LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)最新文献_第5页

The Influence of Cross-Border Cooperation on Equity Market Liquidity 跨境合作对股票市场流动性的影响

LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-11-19 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3073831

R. Silvers

{"title":"The Influence of Cross-Border Cooperation on Equity Market Liquidity","authors":"R. Silvers","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3073831","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3073831","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines how cooperation between national securities regulators affects equity market liquidity, using the International Organization of Securities Commissions’ (IOSCO’s) Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MMoU) as a shock to cooperation. The MMoU was set up to protect investors by fostering cooperation between regulators, and fill gaps in cross-border regulatory capacities that historically exposed investors to information asymmetry, agency costs, and expropriation risks. Consistent with a deterrent effect, I find that when a regulator enters the MMoU network, the markets it supervises experience enhanced liquidity, as indicated by narrower quoted bid-ask spreads. Incremental to this effect, I find larger liquidity improvements in when linkages are formed between the precise regulators that co-supervise a firm affiliated with both markets. Cross-sectional tests show that legal, cultural, economic, and firm-level attributes condition the effect; these results shed light on how cooperation works and what makes it effective. Coordination is one way that regulators who are grappling with the interjurisdictional complexities of increasingly interconnected markets can protect investors and enhance liquidity.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"98 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126085389","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4

Economic Analysis of Network Effects and Intellectual Property 网络效应与知识产权的经济分析

LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-11-16 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3072633

Peter S. Menell

{"title":"Economic Analysis of Network Effects and Intellectual Property","authors":"Peter S. Menell","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3072633","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3072633","url":null,"abstract":"The information revolution has brought demand-side effects to the fore of economic activity, business strategy, and intellectual property jurisprudence and policy. Intellectual property doctrines play a central role in harnessing network effects, promoting innovation to overcome excess inertia, and balancing consumer welfare, competition, and innovation. This chapter surveys and integrates the economic, business strategy, and legal literatures relating to network effects and intellectual property. Part I introduces the topic of network effects and provides an overview of this Chapter. Part II describes the functioning of network markets. Part III examines the interplay of business strategy, contract, standard setting organizations, intellectual property, and competition policy. Part IV presents three principles for tailoring intellectual property regimes and competition policy for network technologies. Part V traces the evolution of intellectual property protection for network features of systems and platforms. Part VI discusses the interplay of intellectual property protection and competition policy. Part VII assesses the extent to which intellectual property protection and competition policy align with the normative design principles. Part VIII identifies promising areas for future research.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126922276","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 6

Does Efficiency Trump Legality? The Case of the German Constitutional Court 效率胜过合法性?德国宪法法院案例

LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-10-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3048182

C. Engel

{"title":"Does Efficiency Trump Legality? The Case of the German Constitutional Court","authors":"C. Engel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3048182","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3048182","url":null,"abstract":"The US Supreme Court has the power of certiorari. It may pick its fights. As a beneficial side effect, the court may allocate its resources, in particular the time and energy the justices spend on a case, to worthy causes. In economic parlance, this discretion makes the court more efficient. Efficiency comes at a political cost, though. This discretion also gives the court political power. It may direct its verdict to causes that are politically most relevant, or it may put an issue on the political agenda. Officially German constitutional law does not have certiorari. The Constitutional Court must decide each and every case that is brought. Yet over time the court has crafted a whole arsenal of more subtle measures for managing the case load. This paper shows that it uses these tools to engage in its version of allocating resources to cases. It investigates whether the ensuing efficiency gain comes at the cost of biasing the court’s jurisprudence. The paper exploits a new comprehensive data set. It consists of all (mostly only electronically) published cases the court has heard in 2011. While the data is rich, in many technical ways it is demanding. The paper uses a factor analysis to create a latent variable: to which degree has the court taken an individual case seriously? It then investigates whether observed indicators for bias explain this latent variable. Since the paper essentially investigates a single (independent) case, in statistical terms the findings are to be interpreted with caution. The paper can only aim at finding smoking guns.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116241258","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4

Regulating Motivation: A New Perspective on the Volcker Rule 监管动机:沃尔克规则的新视角

LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-08-03 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.3016034

