{"title":"Resale Price Maintenance in China: An Economic Perspective","authors":"Shan (Victor) Jiang, D. Sokol","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2509854","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2509854","url":null,"abstract":"This article analyzes resale price maintenance (RPM), its economic principles, and its application in the United States, Europe and China. The application of RPM varies across each of these three jurisdictions. In China, there are competing economic goals, no clear standard (per se illegality versus rule of reason) and case outcomes that do not necessarily fully embrace an economic based approach. We identify those areas in Chinese antitrust jurisprudence that will shape enforcement and offer an economic approach that allows for internal consistency for decision-making.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"374 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123950836","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Considerations Regarding the Impact of Legislative Inflation on Economic Operators","authors":"Claudiu Ramon D. Butculescu","doi":"10.26458/1523","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26458/1523","url":null,"abstract":"This paper addresses the impact of legislative inflation upon the activities of the commercial agents. A clear and transparent legal framework is required in order for the economic system to be efficient and to grow. Unfortunately, the large amount of norms that come into force monthly, if not weekly and regulate the activities of the moral persons, and in particular, the activities of the economic agents determine a high grade of informational entropy at a systemic level. This study tackles the possibility of improving the legal communication of norms by reducing legislative inflation. Firstly, the communication stream is analysed, and then the possibilities for improving such communication are brought forward.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114328715","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The (Rail)Road to Lochner: Reproduction Cost and the Gilded Age Controversy on Rate Regulation","authors":"N. Giocoli","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2599032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2599032","url":null,"abstract":"The controversy over railroad rates regulation represented a fundamental component of the jurisprudential trajectory that, culminating in Lochner v. New York, led to the era of so-called laissez faire constitutionalism. Constitutional protection of property required that regulation be such as to preserve the value of the regulated business. The paper builds on Siegel 1984 to argue that, by indicating in Smyth v. Ames (1898) reproduction cost as the correct technique to calculate the value of a railways, the Supreme Court retained its allegiance to the fundamental tenets of classical political economy even in a period of massive economic transformations, when classical economics was increasingly viewed as unable to capture the new reality of American industrial life.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115310600","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"CRD IV and the Mandatory Structure of Bankers’ Pay","authors":"G. Ferrarini","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2593757","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2593757","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I analyse the rise of mandatory structure of bankers’ pay in Europe as outcome of criticism of pre-crisis remuneration practices at financial institutions. Whether flawed bankers’ pay contributed to the financial crisis is still debated amongst scholars. It appears more likely that insufficient prudential regulation and flawed risk management contributed to banks’ undertaking risks that were later proven to be excessive from a societal perspective. All this would have suggested improving risk management systems and reforming areas of prudential regulation such as capital adequacy and organizational requirements, rather than intervening directly on bankers’ incentives. Nonetheless, governments and legislators, under the pressure of the media and public opinion, proceeded to extensive reforms of bankers’ remuneration, with reference to both the top executives and other risk-taking/high-earning employees at various levels of the institutions concerned. Indeed, the FSB principles and standards cover not only remuneration governance and disclosure, but also remuneration structures. Both the fixed and the variable remuneration components and the relationship between the same are subject to detailed regulation. As a result, the international standards have nature of “rules” and have been implemented as such. The EU in particular has followed a strict approach to the implementation of the FSB standards and has also departed from the latter by introducing an unprecedented cap on variable remuneration in CRD IV. I analyse this cap from a legal and economic perspective, showing that its rationale is flawed and that unintended consequences may derive from it as a result. Moreover, the cap is inconsistent with other aspects of CRD IV which incorporate the international standards on variable pay.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117172648","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Putting Disclosure to the Test: Toward Better Evidence-Based Policy","authors":"Talia B. Gillis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2638958","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2638958","url":null,"abstract":"Financial disclosures no longer enjoy the immunity from criticism they once had. While disclosures remain the hallmark of numerous areas of regulation, there is increasing skepticism as to whether disclosures are understood by consumers and do in fact improve consumer welfare. Debates on the virtues of disclosures overlook the process by which regulators continue to mandate disclosures. This article fills this gap by analyzing the testing of proposed disclosures, which is an increasingly popular way for regulators to establish the benefits of disclosure. If the testing methodology is misguided then the premise on which disclosures are adopted is flawed, leaving consumers unprotected. This article focuses on two recent major testing efforts: the European Union’s testing of fund disclosure and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s testing of the integrated mortgage disclosures, which will go into effect on August 1, 2015.Despite the substantial resources invested in these quantitative studies, regulation based on study results is unlikely to benefit consumers since the testing lacks both external and internal validity. The generalizability of the testing is called into question since the isolated conditions of testing overlook the reality of financial transactions. Moreover, the testing method mistakenly assumes a direct link between comprehension and improved decisions, and so erroneously uses comprehension tests. As disclosure becomes more central to people’s daily lives, from medical decision aids to nutritional labels, greater attention should be given to the testing policies that justify their implementation. This article proposes several ways to improve the content and design of quantitative studies as we enter the era of testing.