Political Economy: Structure & Scope of Government eJournal最新文献

{"title":"From Commodity Discovery to Production","authors":"T. Khan, T. Nguyen, R. Schodde, F. Ohnsorge","doi":"10.1596/1813-9450-7823","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-7823","url":null,"abstract":"Major resource discoveries have transformed growth prospects for many low-income countries. However, the sharp downturn in commodity prices in recent years is affecting resource investment in these countries, and may delay the development of recent discoveries into production. This study investigates lead times from discovery to production for a unique data set of gold and copper discoveries worldwide during 1950-2014. The study employs standard parametric and nonparametric duration analysis. The results suggest an important role for copper prices; for instance, an upswing at the time of discovery can hasten the development of the mine by two to three years in low-income countries. There appears to be a similarly beneficial impact on lead times of sounder macroeconomic policies and quality of governance.","PeriodicalId":369466,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Structure & Scope of Government eJournal","volume":"129 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114676231","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Post-Cameralist Governance: Towards a Robust Political Economy of Bureaucracy","authors":"A. Salter","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2645828","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2645828","url":null,"abstract":"I develop a robust political economy of bureaucracy by highlighting the conditions necessary for hierarchical administrative bodies to govern protectively and productively, but not predatorily. These conditions are residual claimancy and jurisdictional competition. I make this argument by exploring a post-cameralist interpretation of governance. Cameralism arose as a governance philosophy in the fractured principalities of 17th century Germany following the Thirty Year’s War. Post-cameralism focuses not on particular cameralist governance strategies, but on a paradigm which sees governance as an activity provided within a larger exchange order, rather than imposing itself on that order, as in more conventional treatments of public economics. While a post-cameralist conception of governance comes with its own challenges, such as tensions with normative visions that promote self-governance, it nonetheless presents an intriguing synthesis of monocentric and polycentric insights.","PeriodicalId":369466,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Structure & Scope of Government eJournal","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133184378","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Making Budgets Attractive: Best Practices From Government’s Financial Transparency Portals","authors":"Danny Lämmerhirt","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3338396","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3338396","url":null,"abstract":"Fiscal transparency is defined by the IMF as “the comprehensiveness, clarity, reliability, timeliness, and relevance of public reporting on the past, present, and future state of public finances”. For journalists, parliamentarians and citizens alike, fiscal transparency can mean an unobstructed view into the financial affairs of the state. \u0000 \u0000But, what does that mean concretely? How does one do ‘fiscal transparency’? As it turns out, the starting point for this potentially empowering concept lies with open spending platforms, usually in the form of websites containing fiscal data. They are the key interfaces between data suppliers and users, and the result of policy makers carefully navigating a plethora of challenges ranging from data quality and compatibility to varying accounting systems and legal contexts. \u0000 \u0000This paper, developed as part of the H2020 OpenBudgets.eu project, presents the results of conversations with creators and proponents of open spending portals, both to better understand its pitfalls and to formulate best practices.","PeriodicalId":369466,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Structure & Scope of Government eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131356747","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"What Are the Areas of Competence for Central and Local Governments? Accountability Mechanisms in Multi-Level Governance","authors":"Sounman Hong","doi":"10.1093/JOPART/MUW048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOPART/MUW048","url":null,"abstract":"This study aims to advance understanding of the distinctive areas of competence for central and local governments. In doing so, we focus on the relative impacts of two accountability mechanisms — elections and management approaches — on the bureaucratic attitudes and behaviors exhibited within central and local governments. We posit that elections have dominant impacts in local governments, whereas management systems play a relatively larger role in the central government. Due to this difference, the central government may be better placed than local governments to administer those public service activities that either have outputs unobservable to the citizenry or require a lead time that is longer than the time between elections. This study investigates this argument empirically by taking advantage of a unique quasi-experiment in South Korea in which responsibility for administration of local water supply services changed from local governments to a central government agency. Investigating seven years’ worth of quarterly data, we find that following the change in governance, citizen satisfaction deteriorated but efficiency improved.","PeriodicalId":369466,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Structure & Scope of Government eJournal","volume":"108 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115952169","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Risk, Race, & Recidivism: Predictive Bias and Disparate Impact","authors":"Jennifer L Skeem, Christopher T. Lowenkamp","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2687339","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2687339","url":null,"abstract":"One way to unwind mass incarceration without compromising public safety is to use risk assessment instruments in sentencing and corrections. Although these instruments figure prominently in current reforms, critics argue that benefits in crime control will be offset by an adverse effect on racial minorities. Based on a sample of 34,794 federal offenders, we examine the relationships among race, risk assessment (the Post Conviction Risk Assessment [PCRA]), and future arrest. First, application of well-established principles of psychological science revealed little evidence of test bias for the PCRA — the instrument strongly predicts arrest for both Black and White offenders and a given score has essentially the same meaning — i.e., same probability of recidivism — across groups. Second, Black offenders obtain higher average PCRA scores than White offenders (d= 0.34; 13.5% non-overlap in groups’ scores), so some applications could create disparate impact. Third, most (66%) of the racial difference in PCRA scores is attributable to criminal history — which is already embedded in sentencing guidelines. Finally, criminal history is not a proxy for race, but instead mediates the relationship between race and future arrest . Data are more helpful than rhetoric, if the goal is to improve practice at this opportune moment in history.","PeriodicalId":369466,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Structure & Scope of Government eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130960364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Governance: Blending Bureaucratic Rules with Day to Day Operational Realities; Comment on 'Governance, Government, and the Search for New Provider Models'","authors":"D. Chinitz","doi":"10.15171/ijhpm.2016.69","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15171/ijhpm.2016.69","url":null,"abstract":"Richard Saltman and Antonio Duran take up the challenging issue of governance in their article \"Governance, Government and the