{"title":"Chapter 6: “Over the Barriers”","authors":"V. A. Petrovsky","doi":"10.1080/10610405.2021.1933837","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10610405.2021.1933837","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":308330,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Russian & East European Psychology","volume":"85 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127029472","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Chapter 1: The Paradox of Disappearing Activity","authors":"V. Petrovsky","doi":"10.1080/10610405.2021.1933826","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10610405.2021.1933826","url":null,"abstract":"Few people today would be surprised by yet another example of the conflict between an object’s appearance according to “common sense” and how the same object looks according to a scientific theory. Rather, when theoretical and everyday ideas expressing the characteristics of a given object Lperceived as a kind of norm, expressing the “scientific nature” of those theoretical views. Otherwise, it is said that the theory is poor, that its methodological premises are not constructive, or that it does not have effective means of analyzing the phenomena under study. It would seem from this that it would be possible to look at the problem of activity, which has recently been actively discussed in philosophy and psychology, in this way. Yet if we address the relationship between theoretical and everyday ideas regarding the essence of activity, we find a truly grotesque situation: The everyday view of activity contrasts, not with some stable and integrated system for revising its scientific views but with fundamentally different, sometimes actively antagonistic and quite opposing views. This applies to the definition of the essence of activity, to the description of its structure and functions, to the identification of its specific determinants, and so forth. As a result, a very curious paradox arises that deserves special discussion. Let us turn first to a rather familiar everyday understanding of activity, in order to then establish what metamorphoses it undergoes when it becomes the object of methodological and theoretical analysis. In the intuitive understanding of activity that corresponds to ordinary everyday word usage, a number of attributes are traditionally distinguished. The subjectness of activity. People usually say: “the activity of the subject,” “is realized by the subject,” or “is determined by the subject.” Let us illustrate the “subject” in question as follows (see Figure 1.1):","PeriodicalId":308330,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Russian & East European Psychology","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127996890","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Chapter 2: The Postulate of Congruity and the Principle of Self-Motion of Activity","authors":"V. Petrovsky","doi":"10.1080/10610405.2021.1933828","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10610405.2021.1933828","url":null,"abstract":"At the very foundation of empirical psychology there lies a certain methodological premise, which has the character of a postulate. It could be designated “the postulate of congruity.” To the individuum is attributed a primary striving for an “inner goal,” which drives all manifestations of activity without exception. This is essentially talking about the primary adaptive orientation of all mental processes and behavioral acts. The concepts of “adaptability,” “adaptive orientation,” and so forth, are interpreted here in an extremely broad sense. They refer not only to the adaptation of the individuum to the natural environment (preserving bodily integrity, ensuring survival, normal functioning, etc.) but also adaptation to the social environment by fulfilling the requirements, expectations, and norms of society, which secures the subject’s value as an upstanding member of society. By “adaptation,” we also mean the processes of “self-adjustment”: self-regulation, subordination of higher interests to lower ones, and so forth. Finally, it is especially important to emphasize that we are not talking only about processes that lead to subordination of the environment to the subject’s original interest, but also to the actualization of the subject’s fixed object-related orientations: satisfaction of the need that initiated the behavior, achievement of an established goal, solution of the original problem, and so forth. Whether the individuum adapts himself to the world or subordinates the world to his original interests, in either case he defends himself before the world in ways already known to him, and ways that are gradually being discovered, forming the basis for the manifold phenomena of human activity. Thus, adaptation is understood as the subject’s tendency to","PeriodicalId":308330,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Russian & East European Psychology","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115231834","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Chapter 4: The Process of Analysis Through Synthesis and Its Role in Problem-Solving","authors":"S. Rubinstein","doi":"10.1080/10610405.2021.1899668","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10610405.2021.1899668","url":null,"abstract":"The thinking process originates in a problematic situation. The characteristics of a problematic situation and the characteristics of the thinking process itself are inevitably interconnected and interdependent. A problematic situation, as we have seen, is a situation that contains (explicitly or implicitly) components or elements that are not defined in it and that presupposes something undiscovered in it. A problematic situation stirs up questions because its elements seem inadequate to the relationship in which they appear in the given situation (in the given context). The impetus to analyze the objects or phenomena that one’s thinking encounters arises when one discovers that, in the capacity in which they directly appear, they are not part of the connections with which one’s thinking deals. The thought process begins with the fact that the problematic situation itself is analyzed. As a result, the analysis separates the given, the known, and the unknown. This initiates the formulation of a problem, which we therefore distinguish from the problematic situation itself. The problem emerges in a certain formulation as a result of the analysis of the problematic situation. The problem’s formulation depends on how the analysis of the problematic situation was performed. The analysis of the data leads to the isolation of the conditions of the problem in the strict sense of the word and of its requirements. We take the conditions of the problem in the strict sense of the word to mean the data that underlie a solution and are incorporated as necessary premises into the line of reasoning that leads to a solution. Usually the problem contains a host of attendant circumstances that are not conditions of the problem in the aforementioned specific strict sense of the word. An example is a certain position of a figure in a drawing that is presented when a problem is formulated. An analysis that isolates the conditions of the problem in the aforementioned precise sense from the set of attendant","PeriodicalId":308330,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Russian & East