LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)最新文献

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Horizontal Mergers in Optimal Auctions 最优拍卖中的横向合并
LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-01-30 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2742187
Luke M. Froeb, Vlad Mares, S. Tschantz
{"title":"Horizontal Mergers in Optimal Auctions","authors":"Luke M. Froeb, Vlad Mares, S. Tschantz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2742187","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2742187","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we study the impact of mergers among bidders when the auctioneer can respond optimally to changes in the market concentration. We find that the auctioneer's ability to exercise such \"buyer power\" limits the ability of the merged bidders to exercise \"market power.\" In particular, while mergers always harm the auctioneer, the magnitude of the harm is much smaller than in an open auction benchmark. Bidder concentration matters but is less important than the auctioneer's reservation utility. We also find that mergers benefit non-merging bidders, and will become unprofitable when the potential surplus is small enough. Welfare effects are complex as they depend both on the profile of the merging parties as well as on the auctioneer's reservation utility.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115304262","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
End of 9-Endings and Price Perceptions 结束-结束和价格感知
LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-01-20 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2902940
H. Chen, Daniel Levy, Avichai Snir
{"title":"End of 9-Endings and Price Perceptions","authors":"H. Chen, Daniel Levy, Avichai Snir","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2902940","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2902940","url":null,"abstract":"We take advantage of a natural experiment to document an emergence of a new price ending that has the same effects as 9-endings. In January 2014, the Israeli parliament has passed a law prohibiting the use of non 0-ending prices. We find that one year after 9-ending prices have disappeared, 90-ending prices acquired the same status as 9-ending prices had before the law was passed. 90-ending prices became the new psychological price points. The retailers and the shoppers both reacted to the regulatory intervention optimally, which has eliminated the regulation’s intended effect.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129583580","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Three Economist's Tools for Antitrust Analysis: A Non-Technical Introduction 三位经济学家的反垄断分析工具:非技术介绍
LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-01-13 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2898869
R. Pittman
{"title":"Three Economist's Tools for Antitrust Analysis: A Non-Technical Introduction","authors":"R. Pittman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2898869","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2898869","url":null,"abstract":"The importance of economics to the analysis and enforcement of competition policy and law has increased tremendously in the developed market economies in the past forty years. In younger and developing market economies, competition law itself has a history of twenty to twenty-five years at most – sometimes much less – and economic tools that have proven useful to competition law enforcement in developed market economies in focusing investigations and in assisting decision makers in distinguishing central from secondary issues are inevitably less well understood. This paper presents a non-technical introduction to three economic tools that have become widespread in competition law enforcement in general and in the analysis of proposed mergers in particular: critical loss analysis, upward pricing pressure, and the vertical arithmetic.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"C-34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126490073","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Differentiated Integration or Uniform Regime? National Derogations from EU Internal Market Measures 差别化整合还是统一制度?欧盟内部市场措施的国家减损
LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-09-30 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2845819
E. Vos, M. Weimer
{"title":"Differentiated Integration or Uniform Regime? National Derogations from EU Internal Market Measures","authors":"E. Vos, M. Weimer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2845819","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2845819","url":null,"abstract":"The EU has most frequently resorted to harmonisation as a model to achieve its in-ternal market. This contribution examines the dynamics of legal differentiation in EU’s internal market law laid down in Article 114 TFEU and secondary laws. It con-cludes that there has been a modest number of invocations of the derogation possibili-ties under Article 114 (4) and (5) TFEU and the safeguard clauses. The low number may be due to the fact that may both the Commission and the Courts have a very rig-id reading of the procedure whilst the grounds for invocation are very limited. This low number nevertheless does not automatically imply that Member States agree with the level of protection laid down in the EU’s harmonisation measures or that the opt out mechanisms are not relevant. Derogation mechanisms may play an important role in the negotiations of the level of protection in the draft legislative acts. This study moreover reveals that the derogation mechanisms may be important devices of regulatory adjustment and learning in the fields of public health and environmental protection in the EU. They ultimately may rather strengthen the uniformity of regula-tory requirements in the EU internal market instead of leading to regulatory diversity.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"143 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116559579","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Irreversibility and Uncertainty Cause an Intergenerational Equity-Efficiency Trade-Off 不可逆性和不确定性导致代际公平-效率权衡
LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-08-25 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1764443
Nikolai Hoberg, Stefan Baumgärtner
{"title":"Irreversibility and Uncertainty Cause an Intergenerational Equity-Efficiency Trade-Off","authors":"Nikolai Hoberg, Stefan Baumgärtner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1764443","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1764443","url":null,"abstract":"Two important policy goals in intergenerational problems are Pareto-efficiency and sustainability, i.e. intergenerational equity. We demonstrate that the pursuit of these goals is subject to an intergenerational equity-efficiency trade-off. Our analysis highlights two salient characteristics of intergenerational problems and policy: (i) temporal irreversibility, i.e. the inability to revise one's past actions; and (ii) uncertainty of future consequences of present actions in human-environment systems. We employ a two-non-overlapping-generations model that combines an intragenerational production decision on the use of circulating capital and a non-renewable resource, with a negative intergenerational externality as an unforeseen contingency. If initially unknown problems become apparent and policy is enacted after irreversible actions were taken, policy-making faces a fundamental trade-off between ex-post Pareto-efficiency and sustainability. That is, one can achieve either one of these two goals, but not both.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116287058","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
