Chapter 1: The Paradox of Disappearing Activity

Abstract

Few people today would be surprised by yet another example of the conflict between an object’s appearance according to “common sense” and how the same object looks according to a scientific theory. Rather, when theoretical and everyday ideas expressing the characteristics of a given object Lperceived as a kind of norm, expressing the “scientific nature” of those theoretical views. Otherwise, it is said that the theory is poor, that its methodological premises are not constructive, or that it does not have effective means of analyzing the phenomena under study. It would seem from this that it would be possible to look at the problem of activity, which has recently been actively discussed in philosophy and psychology, in this way. Yet if we address the relationship between theoretical and everyday ideas regarding the essence of activity, we find a truly grotesque situation: The everyday view of activity contrasts, not with some stable and integrated system for revising its scientific views but with fundamentally different, sometimes actively antagonistic and quite opposing views. This applies to the definition of the essence of activity, to the description of its structure and functions, to the identification of its specific determinants, and so forth. As a result, a very curious paradox arises that deserves special discussion. Let us turn first to a rather familiar everyday understanding of activity, in order to then establish what metamorphoses it undergoes when it becomes the object of methodological and theoretical analysis. In the intuitive understanding of activity that corresponds to ordinary everyday word usage, a number of attributes are traditionally distinguished. The subjectness of activity. People usually say: “the activity of the subject,” “is realized by the subject,” or “is determined by the subject.” Let us illustrate the “subject” in question as follows (see Figure 1.1):