独家合同和议价能力

LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-02-01 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.2836769

H. Kitamura, Noriaki Matsushima, Misato Sato

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引用次数: 15

摘要

本文构建了一个最简单的模型来检验阻止下游买方从新的上游供应商处购买投入的反竞争排他性合同。将纳什议价纳入芝加哥学派批评的标准一买家一供应商框架，我们展示了一种可能性，即低效的现有供应商可以通过排他性合同阻止社会高效的进入。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Exclusive Contracts and Bargaining Power

This study constructs a simplest model to examine anticompetitive exclusive contracts that prevent a downstream buyer from buying input from a new upstream supplier. Incorporating Nash bargaining into the standard one-buyer-one-supplier framework in the Chicago School critique, we show a possibility that an inefficient incumbent supplier can deter a socially efficient entry through exclusive contracts.

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LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)

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