European Psychology","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126451390","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Chapter 2: On the Nature of Thinking and Its Composition","authors":"S. Rubinstein","doi":"10.1080/10610405.2021.1899664","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10610405.2021.1899664","url":null,"abstract":"A psychological study of thinking, of course, depends on the overall psychological theory that is applied. The basic postulate of the psychological theory from which we proceed may be formulated as follows: the primary mode of the existence of the psyche is its existence as a process or activity. Based on this premise, the main subject matter of the psychological study of thinking is thinking as a process, as an activity. This principle is aimed against the conscious or unconscious behaviorist, pragmatic, positivist tendencies that have proliferated lately in psychology and that are manifested in the reduction of a psychological study to a “pure description” of the external course of events without uncovering the internal course of the process that underlies these external facts and leads to them. We strive everywhere to proceed from objectively controlled “external” facts, but we regard the task of a psychological study as also shedding light on the internal conditions and patterns of the hidden process that does not appear in a straightforward way and that leads to them. When we refer to the necessity of shedding light behind the external results on the process that leads to them, we mean the necessity of shedding light on the internal conditions of what takes place in the external course of events and properly correlating external and internal conditions; in other words, we are not talking about some process in general but about a certain understanding of it that is in keeping with the principle of determinism. Therefore, the two fundamental postulates that define our approach to the problem of thinking—the dialectical-materialist principle of determinism and the proposition regarding the process of thinking as the basic subject matter of the psychological study—essentially form a single unit. Every thought process has its own resultant expression in a certain formation (e.g., perception as a process in the perception of an object as an image; or thinking as process in a certain concept). Since any such formation is the result or “product” of the relevant process, it is then","PeriodicalId":308330,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Russian & East European Psychology","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126585033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Chapter 6: The Reasoning Process","authors":"S. Rubinstein","doi":"10.1080/10610405.2021.1899677","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10610405.2021.1899677","url":null,"abstract":"The main element of thinking that we have singled out—analysis through synthesis that detects more and more new properties in the analyzed objects when they are incorporated into new connections—is also highly important for an understanding of the reasoning for a proof and the derivation in the course of reasoning of more and more new propositions. It contains the key to the answer to a question that has constantly come up in the history of scientific and philosophical thought: How is it possible in reasoning, for example regarding geometry, based on a finite number of premises, to arrive at an infinite number of more and more new deductions? The answer to this question lies, above all, in the fact that in the course of any reasoning process, including a deductive one—which, however, is never performed in real life separately from induction—more and more new premises are introduced that are not given in the original conditions. These new premises are formed by means of an analysis that is done through synthesis, an analysis that, by incorporating objects into more and more new connections, “scoops out” more and more new content from them, “turns them around,” as it were, to their other side, and makes them function in a new capacity, with a new conceptual character. For example, in the conditions of a problem, it is only given that a certain segment is a bisector. By correlating the segment with other segments, angles, and figures it is determined that that segment is a median, then that it is also a transversal, and so forth. Each of these premises that emerge in the process of analyzing the problem represents a new, minor premise that is introduced into the reasoning by the course of analysis. The thinking process itself creates prerequisites and conditions for its further progress. The reason that the necessary reasoning for a proof and the derivation of certain propositions from others can lead to more and more new knowledge and deductions is that this process yields more and more new data and new, “minor” premises.","PeriodicalId":308330,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Russian & East European Psychology","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130217929","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Conclusion","authors":"S. Rubinstein","doi":"10.1080/10610405.2021.1899678","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10610405.2021.1899678","url":null,"abstract":"In this work we have summarized in a generalized form the key results of a number of our studies (some of them—e.g., studies on the development of grammatical generalizations and numerical concepts in children—have set aside for now; we will return to them elsewhere). The concrete focus in our experimental research was on the key fundamental principles of the general psychological theory of thinking. Above all, the flow of a thought process, just like personality development, cannot be either explained on the basis of internal conditions alone or directly derived from external stimuli. The possibility of this analogy and its validity are based on the fact that there is a general pattern that defines any specific patterns—the principle of determinism. This principle correlates external conditions (causes) and internal conditions (foundations): external causes act through internal conditions. External and internal conditions thus merge together. These postulates are necessary for every theory intended to explain any phenomena. They remain valid for the psychological theory of thinking as well. In the future, we believe, psychological research faces the challenge of carrying out a similar restructuring of other parts of psychological theory as well—a restructuring aimed at shedding light on the internal patterns of all mental processes. Each of them is determined by external stimuli that are interpreted through the internal conditions of the personality’s mental activity. The interconnection among all the components of the theory of thinking outlined in this book is clearly manifested in the fact that each of them implements, in particular, the postulate on thinking as interaction between a cognitive subject and an object. It is not hard to become convinced that this postulate, which we initially formulated in a general form, is intertwined with all of the main aspects of our concrete analysis of thinking. Above all, the understanding of thinking as a process—which runs through this entire work—derives from the concept of thinking as interaction; thinking is