Search for New Provider Models,\" and use two case studies of health policy changes in Sweden and Spain to shed light on the subject. In this commentary, I seek to link their conceptualization of governance, especially its interrelated roles at the macro, meso, and micro levels of health systems, with the case studies on which they report. While the case studies focus on the shifts in governance between the macro and meso levels and their impacts on achievement of desired policy outcomes, they also highlight the need to better integrate the dynamics of day to day operations within micro organizations into the overall governance picture.","PeriodicalId":369466,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Structure & Scope of Government eJournal","volume":"132 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114360959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Controlling the Public Purse: The Fiscal Accountability of Canada's Senior Governments, 2016","authors":"C. Busby, W. Robson","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2765537","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2765537","url":null,"abstract":"With governments playing such massive roles in Canada’s economy and Canadians’ lives, we need transparency and accountability in fiscal policy as much as we need it anywhere. Over the past 15 years, Canadian governments have done much to improve their reporting, and stewardship, of public money. Yet major gaps remain, and the astonishing amounts by which revenue and spending have exceeded the amounts approved by legislators at budget time over the period show that failures of accountability have major real-world consequences. This latest edition of the C.D. Howe Institute’s annual report on the fiscal accountability of Canada’s federal, provincial and territorial governments assesses the quality of financial information these governments present, and looks at their success or failure in achieving their budgetary goals over the past 15 years. It measures the quality of financial reporting by a number of criteria. The key question is whether an intelligent and motivated non-expert – a citizen, taxpayer or legislator – could find valid consolidated numbers for revenue and spending in the budget each government presents at the beginning of the year, and in the financial statements released with its public accounts at the end of the year. The top presentation marks go to Alberta and Saskatchewan, with Ontario not far behind. British Columbia and New Brunswick also earn high marks for consistent and clear presentations, but auditor reservations push them out of the top tier. The federal government provides reliable numbers, but its budgets do not display them prominently, and the spending estimates members of parliament review are on an incompatible basis of accounting. As for success or failure in hitting budget targets, the dominant theme of the 15-year period is major overshoots of both spending and revenue. Cumulatively, Canada’s federal, provincial and territorial governments spent some $69 billion more than projected, with the Prairie provinces and the territories showing the biggest over-runs relative to the size of their budgets. Over the same period, revenues overshot budget projections by an even larger amount: $118 billion. More encouragingly, comparing the overshoots over the period shows some improvements: smaller misses generally, and less tendency for in-year revenue “surprises” to be accompanied by in-year spending “surprises.” Legislators and Canadians generally should insist on better financial information from governments, and use that information to hold governments to a higher standard when it comes to hitting their budget targets. Canada’s senior governments can improve their financial reporting and their adherence to targets, and legislators and voters should hold them accountable for doing so.","PeriodicalId":369466,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Structure & Scope of Government eJournal","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123609680","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Innovation and Public Reform","authors":"Ani Matei, Razvan Bujac","doi":"10.1016/S2212-5671(16)30278-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/S2212-5671(16)30278-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":369466,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Structure & Scope of Government eJournal","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128650677","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"NFIB v. Sibelius and the Individual Mandate: Thoughts on the Tax/Regulation Distinction","authors":"Kyle D. Logue","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2741471","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2741471","url":null,"abstract":"Should Congress’s taxing power be broader than its regulatory power? Put differently, should the courts, on federalism grounds, be more willing to strike down federal laws that are adopted under the Commerce Clause than federal laws that are adopted under the taxing power? The Supreme Court thinks so. While the Court has on occasion held that Congress’s has exceeded its regulatory power by unconstitutionally encroaching on the regulatory domain properly reserved to the states, the Court has never found that Congress has exceeded its taxing power. Moreover, the Court recently (and famously) doubled-down on the position that Congress’s taxing power exceeds it regulatory power in the landmark case of National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius [“NFIB”], which upheld the Affordable Care Act’s “individual mandate” on taxing-power grounds. Whether it makes normative sense for the Court to treat Congress’s taxing-power as being broader than its regulatory power is the question this Article explores. The Article concludes that the way the Court has drawn the distinction between taxes and regulations, or between taxes and penalties (which, as I will point out, are a type of regulatory provisions), is both counter-intuitive and could create incentives that inefficiently alter Congress’s choices among various policy instruments. The Article also provides an alternative way of drawing the tax/regulation distinction that does not suffer from this problem. The Article ultimately concludes, however, that the tax/regulation dichotomy should probably be abandoned; and it concludes that the Supreme Court was right to uphold the Affordable Care Act’s individual health-insurance mandate, though for reasons different than ones the Court offered.","PeriodicalId":369466,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Structure & Scope of Government eJournal","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132999754","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Chief Justice, Experience, and Strategic Behavior on the Supreme Court","authors":"Joseph Daniel Ura, Carla Flink","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2746198","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2746198","url":null,"abstract":"We develop and test a theoretical account of the effect of management tenure on the strategic behavior of the Chief Justice of the United States. Substantial evidence from a variety of learning models and the public management literature indicates that tenure (length of service) is positively related to management performance in public organizations. This suggests that the chief justice’s tenure in office should be positively related to efficiency in the use of the chief justice’s formal powers. We assess this hypothesis by replicating and extending Johnson, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck’s (2005) study of Chief Justice Burger’s conference voting behavior. The data support our management tenure hypothesis, showing that Burger used greater discretion in reserving his conference vote over time as he became more adept at discriminating between circumstances when the tactic was strategically valuable and when it was not.","PeriodicalId":369466,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Structure & Scope of Government eJournal","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128801142","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}