{"title":"Vertical Arrangements and Upstream Mergers","authors":"E. Petrakis, Panagiotis Skartados","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3223250","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3223250","url":null,"abstract":"We study the incentives for horizontal upstream mergers in a quantity-setting vertically related industry, under bargain and endogenous contract types. We show that the contract types used could have important consequences for the equilibrium market structure and vice versa. If it is the retailers who choose contract types, they share the same preferences as the policymakers and choose to offer two-part tariff contracts, leading the suppliers not to merge. This result has some obvious policy implications. If it is the suppliers who decide contract types, they prefer to merge and offer a partial forward vertical ownership scheme. Under Bertrand competition, there is always an upstream merger, but the common manufacturer will offer a two-part tariff contract for intermediate bargain power levels. For high bargain power levels, he will choose a partial forward vertical ownership scheme, while for low bargain power will suffer from negative profits. A policymaker, considering the maximization of the social welfare should consider the upstream merger and two-part tariff contracts.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126958796","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Tad Lipsky, Joshua D. Wright, D. Ginsburg, John M. Yun
{"title":"United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division Public Roundtable Series on the Relationship between Competition and Regulation, Second Roundtable – On Consent Decrees: Comment of the Global Antitrust Institute, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University","authors":"Tad Lipsky, Joshua D. Wright, D. Ginsburg, John M. Yun","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3169451","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3169451","url":null,"abstract":"The Comment outlines the basic economic analysis that applies to agency consideration of whether to resolve cases by consent decree or by litigation. It describes past experience with government antitrust decrees that required modification or termination due to the passage of time or significant changes in the affected markets, as well as certain decrees whose effectiveness in serving antitrust objectives was questionable even at the time of initial entry. The Comment points out certain dangers to the consumer interest in vigorous competition that are associated with excessive agency reliance on consent decrees, and recommends institutional vigilance as a safeguard against such dangers. Finally, the Comment notes the continuing potential value of so-called conduct remedies, as distinct from structural remedies, particularly in the context of vertical acquisitions, while recognizing that structural remedies are properly accepted as the preferable mode of relief, especially in cases involving horizontal acquisitions.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127439682","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Valuing Life as an Asset, as a Statistic and at Gunpoint","authors":"J. Hugonnier, Florian Pelgrin, Pascal St-Amour","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3156911","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3156911","url":null,"abstract":"The Human Capital (HK) and Statistical Life Values (VSL) differ sharply in their empirical pricing of a human life and lack a common theoretical background to justify these differences. We first contribute to the theory and measurement of life value by providing a unified framework to formally define and relate the Hicksian willingness to pay (WTP) to avoid changes in death risks, the HK and the VSL. Second, we use this setting to introduce an alternative life value calculated at Gunpoint (GPV), i.e. the WTP to avoid certain, instantaneous death. Third, we associate a flexible human capital model to the common framework to characterize the WTP and the three life valuations in closed-form. Fourth, our structural estimates of these solutions yield mean life values of 8.35 M$ (VSL), 421 K$ (HK) and 447 K$ (GPV). We con firm that the strong curvature of the WTP and the linear projection hypothesis of the VSL explain why the latter is much larger than other values.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121026334","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Defenses","authors":"O. Bar‐Gill, Gabriella Blum","doi":"10.1007/springerreference_70318","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/springerreference_70318","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134524919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"An Econometric Analysis of North Carolina's Legislative Right to Counsel","authors":"A. Nelson, Cj Ryan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3105704","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3105704","url":null,"abstract":"Misconduct on campus often leads students to encounter a quasi-judicial university disciplinary process. This study analyzes the effect of N.C. GEN. STAT. §116-40.11(a) (2015), which allows students to be represented by counsel in these proceedings, on the number of disciplinary referrals for alleged campus conduct violations committed by students in University of North Carolina System schools. We use two approaches to estimate effects. First, we use state-level synthetic comparison methods. Second, we use institution-level difference-in-differences estimation.<br><br>The results from this study provide evidence that statutory regulation of student conduct administration in North Carolina may have unexpectedly altered the number of alcohol and illicit substance related referrals to campus disciplinary processes. While referral rates dropped, there is evidence suggesting student behaviors tend to remain constant. We propose these results evidence that administrators may have adjusted their practices just before and upon the adoption of N.C. Gen. Stat. 116-30.11(a) (2015). We offer, as a theoretical explanation, that these adjustments, whether intentional or otherwise, can be explained by the need to be cost-conscious and risk-averse. These results proffer important considerations when planning policies that modify if or how attorneys may participate in student conduct and disciplinary processes.