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133330348","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Regulation and Net Neutrality","authors":"Michael Kotrous","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2575436","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2575436","url":null,"abstract":"This paper seeks to inform the network neutrality debate by looking at the role existing government regulation has played in shaping the market for broadband access. Prior research has concluded that network externalities that exist in the market for broadband services justify government intervention (Economides and Tag, 2012). This literature takes limited competition among broadband providers as given rather than questioning why competition is limited in the first place. I argue here that limited competition among broadband providers is not the result of a market failure but rather stems from barriers to entry erected by government regulation, notably municipal “rights-of-way.” The key to improving consumer welfare is therefore not to impose additional regulations on broadband providers, but to clear the way for capital investments in the expansion of new infrastructure and the improvement of existing infrastructure by removing existing regulatory barriers to entry. I conclude that deregulation rather than more regulation would improve Internet access and result in a more level playing field for all content providers.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"181 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121625759","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Correlates and Determinants of Direct Democracy","authors":"L. Blume, B. Hayo, S. Voigt","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2542156","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2542156","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies correlates and determinants of direct democracy institutions (DDIs), such as referendums and initiatives, based on the premise that constitutions themselves are endogenous. Our sample covers as many as 132 countries from 1950 to 2006. We find that the likelihood that a country includes DDIs in its constitution increases over time, particularly during the 1990s and 2000s. In our econometric analysis, we employ a two-tier approach, the first tier analyzing the time-invariant factors associated with the existence of DDIs, the second tier focusing on changes in time-variant factors. We discover that (i) new constitutions make the introduction of DDIs more likely; (ii) the degree of democratization is positively related to constitutions containing DDIs; (iii) an increase in the number of riots and assassinations raises the likelihood of constitutionally anchoring DDIs; (iv) if political leaders achieved power or were removed from office through irregular means, the introduction of DDIs is more likely; if they leave office due to health reasons, DDIs are less likely to be included in the constitution; and (v) religious fractionalization is negatively associated with the possibility of referendums.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116924629","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"An Economic Analysis of Effective Compliance Programs","authors":"","doi":"10.4337/9781783474479.00019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781783474479.00019","url":null,"abstract":"Tests for “effective” compliance programs take the form of lists specifying required elements in varying level of detail. From an economic perspective, an effective compliance program can be defined more fundamentally as the set of policies and procedures that a rational, profit-maximizing firm would establish if it faced an expected sanction equal to the social costs of violations. This paper explores the idea and several of its extensions and qualifications.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126857565","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Rethinking Nudges","authors":"P. Mongin, M. Cozic","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2529910","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2529910","url":null,"abstract":"Nudge is a semantically multifarious concept that originates in Thaler and Sunstein's (2008) popular eponymous book. In one of its senses, it is a policy for redirecting an agent's choices by only slightly altering his choice conditions, in another sense, it is concerned with bounded rationality as a means of the policy, and in still another sense, it is concerned with bounded rationality as an obstacle to be removed by the policy, when the latter has a benevolent aim. The paper centres on the interrelations, both semantic and factual, of these three nudge concepts. It argues that the first and second are basically disconnected on Thaler and Sunstein's major examples of nudges, and that this has gone unnoticed to them because they wrongly equate the second with the third concept, and also because they overestimate the explanatory power of behavioural economics, compared with that of classical rational choice theory, to account for successful interventions. After completing this analysis, the paper moves to some of the normative issues raised by Thaler and Sunstein. Their thought-provoking claim that liberalism and paternalism can be reconciled within one and the same doctrine of social ethics - libertarian paternalism – has been subjected to thorough philosophical criticism. Rather than following this abstract line, the paper takes the shortcut of arguing that Thaler and Sunstein lose their best defence of libertarian paternalism after the nudge concepts are disentangled. They had effectively based their case on the view that slight interventions could have powerful effects through a clever use of bounded rationality, and it has been shown that the latter is not really at work in the interventions they consider. The paper finally concludes that the three nudge concepts are worth pursuing, though independently of each other, and in particular that the third one, which involves correcting the pitfalls of bounded rationality, should receive sustained attention from policy analysts.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"65 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129990919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Criticism Directed to the Case Preparation Panel in Economic Courts in Egypt","authors":"M. Ghanem","doi":"10.20472/ss2015.4.3.004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.20472/ss2015.4.3.004","url":null,"abstract":"Law and economy are firmly connected. Adding to that the economic life has an effect on the judicial thinking. So, rules of law should characterized the care of existed economic attitude in the state in a way that law seems to be a mirror in which the existed economic attitudes in most branches of law are reflected even if they are not of direct shape. judiciary may be an attracting factor for investment through understanding and the speed of settling the disputes achieving quick justice. On the other hand, it may be a factor of dispelling of investment and development via prolonging the period of litigation and being not aware of the nature of such disputes.So, Egyptian legislator created special Economic Courts to deal with economic disputes, and to avoid its negative effects, by Law No. 120 of 2008. Which decide that this kind of litigation can be solved by judges specialized in this kind of litigation, to encourage investment, and to provide maximum protection for economic activity and help develop the plans and ensure justice. But, There are some Criticism Directed to the Case Preparation Panel in Economic Courts in Egypt. So, I will discuss it in my paper.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129293763","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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