{"title":"Detecting Collusion in Spatially Differentiated Markets","authors":"Matthias Firgo, Agnes Kuegler","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2551794","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2551794","url":null,"abstract":"The empirical literature on mergers, market power and collusion in differentiated markets has mainly focused on methods relying on output and/or panel data. In contrast to this literature we suggest a novel approach that allows for the detection of collusive behaviour among a group of firms making use of information on the spatial structure of horizontally differentiated products. By estimating best response functions using a spatial econometrics approach, we focus on differences in the strategic interaction in pricing between different groups of firms as well as on differences in price levels. We apply our method to the market for ski lift tickets using a unique data set on ticket prices and detailed resort-specific characteristics covering all ski resorts in Austria. We show that prices of ski resorts forming alliances are higher and increase with the size and towards the spatial center of an alliance. Strategic interaction in pricing is higher within than outside alliances. All results are in line with the findings of theoretical models on collusion in horizontally differentiated markets.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"42 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128494873","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Coping with Imbalances in the Euro Area: Policy Alternatives Addressing Divergences and Disparities between Member Countries","authors":"Eckhard Hein, Daniel Detzer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2509355","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2509355","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we outline alternative policy recommendations addressing the problems of differential inflation, divergence in competitiveness and associated current account imbalances within the Euro area. The major purpose of these alternative policy proposals is to generate sustainably high demand and output growth in the Euro area as a whole, providing high levels of non-inflationary employment, as well as preventing ‘export-led mercantilist’ and ‘debt-led consumption boom’ types of development, both within the Euro area and with respect to the role of the Euro area in the world economy. We provide a basic framework in order to systematically address the related issues making use of Thirlwall’s (1979; 2002) model of a ‘balance-of-payments-constrained growth rate’ (BPCGR). Based on this framework, we outline the required stance for alternative economic policies and then we discuss the implications for alternative monetary, wage/incomes and fiscal policies in the Euro area as a whole, as well as the consequences for structural and regional policies in the Euro area periphery, in particular.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122203498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Deterrence and Antitrust Punishment: Firms versus Agents","authors":"Keith N. Hylton","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2533607","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2533607","url":null,"abstract":"Antitrust enforcement regimes rely on two types of penalties for deterrence: penalties against the violating firm and penalties against the agents of the violating firm. In this paper I examine the economics of punishing agents versus firms. My area of application is antitrust, but the argument applies generally to other fields in which the government has the choice between punishing the agent, the firm, or both. This analysis suggests that whenever the firm has an incentive, given existing penalties, to engage in some illegal act that may result in relatively modest punishment for its agents, it can almost always induce its agents to carry out the illegal act. It follows that almost any plausible effort to use penalties against agents to deter price fixing can be undone by the firm’s own system of rewards for agents. For deterrence, penalties against the firm sufficient to eliminate the firm’s incentive to fix prices are necessary.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121544397","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Curious Case of Competition and Quality","authors":"Ariel Ezrachi, M. Stucke","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2494656","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2494656","url":null,"abstract":"Alongside the consideration of price, competition authorities recognize that quality can be as, if not more, important in some markets. But as competition authorities also recognize, identifying the dimensions of competition important to many consumers is difficult. Even when these dimensions of quality are identified, measuring them represents additional challenges. To circumvent these challenges, competition authorities rely on several heuristics when assessing a merger’s, cartel’s or monopolistic restraint’s impact on quality. Often the heuristics work well for the competition authorities.Our paper, however, identifies several scenarios where these heuristics break down, when competition and quality are not positively correlated, and when an increase in competition can actually reduce consumer welfare. We also identify two necessary, but not sufficient, conditions that are common to every scenario. With these two conditions in mind, we provide instances when an increase in competition will not increase quality (when one would expect it should). We also provide instances when an increase in competition will lead to quality degradation.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"91 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129027435","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Insider Trading Controversies: A Literature Review","authors":"Utpal Bhattacharya","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2340518","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2340518","url":null,"abstract":"Using the artifice of a hypothetical trial, this article presents the cases for and against insider trading. Both sides in the trial produce as evidence the salient points made in more than 100 years of literature on insider trading. The initial days of the trial focus on the issues raised in the law literature such as fiduciary responsibility, the misappropriation theory, and the fairness and integrity of markets; however, the trial soon transfers focus to issues such as Pareto optimality, efficient contracting, market efficiency, and predictability raised in the financial economics literature. Open issues are then brought up. A jury finally hands down its verdict.