{"title":"Regulating Motivation: A New Perspective on the Volcker Rule","authors":"","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3016034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3016034","url":null,"abstract":"The myriad problems with the Dodd-Frank Act’s ban on proprietary trading by banks have led to a rare bipartisan consensus: the Volcker Rule must be pared back or even repealed. At the root of the Rule’s problems is the fundamental definitional challenge posed by the current approach. The definition of banned proprietary trading turns on the motivation underlying a trade, which is difficult for regulators to determine. Regulators must adopt either a hardline approach that risks deterring banks from engaging in core financial intermediation functions or a more permissive approach that risks the continuance of speculative gambles that threaten the financial system. \u0000We propose a new paradigm for achieving the Volcker Rule’s objectives that resolves this dilemma. Rather than define and ban proprietary trading, regulators should simply ban banks from paying traders on the basis of trading profits. Our proposal takes advantage of the competition between proprietary trading firms in two markets: they compete in the securities market to identify and exploit trading opportunities and they compete in the labor market to hire and motivate the best traders. Because speculative trading is a zero-sum game, handicapping banks relative to unregulated entities, such as hedge funds, in the labor market for traders would generate powerful incentives for banks to get out of the trading game. Our simple compensation-based approach would likely be more effective at ending speculative trading at banks---and do so at lower cost---than the complex and loophole-ridden current approach.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"2021 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123151539","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

The Fiction of Locally Owned Mom and Pop Car Dealers: Some Data on Franchised Automobile Distribution in the State of Michigan 本地拥有的夫妻店汽车经销商的虚构:密歇根州特许汽车分销的一些数据

LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-07-10 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.3000497

D. Crane

{"title":"The Fiction of Locally Owned Mom and Pop Car Dealers: Some Data on Franchised Automobile Distribution in the State of Michigan","authors":"D. Crane","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3000497","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3000497","url":null,"abstract":"The State of Michigan is currently defending a constitutional challenge to its automobile direct distribution prohibition. The lawsuit was brought by the automotive manufacturer Tesla, which has been denied a license to open show rooms or service centers in the state. A 2014 amendment to Michigan’s vehicle franchise statute tightened the statute’s direct distribution prohibition to make clear that even a manufacturer like Tesla that did not franchise dealers at all is prohibited from opening its own showrooms or service centers and dealing directly with consumers in the state. That law has been widely criticized by economists, consumer protection organizations like the Federal Trade Commission and Consumer Federation of America, environmental groups like the Sierra Club, and free market organizations like the Institute for Justice. \u0000In the Michigan litigation, the State is expected to rely on the assertion, frequently made by the dealers’ lobbyists, that maintaining a locally owned dealership system is beneficial to the State. Such assertions are grounded in the trope of the atomistic “mom and pop” dealer of American economic folklore — the family-owned, locally rooted dealership. This justification is increasingly a fiction. While some such dealerships may still exist, Michigan law does not require dealerships to be locally owned and operated or independent from other economic enterprises. Many are not.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"117 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132543294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Ideas and Origins of the Planning Commission in India 印度计划委员会的思想和起源

LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-07-01 DOI: 10.1017/9781108859448.004

S. Rajagopalan

引用次数: 1

Beyond Nudging: Debiasing Consumers Through Mixed Framing 超越轻推:通过混合框架消除消费者偏见

LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-06-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3120691

M. Godi

{"title":"Beyond Nudging: Debiasing Consumers Through Mixed Framing","authors":"M. Godi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3120691","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3120691","url":null,"abstract":"The consumer-protection literature can be divided into two camps: laissez-faire libertarianism and paternalism. Paternalism, as advanced by behavioral law and economics, calls for nudging consumers toward their utility-maximizing preference. Laissez-faire libertarianism, instead, calls for relying on rational-choice theory and the free market to allocate consumer goods. Although each camp presents the other as its diametric opponent, this Note shows that this dichotomy is overstated. Neither camp is incompatible with the other, nor infallible on its own. Through an original behavioral study, this Note reveals flaws in the fundamental assumptions of both camps: that no information can be conveyed neutrally (behavioral law and economics) and that consumer-oriented regulation diminishes autonomy (rational-choice theory). It does so by focusing on an understudied form of consumer-protection regulation: mixed framing. Legal scholars and regulators have largely ignored this phenomenon, yet it offers a more robust and actionable regulatory approach than the existing literature and one that is distinct from both paternalism and libertarianism. By examining the case study of food-safety regulations, this Note sketches the analytic and normative case for why regulators should embrace mixed framing. Using a process of debiasing through mixed framing, agencies can promulgate rules that minimize the risk of deceptive advertising tactics and maximize the provision of neutral and complete information—without running afoul of the First Amendment or falling into paternalistic restrictions on autonomy.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"236 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114017587","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Is the SEC Captured? Evidence from Comment-Letter Reviews 美国证券交易委员会被抓住了吗?来自评论信评论的证据

LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-06-09 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2947752

Jonas Heese, Mozaffar Khan, K. Ramanna

引用次数: 96

The Law and Economics of Shadow Banking 影子银行的法律和经济学

LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-03-26 DOI: 10.4337/9781785362637.00008

A. M. Pacces, Hossein Nabilou

引用次数: 17

Exclusive Contracts and Bargaining Power 独家合同和议价能力

LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-02-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2836769

H. Kitamura, Noriaki Matsushima, Misato Sato

引用次数: 15