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114370417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fiscal Forearms: Taxation as the Lifeblood of the Modern Liberal State","authors":"Ajay K. Mehrotra","doi":"10.1017/9781316471586.012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316471586.012","url":null,"abstract":"For nearly all advanced industrialized nation-states, taxation is the central source of public revenue. Indeed, taxation is the one policy area without which nearly all of the other functions and aspects of the modern state would not be possible. Thus, to continue the Bourdieuian metaphor of a body politic that frames this edited volume, taxation is the lifeblood of the effective, modern, liberal state. Like blood itself, taxation does much more than provide material sustenance for the body politic. Because taxation is one of the most widely and persistently experienced relationships that individuals have with their government, it helps us define the meaning of fiscal citizenship. Taxation institutionalizes the concept of a social contract between the state and its citizens, between the sovereign and its subjects. This paper, which is part of a collection of essays, explores the central role of taxation to the development of an effective, modern state. After reviewing some of the classic social and economic literature on how taxation is the key link between war and state formation, this paper investigates how scholars have recently begun to go beyond the conventional view of taxation as simply a source of material resources, to examine the historical relationship between taxation and citizenship. There is perhaps no better example of how taxation has shaped social and cultural conceptions of fiscal citizenship than the U.S.’s adoption of direct and progressive taxation in the early twentieth century. Using the United States during this period as a case study, this paper shows how American reformers deliberately deployed a particular vision and idiom about taxation to help lawmakers and ordinary Americans reimagine the financial basis of government programs.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124742255","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Regulation Costs and Private-Sector Know-How Spillovers of Public-Private Partnerships","authors":"Marian W. Moszoro","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3169571","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3169571","url":null,"abstract":"The paper presents comparative statics of organizational modes of natural monopoly in public utilities with a focus on co-ownership and co-governance. Private monopoly lowers output and increases price to maximize profit; public monopoly incurs higher costs due to the lack of know-how; and a regulated monopoly results in regulation costs to overcome informational asymmetries. A public-private partnership arises as an efficient organization mode when it enables the internalization of private know-how and saves regulation costs due to correspondingly sufficient private and public residual and control rights. Public-private monopoly supports higher prices than marginal costs due to rent sharing, with its upper price frontier decreasing in private residual rights.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"219 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115734236","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Crowdsourcing Accurately and Robustly Predicts Supreme Court Decisions","authors":"D. Katz, M. Bommarito, J. Blackman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3085710","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3085710","url":null,"abstract":"Scholars have increasingly investigated “crowdsourcing” as an alternative to expert-based judgment or purely data-driven approaches to predicting the future. Under certain conditions, scholars have found that crowd-sourcing can outperform these other approaches. However, despite interest in the topic and a series of successful use cases, relatively few studies have applied empirical model thinking to evaluate the accuracy and robustness of crowdsourcing in real-world contexts. In this paper, we offer three novel contributions. First, we explore a dataset of over 600,000 predictions from over 7,000 participants in a multi-year tournament to predict the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. Second, we develop a comprehensive crowd construction framework that allows for the formal description and application of crowdsourcing to real-world data. Third, we apply this framework to our data to construct more than 275,000 crowd models. We find that in out-of-sample historical simulations, crowdsourcing robustly outperforms the commonly-accepted null model, yielding the highest-known performance for this context at 80.8% case level accuracy. To our knowledge, this dataset and analysis represent one of the largest explorations of recurring human prediction to date, and our results provide additional empirical support for the use of crowdsourcing as a prediction method.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128259023","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How to Improve Pennsylvania's Tax System","authors":"P. Yakovlev","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3169518","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3169518","url":null,"abstract":"Pennsylvania ranks near the top in tax burden and near the bottom in business friendliness in the nation. While much good can be said about the state’s at personal income tax rate and relatively low sales tax rate, Pennsylvania’s business taxes are in serious need of reform. The state government took a step in the right direction by phasing out its archaic capital stock and foreign franchise tax, but Pennsylvania’s economy is still being held back by its high corporate income and unemployment insurance taxes. Pennsylvania’s 9.99 percent corporate income tax rate, the second highest in the nation, puts the state at a significant competitive disadvantage while generating less than 7 percent of total tax revenue. A combination of business tax cuts and tax base broadening could make Pennsylvania’s economy grow faster without jeopardizing its public finances.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"884 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114278417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Existence of Equilibria in Procurement Auctions","authors":"Gyula Seres","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3076880","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3076880","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates symmetric equilibria in first- and second-price auctions with multidimensional types. The constructed model mirrors the information structure of actual procurement auctions. We demonstrate by a counterexample that symmetric and continuous type distribution is not a sufficient condition for the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium, but it is guaranteed if distributions of all components are log-concave. We state a new Revenue Equivalence Theorem applied to first- and second-price auctions and conclude that the two standard auction formats yields the same expected price to the auctioneer.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126849837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}