发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Changes in the Labor Market Since India's Economic Reforms 印度经济改革以来劳动力市场的变化
LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2014-03-14 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2487704
Woong Lee, Young Chul Song, C. Cho, Yoon-Jung Choi
{"title":"Changes in the Labor Market Since India's Economic Reforms","authors":"Woong Lee, Young Chul Song, C. Cho, Yoon-Jung Choi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2487704","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2487704","url":null,"abstract":"This report examines changes in the Indian labor market since the economic reforms of 1991. Analyzed here is the direction toward which the labor market moved, as the economic reform has proceeded, with particular focus on the labor market change pre-and-post reform. For the distinction by period, four phases are defined as follows: the period of economic reform by external factors after the 1991 reform, the period of economic reform that reflected domestic demand, the period of booming economy and then the period after the global financial crisis. In industrial relation analysis, the time period under discussion is simply divided into two by 1991 economic reform as the divider because there has not been much change in labor market institutions, including industrial relations, compared to other sectors.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127519196","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Truly General Theory of Employment: How Keynes Could Have Succeeded 《真正的一般就业理论:凯恩斯是如何成功的
LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2014-03-10 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2406891
Egmont Kakarot-Handtke
{"title":"The Truly General Theory of Employment: How Keynes Could Have Succeeded","authors":"Egmont Kakarot-Handtke","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2406891","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2406891","url":null,"abstract":"There is not much use to attack standard economics because deep in his heart the representative economist long knows that he is tied to a degenerating research program. The problem is, rather, that it seems to be exceedingly difficult to build up a convincing alternative. Keynes, for one, tried and was successful – albeit not fully. Unfortunately, he got some basics wrong. The conceptual consequence of the present paper is to discard the accustomed subjective-behavioral axioms and to take objective-structural axioms as the formal point of departure for the analysis of employment as the main practical issue of economics.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"34 1-2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133071917","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
A Strict Liability Regime for Rating Agencies 评级机构严格的法律责任制度
LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2014-03-06 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2405509
A. M. Pacces, A. Romano
{"title":"A Strict Liability Regime for Rating Agencies","authors":"A. M. Pacces, A. Romano","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2405509","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2405509","url":null,"abstract":"This paper argues that a mitigated strict liability regime can incentivize Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) to produce ratings as accurate as the available forecasting technology allows. A damage cap based on objective factors is introduced in order to avoid crushing liability. Moreover, CRAs are allowed to choose how much to commit to their predictions. CRAs may opt out of liability even entirely, unless their ratings are relevant for regulation. Finally, corrections in the relevant timeframe for the imposition of liability are introduced in order to protect CRAs from systemic risk.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134397111","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
The Role of Legal Principles in the Economic Analysis of Competition Policy 法律原则在竞争政策经济分析中的作用
LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2014-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2377315
Harold Houba, E. Motchenkova, Quan Wen
{"title":"The Role of Legal Principles in the Economic Analysis of Competition Policy","authors":"Harold Houba, E. Motchenkova, Quan Wen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2377315","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2377315","url":null,"abstract":"We study the impact of legal principles on the design and the effectiveness of antitrust fines. Modern antitrust enforcement obeys four basic legal principles: punishments should fit the crime, proportionality, bankruptcy considerations, and minimum fines. We integrate these principles into a Bertrand oligopoly model, where bankruptcy considerations ensure abnormal cartel profits. We discuss the optimal legally-constrained fine schedule that achieves maximal social welfare under these legal principles. This fine schedule induces collusion on a lower price by making it more attractive than collusion on higher prices. This fine structure depends on the characteristics of competition, legal restrictions, and market conditions and can be related to price-cap regulation implemented in several sectors, such as electricity and telecom. We analyze the welfare implications of limited liability restrictions and minimum fines. We conclude that regulations aiming at either reducing legal ceilings or raising minimum fines reduce social welfare and should better be avoided.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"84 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116841209","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Rethinking Modern European Industrial Policy: Beyond the Current EU Legal Framework 反思现代欧洲产业政策:超越当前欧盟法律框架
LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-09-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2326072
Matjaž Nahtigal
{"title":"Rethinking Modern European Industrial Policy: Beyond the Current EU Legal Framework","authors":"Matjaž Nahtigal","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2326072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2326072","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this article is to show that the current European Union (EU) legal framework is unnecessarily restrictive and unduly suppresses economic and developmental initiatives in many stagnating regions across Europe. More innovative industrial policies, instruments and measures should be adopted in a highly decentralized manner across the EU. Between the ‘laissez-faire’ and ‘dirigiste’ approaches, there is significant room to maneuver for more pro-active industrial and development policies. New forms of industrial policies could and should be reinvented and implemented across the EU – not to harm or distort competition, but rather to further enhance it. More than one form and framework exist for a Single Market and for the competition policies.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132175691","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Economics of the Restatement and of the Common Law 重述和普通法的经济学
LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-07-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2307148
Keith N. Hylton
{"title":"The Economics of the Restatement and of the Common Law","authors":"Keith N. Hylton","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2307148","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2307148","url":null,"abstract":"The common law process appears to have checks and balances that prevent the self-interest of a particular embedded actor (judge or lawyer) from having a substantial distortive effect. The question that follows is whether the Restatement project is also immune, to the same extent as the common law, from the self-interested incentives of actors involved in its creation. I argue that the Restatement process is far more vulnerable to distortion from self-interest than is the common law process.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"69 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134182297","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Use of Natural Experiments in Merger Analysis 自然实验在合并分析中的应用
LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-06-07 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1853705
M. Coate
{"title":"The Use of Natural Experiments in Merger Analysis","authors":"M. Coate","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1853705","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1853705","url":null,"abstract":"Natural experiments may serve as a test of an economic theory that purports to evaluate the competitive effects of a proposed transaction and therefore play an important role in merger analysis. Using aggregate reviews of Federal Trade Commission merger studies, it is possible to identify a number of quantitative and qualitative experiments supportive of unilateral effects, coordinated interaction, or continued competition theories. The court decisions in Staples, Oracle, and Whole Foods play a role in structuring the review in unilateral cases, while Judge Posner’s commentary on performance analysis is relevant in coordinated interaction cases. Other experiments show either no structure-performance relationship in a market or undermine a key characteristic of Guidelines analysis to imply that the merger in question is not likely to be anticompetitive. A final section evaluates the linkage between the experimental evidence, supplemented at times with validated customer complaint and hot document findings, and the merger challenge decision. While the results show the bulk of the merger challenges were substantiated by some type of evidence, a number of monopoly and duopoly matters are challenged on pure structural grounds.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130959767","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 15
The Public Option in Housing Finance 住房金融中的公共选择权
LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-05-13 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.1966550
Adam J. Levitin, Susan M. Wachter
{"title":"The Public Option in Housing Finance","authors":"Adam J. Levitin, Susan M. Wachter","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1966550","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1966550","url":null,"abstract":"The U.S. housing finance system presents a conundrum for the scholar of regulation because it defies description using the traditional regulatory vocabulary of command-and-control, taxation, subsidies, cap-and-trade permits, and litigation. Instead, since the New Deal, the housing finance market has been regulated primarily by government participation in the market through a panoply of institutions. The government’s participation in the market has shaped the nature of the products offered in the market. We term this form of regulation “public option” regulation.This Article presents a case study of this “public option” as a regulatory mode. It explains the public option’s rise as a governmental gap-filling response to market failures. The public option, however, took on a life of its own as the federal government undertook financial innovations that the private market had eschewed, in particular the development of the “American mortgage” — a long-term, fixed-rate fully amortizing mortgage. These innovations were trend-setting and set the tone for entire housing finance market, serving as functional regulation.The public option was never understood as a regulatory system due to its ad hoc nature. As a result, its integrity was not protected. Key parts of the system were privatized without a substitution of alternative regulatory measures. The consequence was a return to the very market failures that led to the public option in the first place, followed by another round of ad hoc public options in housing finance. This history suggests that an awareness of the public option regulatory mode in housing finance is in fact critical to its long-term success, and that the public option is a well- pedigreed regulatory mode that has historically been associated with stable housing finance markets.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130280404","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 12
Selfishness as a Potential Cause of Crime - A Prison Experiment 自私是犯罪的潜在原因——一项监狱实验
LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-03-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2239027
T. Chmura, C. Engel, Markus Englerth
{"title":"Selfishness as a Potential Cause of Crime - A Prison Experiment","authors":"T. Chmura, C. Engel, Markus Englerth","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2239027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2239027","url":null,"abstract":"For a rational choice theorist, the absence of crime is more difficult to explain than its presence. Arguably, the expected value of criminal sanctions, i.e. the product of severity times certainty, is often below the expected benefit. We rely on a standard theory from behavioral economics, inequity aversion, to offer an explanation. This theory could also explain how imperfect criminal sanctions deter crime. The critical component of the theory is aversion against outperforming others. To test this theory, we exploit that it posits inequity aversion to be a personality trait. We can therefore test it in a very simple standard game. Inequity averse individuals give a fraction of their endowment to another anonymous, unendowed participant. We have prisoners play this game, and compare results to findings from a meta-study of more than 100 dictator games with non-prisoners. Surprisingly, results do not differ, not even if we only compare with other dictator games among close-knit groups. To exclude social proximity as an explanation, we retest prisoners on a second dictator game where the recipient is a charity. Prisoners give more, not less.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115095578","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
Antitrust's Rule of Reason: Only Competition Matters 反垄断的理性法则:只有竞争才重要
LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-03-01 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2227097
G. Werden
{"title":"Antitrust's Rule of Reason: Only Competition Matters","authors":"G. Werden","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2227097","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2227097","url":null,"abstract":"The rule of reason is the standard for testing whether a restraint of trade violates the Sherman Act. The thesis of this article is that the only issue under the rule of reason is the impact of a restraint on the competitive process; the Sherman Act does not employ a welfare standard. This thesis is developed first by clarifying welfare concepts, explaining how the views of Robert Bork have been misrepresented, and examining the relationship between the Sherman Act's goal and its liability standard. The article then reviews Supreme Court decisions articulating and explicating the rule of reason to show that the Court's focus has been on the competitive process rather than welfare. The article also outlines the application of the rule of reason using impact on the competitive process as the test for legality. Finally, the article shows that Sherman Act cases cited by scholars as adopting or implying a welfare standard actually do no such thing.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"21 8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125989322","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 33
首页 上一页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：481959085
Book学术官方微信