{"title":"Banking Supervision Outsourcing: Economics, Rules and Drivers","authors":"D. Masciandaro","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2732633","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2732633","url":null,"abstract":"What are the pros and cons of involving external auditors in banking supervision? Which are the concrete rules of the game all around the world? How to evaluate them? The aim of this paper is to shed light on the relationship between the quality of banking supervision and the involvement of external auditors, considering the potential benefits and costs. On the one side, the involvement of private financial gatekeepers can improve overall credibility of the supervisory setting. On the other side, the involvement of private actors for the implementation of public tasks can give rise to a range of known risks.The article opens with economic analysis highlighting the pros and cons of involving external auditors and entrusting them with a measure of banking supervision. On the basis of the economic framework, the author constructs an original and systematic index of Auditors’ Involvement in Supervision – the AIS Index – based on 22 indicators, which is then applied to evaluate country by country the state of banking supervision in the world. The resulting data set is used for econometric testing of the existence of drivers that can explain the political choices made over auditors’ involvement in supervision.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131322975","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Cournot, Stackelberg and Hotelling Competition","authors":"Hak Choi","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2712958","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2712958","url":null,"abstract":"This paper shows that Stackelberg has turned the Cournot competitors into monopolists, to result in Bertrand’s equilibrium, and to fall into a prisoner’s dilemma. This paper then applies Hotelling’s theory to break the dilemma.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"81 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133718449","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Joshua D. Wright, Koren W. Wong-Ervin, D. Ginsburg, Bruce H. Kobayashi, James C. Cooper
{"title":"Comment of the Global Antitrust Institute, George Mason University School of Law, on the European Commission’s Public Consultation on the Regulatory Environment for Platforms","authors":"Joshua D. Wright, Koren W. Wong-Ervin, D. Ginsburg, Bruce H. Kobayashi, James C. Cooper","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2709188","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2709188","url":null,"abstract":"This comment is submitted in response to the European Commission’s (EC’s) public consultation on the Regulatory Environment for Platforms, Online Intermediaries, Data, Cloud Computing, and the Collaborative Economy.The comment addresses: (1) concerns that the EC’s survey methodology and design is not conducive to generating reliable and policy-relevant data; (2) the economic analysis of platforms and multi-sided markets; (3) the dangers to competition and consumers of new ex ante regulation designed to regulate platforms, as opposed to relying upon existing European competition and consumer protection laws to address any potential anticompetitive effects or consumer harm arising from conduct by platform owners; and (4) the economic analysis of privacy and data security and its implications for new regulation.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127142795","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Short and Long Term Investors (and Other Stakeholders Too): Must (and Do) Their Interests Conflict?","authors":"C. Hill, Brett H. Mcdonnell","doi":"10.4337/9781784711481.00034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781784711481.00034","url":null,"abstract":"In this chapter for an edited volume, we review and analyze theoretical and empirical questions raised by the ongoing debate over whether American public corporations face undue legal and market pressure to pursue short term profits. Orthodox theory holds that the highest ‘bucks’ should not necessarily be the ‘quickest’ – that is, that markets correctly value a company’s prospects, no matter how far in the future they are. Of course, given the time value of money, a long-term prospect has to be much better than a short-term one to be worthwhile. But the argument made with respect to shareholder activists, and to a lesser but still considerable degree corporate raiders, was that cost-cutting was being encouraged even if doing so saved less than the discounted value foregone.This argument is not consistent with orthodox theory. Here, we explain why this is so, consider reasons why that theory might be wrong, and make some suggestions for ways to proceed. In our view, there is plausible, and perhaps sufficient, evidence of a problem from shareholders’ perspective – corporations may indeed be shunning some potentially higher-yielding long-term strategies, emphasizing instead the short-term strategies that yield cash and savings in the short term. There may be a problem from the societal perspective as well, which is separate from but related to the question of short-term strategies. The market may be addressing the shareholder problem, although perhaps not sufficiently, and probably not sufficiently quickly. The societal problem, the underprovision of public goods, and the imposition of negative externalities, is far trickier to address. We offer some suggestions which might help on both fronts. That being said, in some cases, the conflict between a shareholder value maximization perspective and a societal perspective may be intractable.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116531398","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Net Neutrality and Inflation of Traffic","authors":"M. Peitz, F. Schütt","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2573466","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2573466","url":null,"abstract":"Under strict net neutrality Internet service providers (ISPs) are required to carry data without any differentiation and at no cost to the content provider. We provide a simple framework with a monopoly ISP to evaluate different net neutrality rules. Content differs in its sensitivity to delay. Content providers can use congestion control techniques to reduce delay for their content, but do not take into account the effect of their decisions on the aggregate volume of traffic. As a result, strict net neutrality often leads to socially inefficient allocation of traffic and traffic inflation. We show that piece-meal departures from net neutrality, such as transmission fees or prioritization based on sensitivity to delay, do not necessarily improve efficiency. However, the ISP implements the efficient allocation when allowed to introduce bandwidth tiering and charge for prioritized delivery.