a process precisely because every step of thinking,","PeriodicalId":308330,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Russian & East European Psychology","volume":"2013 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125894335","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On the Thinking Process in a Scientist’s Research Work","authors":"S. Rubinstein","doi":"10.1080/10610405.2021.1899679","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10610405.2021.1899679","url":null,"abstract":"In this work, we only used material from experimental research. We focused this study on elementary thinking processes in problem-solving in order to identify the general patterns of elementary thought processes. It would be very important, of course, to compare the results we obtained with the data on the thinking process of a scientist who is trying to solve some serious scientific problem. But it is hard to make a scientist’s thinking while he is occupied with his investigation the subject of experimentation. Here we have to take a different path—the path of analyzing the documentation in which the course of his musings would have been objectively recorded. Thanks to precisely dated documentary data presented in B.M. Kedrov’s study “On the Question of the Psychology of Research Work (Regarding D.M. Mendeleev’s Discovery of the Periodic Law)” [“K voprosu o psikhologii nauchnogo tvorchestva (po povodu otkrytiia D.M. Mendeleevym periodicheskogo zakona)”], it is possible to analyze Mendeleev’s line of thinking that led him to the discovery of the periodic law. In view of the interest aroused by an analysis of the scientist’s line of thinking and a comparison of the results of the analysis with our data, it makes sense to include this exploration in this work. Considering the variety of the material that this study uses in regard to the experimental material of our principal study, we decided to put it into a separate appendix. An analysis of the dated documentation uncovered by Kedrov makes it possible to reconstruct as follows Mendeleev’s line of thinking that led him to the discovery of the periodic law. During a lengthy period (about fifteen years) that preceded the discovery of the periodic system (and in particular, on February 17, 1869—the date when the first table of elements found by Kedrov was constructed), Mendeleev","PeriodicalId":308330,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Russian & East European Psychology","volume":"123 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127058018","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Chapter 1: The Principle of Determinism and a Psychological Theory of Thinking","authors":"S. Rubinstein","doi":"10.1080/10610405.2021.1899662","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10610405.2021.1899662","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this work is to set out a general outline for a psychological theory of thinking. We will preface the theory of thinking with a few general considerations about the construction of a psychological theory. A theory of any phenomena, including mental ones, is intended to uncover the laws that control those phenomena. Every theory is therefore based on a certain understanding of the determination of the phenomena in question. The concept of determinism is often associated with the doctrine of mechanism that dominated science in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It derived from the concept of cause as an external impetus that directly determined an effect that it produced in another body or phenomenon. This mechanistic theory of determinism only apparently, with some approximation, could be applied in classical mechanics to the mechanical motion of a point, but it turned out that in that form it was not always applicable to quantum mechanics. The mechanistic theory is clearly unable to provide an adequate explanation of the phenomena of organic life, where a single stimulus yields different effects in relation to organisms with different properties and in relation to the same organism in different conditions. The effect of an external stimulus depends on the internal state of the organism on which the stimulus is acting. This postulate, which pertains to all organic phenomena, is even more valid in regard to mental phenomena. We will follow the path of a dialectical-materialist interpretation of determinism. Its basic formula may be summed up as follows: external causes act through the instrumentality of internal conditions. Thus the antithesis between external causation and internal, spontaneous development is removed. It is their internal interconnection that forms the basis for","PeriodicalId":308330,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Russian & East European Psychology","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134391958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Chapter 5: The Generalization of Relations and the Dependence of Generalization on Analysis and Abstraction","authors":"S. Rubinstein","doi":"10.1080/10610405.2021.1899675","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10610405.2021.1899675","url":null,"abstract":"Thinking is, by necessity, associated with generalization; thinking is done in generalizations and leads to generalizations of a higher and higher order. The very transition from problem-solving by means of practical trials based on action to problem-solving on a theoretical, intellectual basis has, as its indispensable prerequisite, the formation of generalization. In the example analyzed earlier, a necessary condition for solving the problem based on a perception that emerged from practical action was a generalized description of “implements” in terms of characteristics essential for solving the problem. Generalization is a result of analysis that identifies essential elements and of synthesis. Every problem is solved by analyzing its conditions based on correlating them with its requirements. Hence a solution to any problem requires a certain degree of generalization of the objects that it deals with and of their properties and relations in terms of characteristics essential to the problem. We dealt with the process of generalization when we studied transfer. Generalization has already appeared in both of its basic forms—an elementary one and a higher one. Elementary generalization is executed as a process of identifying what is in common in the sense of similar; generalization on a higher level is executed as a process of determining essential, necessary connections. How generalized a solution is depends, as we have also seen already, on how “cleanly” the analysis of a problem’s conditions relative to its requirements isolated the essential conditions on which a solution depends from the attendant circumstances in which the problem was initially presented (a certain position of a figure in space and so on). Until a test subject (a pupil and so forth) has analyzed the circumstances in which a problem was presented to him and isolated from them its conditions in the strict sense by correlating them with the requirements of the problem, the solution to the problem cannot","PeriodicalId":308330,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Russian & East European Psychology","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130704730","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}