Bratman’s account of shared agency. Korsgaard’s essay, which is based on her keynote at the Collective Intentionality VII conference in Basel 2010, touches on the topic of group agency. As far as I am aware, all essays except Velleman’s and Shapiro’s are published here for the first time.1 I will here focus on the essays that relate to Bratman’s work on shared agency. In “The Nature of Agreements: A Solution to Some Puzzles about ClaimRights and Joint Intention,” Gilbert presents a joint commitment account of agreements and uses it to explain the nature of claim-rights associated with everyday agreements as well as intentional joint action. A claim-right is a right to the performance of some action φ that a person X has against another person Y. Gilbert argues that such a claim-right and its associated directed obligation is, at least when associated with an agreement, grounded in X and Y’s joint commitment to some plan P, where the action φ is Y’s contribution to the realisation of P. A joint commitment is formed when “each party expresses to the others his","PeriodicalId":37042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Ontology","volume":"1 1","pages":"377 - 379"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/JSO-2015-0002","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66896854","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Fallibilism and Ontology in Tuukka Kaidesoja’s Critical Realist Social Ontology","authors":"D. Little","doi":"10.1515/jso-2015-0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2015-0009","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article addresses Tuukka Kaidesoja’s critique of the philosophical presuppositions of Roy Bhaskar’s theories of critical realism. The article supports Kaidesoja’s naturalistic approach to the philosophy of the social sciences, including the field of social ontology. The article discusses the specific topics of fallibilism, emergence, and causal powers. I conclude that Kaidesoja’s book is a valuable contribution to current debates over critical realism.","PeriodicalId":37042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Ontology","volume":"1 1","pages":"349 - 358"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jso-2015-0009","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66896657","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Précis of Naturalizing Critical Realist Social Ontology","authors":"Tuukka Kaidesoja","doi":"10.1515/jso-2015-0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2015-0016","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper introduces and contextualizes my book Naturalizing Critical Realist Social Ontology (London: Routledge, 2013).","PeriodicalId":37042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Ontology","volume":"1 1","pages":"321 - 326"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jso-2015-0016","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66896866","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Macrocognition: A Theory of Distributed Minds and Collective Intentionality","authors":"Bill Wringe","doi":"10.1515/jso-2015-0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2015-0010","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Ontology","volume":"1 1","pages":"381 - 383"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jso-2015-0010","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66896687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Ontology of the False State","authors":"I. Testa","doi":"10.1515/jso-2014-0025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2014-0025","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper I will argue that critical theory needs to make its socio-ontological commitments explicit, whilst on the other hand I will posit that contemporary social ontology needs to amend its formalistic approach by embodying a critical theory perspective. In the first part of my paper I will discuss how the question was posed in Horkheimer’s essays of the 1930s, which leave open two options: (1) a constructive inclusion of social ontology within social philosophy, or else (2) a program of social philosophy that excludes social ontology. Option (2) corresponds to Adorno’s position, which I argue is forced to recur to a hidden social ontology. Following option (1), I first develop a meta-critical analysis of Searle, arguing that his social ontology presupposes a notion of ‘recognition’ which it cannot account for. Furthermore, by means of a critical reading of Honneth, I argue that critical theory could incorporate a socio-ontological approach, giving value to the constitutive socio-ontological role of recognition and to the socio-ontological role of objectification. I will finish with a proposal for a socio-ontological characterization of reification which involves that the basic occurrence of recognition is to be grasped at the level of background practices.","PeriodicalId":37042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Ontology","volume":"1 1","pages":"271 - 300"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jso-2014-0025","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66895720","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}