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123957550","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Regional State Aid Control in Europe: A Legal and Economic Assessment","authors":"H. Friederiszick, Massimo Merola","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2698053","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2698053","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides a legal and economic analysis of the European rules for regional state aid according to Article 107 (1) and (3) TFEU. It summarizes the historical evolution and the trends of regional aid rules and describes the economic rationale behind them. The main principles are discussed with reference to recent academic research, leading cases and the State Aid Modernization initiative (SAM). The current rules for the assessment of compatibility as laid down in the general block exemption and the regional aid guidelines 2014 are critically reviewed in light of these principles.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125412618","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Economies of Scale: Economics for Lawyers","authors":"M. Laskowska","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2655545","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2655545","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this paper is to give an insight into economies of scale – one of the basic types of efficiency gains. These economies belong to those that are the most frequently referred to and analyzed by the European Commission in its antitrust decisions, yet there are no legal nor economic articles presenting the basic economics underlying this fundamental type of efficiency gains in a way that is accessible to lawyers and the general public. The following issues are studied in this paper: the concept of economies of scale, the economic significance of economies of scale, the sources of economies of scale, the typologies thereof, and learning effects. The main contribution of this paper is to legally conceptualize economies of scale: it provides guidance on the nature and applications of economies of scale for the purpose of legal doctrine and court work on antitrust cases.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"235 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121296348","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Research Handbook on the Economics of Insurance Law: Introduction","authors":"D. Schwarcz, Peter Siegelman","doi":"10.4337/9781782547143","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781782547143","url":null,"abstract":"Insurance law and insurance economics each have long and distinguished scholarly histories, but participants in the two disciplines have not always communicated well across academic silos. The Handbook encourages more policy-relevant insurance economics scholarship and more economically sophisticated legal scholarship by bringing together original contributions from leading scholars in insurance law and insurance economics on a range of issues involving insurance law and regulation.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133700554","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Johannes G. Jaspersen, Andreas Richter, Sebastian Soika
{"title":"On the Demand Effects of Rate Regulation - Evidence from a Natural Experiment","authors":"Johannes G. Jaspersen, Andreas Richter, Sebastian Soika","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2624486","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2624486","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze the influence of rate regulation on insurance demand in an annuity setting. With a unique dataset containing a natural experiment due to German federal regulation and the E.U. Gender Directive we study the impact of unisex tariffs on contract choices in variable annuity products. Our data contains two different choice variables with antithetic predictions for men and women, meaning that women should increase their demand in one choice and decrease it in the other, while men should exhibit opposite behavior. We find with regard to both choices that both men and women have lower demand for guarantees within the annuity in unisex contracts than without rate regulation. This behavior contradicts economic intuition. We hypothesize that the effect could instead be explained by the public perception of unisex tariffs.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127722957","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Taxation and Liquidity: Evidence from Retirement Savings","authors":"E. Chorvat","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2309924","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2309924","url":null,"abstract":"This paper tests the response of a cross section of U.S. households to a reduction in the tax cost of holding liquid assets by the 2003 Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act, whether that response was tax efficient, and the distribution of that response. Empirical results based on regression analyses of Survey of Consumer Finances data between 1998 and 2010 suggest that lower, middle, and high-income households responded to the enactment of the dividend preference in a tax-efficient manner, increasing allocations to liquid accounts and away from tax-preferred retirement accounts. Notwithstanding the conventional wisdom that behavioral responses to changes in the taxation of investments occur predominantly among the wealthy, the paper finds that the largest behavioral response to the 2003 dividend preference appears to have been among those households in the highest and lowest income groups, with the largest elasticity of response among the lowest income households. If household income is an important determinant to the value of liquidity, we might well understand that those with the highest need for liquidity might have the largest response to a reduction in the cost of that liquidity. Curiously, while middle-income households responded to the lower cost of liquidity in a tax-efficient manner, theirs was a distinctly smaller response, suggesting the possibility of a nonlinear relationship between taxation and liquidity response.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"112 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126078803","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}