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"91 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131324547","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"In the Shadow. Illegal Markets and Economic Sociology","authors":"Jens Beckert, Frank P. Wehinger","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2464041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2464041","url":null,"abstract":"Illegal markets differ from legal markets in many respects. Although illegal markets have economic significance and are of theoretical importance, they have been largely ignored by economic sociology. In this article we propose a categorization for illegal markets and highlight reasons why certain markets are outlawed. We perform a comprehensive review of the literature to characterize illegal markets along the three coordination problems of value creation, competition, and cooperation. The article concludes by appealing to economic sociology to strengthen research on illegal markets and by suggesting areas for future empirical research.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116277512","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Law and Development: 40 Years after Scholars in Self Estrangement - A Preliminary Review","authors":"David M. Trubek","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2435190","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2435190","url":null,"abstract":"Noting that 2014 is the 40th anniversary of the publication of Scholars in Self-Estrangement, the author looks at the field of law and development during these four decades. In a preliminary report, he reviews the critique outlined in Scholars and the claim that its publication killed the field it was designed to save. While acknowledging that the field had lost momentum by 1980 he argues that the decline occurred not because of the article but because the field lost the support of development agencies before it could establish a secure place in the academy. Noting that the field revived in the late 1980s-early 1990s, he observes that conditions for law and development scholarship are much better today and there is a proliferation of research much of which has avoided errors pointed to in Scholars. This proliferation has enriched the field but at the price of fragmentation: the field has split into a number of “sub-disciplines” that do not always communicate with one another. The article scans the field in the 21st Century, noting the influence of new ideas about development which stress experimentation and local variation in policy. These, combined with a better understanding of the embeddness of local legal systems and the limits of legal transplants demands more attention to local context and variation. Looking to the future, the author concludes that if law and development is to produce useable knowledge the separate aspects of the field should be better integrated, more attention paid to local variation and context in law and policy, research capacity in the Global South enhanced, and North-South communication improved.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"424 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122466963","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The 'Object' and 'Effect' Restriction of Article 101(1) TFEU","authors":"Nathan Tsormetsri","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2596940","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2596940","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is an assessment of the distinction between the \"Object\" and \"Effect\" restriction of Article 101(1) TFEU and their implementation in case-law of the CJEU. The paper critically examines both concepts and the resulting consequences emanating from how the CJEU has so far interpreted the \"object\" and \"effect\" restriction concept in case-law. It further provides possible paths to adopt so as to eradicate or minimize the problem.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122047182","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Cross-Country Analysis of Bank Bankruptcy Regimes","authors":"Matej Marinč, Vasja Rant","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2445295","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2445295","url":null,"abstract":"This article analyzes bank bankruptcy regimes across 142 countries. By employing factor analysis, we identify five main dimensions of bank bankruptcy frameworks: (1) difficulty of forbearance and ease of court appeal, (2) availability of supervisory tools, (3) court involvement, (4) supervisory powers with respect to managers, and (5) supervisory powers with respect to shareholders and preinsolvency phase. We use cluster analysis to identify and group countries according to two prevalent types of bank bankruptcy frameworks: a court-led and administrative bank bankruptcy regime. Administrative bank bankruptcy regimes are associated with less court involvement in the resolution process, less likely forbearance, a higher possibility of court appeal, greater availability of supervisory tools, weaker supervisory powers with respect to managers and stronger supervisory powers with respect to shareholders, and a preinsolvency phase as opposed to the court-led bank bankruptcy regimes. Administrative bank bankruptcy regimes are also associated with fewer creditor rights, less government effectiveness, and lower institutional quality than court-led bank bankruptcy regimes. We find some evidence that the type and main dimensions of a bank bankruptcy regime are related to the occurrence and severity of the global financial crisis.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131601978","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Are Restrictions of Competition by Sports Associations Horizontal or Vertical in Nature?","authors":"Oliver Budzinski, Stefan Szymanski","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2412471","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2412471","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we discuss from an economic perspective two alternative views of restrictions of competition by sports associations. The horizontal approach views such restrictions as an agreement among the participants of a sports league with the sports association merely representing an organization executing the horizontal cooperation. In contrast, the vertical approach views the sports association as being a dominant upstream firm enjoying a monopoly position on the market stage for competition organizing services, an important input for the actual product – the sports game. Taking the recent financial fair play (FFP) initiative by UEFA (the Union of European Football Associations) as an example, we demonstrate that the different views lead to different assessments of restrictive effects and, thus, matter for competition policy decisions. The economic story of the potential restrictive effect of FFP on players’ and player agents’ income may fit more plausibly to the horizontal approach, whereas the potentially anticompetitive foreclosure and deterrence effects of FFP may be economically more soundly reasoned by taking the vertical view.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"69 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116515497","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}