Teaching About Economic Efficiency in Law and Economics Courses: Clarifying the Conceptual Problems, Empirical Difficulties, and Normative Biases of the Efficiency Criterion 法学和经济学课程中的经济效率教学:澄清效率标准的概念问题、经验困难和规范性偏差
LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-04-09 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2752614
G. Crespi
{"title":"Teaching About Economic Efficiency in Law and Economics Courses: Clarifying the Conceptual Problems, Empirical Difficulties, and Normative Biases of the Efficiency Criterion","authors":"G. Crespi","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2752614","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2752614","url":null,"abstract":"Law and Economics courses taught in law schools are sometimes criticized for inadequately explaining the normative criterion of “economic efficiency” and then applying this criterion throughout the course in a superficial and biased manner that pejoratively labels most governmental market interventions and wealth redistribution measures as inefficient. These criticisms have merit, and in this brief article I point out a significant number of conceptual problems, empirical difficulties and normative shortcomings of the efficiency criterion that one needs to understand in order to be able to effectively counter policy arguments that rest upon efficiency assessments. The specific shortcomings of the efficiency criterion that I address in this brief essay are the pervasiveness of severe data limitations that render efficiency assessments unreliable, the lack of clarity as to whether willingness to pay should be measured by offer prices or instead by asking prices, the difficulty of obtaining honest and accurate responses as to willingness to pay from the persons surveyed, uncertainty as to the appropriate discount rate that should be used for discounting future policy consequences, the problem posed by endogenous preferences, the problem posed by the often-overlooked “problem of person-altering consequences,” the problematic nature of using willingness to pay as a measure of social value, and finally, the problematic nature of using a normative criterion that does not give special primacy to rights.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125831620","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How Many Harberger Triangles Does it Take to Fill One Okun Gap? 需要多少个哈伯格三角形才能填满一个奥肯缺口?
LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-04-06 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2759850
Aart Gerritsen
{"title":"How Many Harberger Triangles Does it Take to Fill One Okun Gap?","authors":"Aart Gerritsen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2759850","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2759850","url":null,"abstract":"At least one; at most a heap.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"126 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131620703","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Are Public and Private Enforcement Complements or Substitutes? Evidence from High Frequency NHL Data 公、私执法是互补还是替代?高频NHL数据的证据
LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-03-25 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2756103
Gregory J. DeAngelo, B. Humphreys, Imke Reimers
{"title":"Are Public and Private Enforcement Complements or Substitutes? Evidence from High Frequency NHL Data","authors":"Gregory J. DeAngelo, B. Humphreys, Imke Reimers","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2756103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2756103","url":null,"abstract":"A substantial theoretical literature identifies two general approaches to deterring anti-social behavior: public police actions (specialized enforcement) to monitor and punish proscribed behavior, and private actions (community enforcement) to discourage both illegal and legal, anti-social activity. Recent papers highlight the importance of both enforcement approaches but empirical identification of their relative effects has been challenging. Utilizing a novel, event-level database from the National Hockey League and random variation in the amount of rest between games that a referee oversees as an instrument, we find that the timing of events is crucial in determining the relationship between different enforcement actions. When specialized enforcement is lacking, community enforcement acts as an effective substitute for specialized enforcement. However, when specialized enforcers are present, community enforcement creates no further deterrence. Conversely, conditional on initial actions by community enforcers, specialized enforcement is an effective complement to community enforcement.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116802646","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Taxation and Innovation - A Sectorial Approach 税收和创新-一个部门的方法
LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-03-11 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2746681
D. Hasen
{"title":"Taxation and Innovation - A Sectorial Approach","authors":"D. Hasen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2746681","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2746681","url":null,"abstract":"A number of tax rules have been adopted or proposed to promote innovation. The primary justification for these rules is that they can be effective in reducing or eliminating chronic market failure in the innovation sector. This paper argues that special tax rules for innovation generally are inappropriate. The basic circumstance giving rise to market failure in the innovation sector is the positive externality associated with information production. Special tax rules do not correct the externality; they merely compensate for it through other mechanisms that themselves create deadweight loss. In place of special tax rules that promote innovation, policy makers should adopt rules that counteract disproportionately large tax-induced distortions in the innovation sector. Among these distortions is excess risk-taking, a phenomenon attributable to the lognormal nature of returns to risk-bearing.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121142331","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Corporate Governance Regulation Through Non-Prosecution 通过不起诉进行公司管治监管
LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-02-11 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2731351
Jennifer H. Arlen, Marcel Kahan
{"title":"Corporate Governance Regulation Through Non-Prosecution","authors":"Jennifer H. Arlen, Marcel Kahan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2731351","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2731351","url":null,"abstract":"Over the last decade, federal corporate criminal enforcement policy has undergone a significant transformation. Firms that commit crimes are no longer simply required to pay fines. Instead, prosecutors and firms enter into pretrial diversion agreements (PDAs). Prosecutors regularly use PDAs to impose mandates on firms creating new duties that alter firms’ internal operations or governance structures. This Article evaluates PDA mandates to determine whether and when prosecutors can appropriately use them to deter corporate crime. We find that mandates can be justified. But, contrary to DOJ policy favoring mandates for any firm with a deficient compliance program at the time of the crime, we find that mandates should be imposed more selectively. Specifically, mandates are only appropriate if a firm is plagued by “policing agency costs” — in that the firm’s managers did not act to deter or report wrongdoing because they benefitted personally from tolerating wrongdoing or from deficient corporate policing. We show that this policing agency cost justification provides guidance on how to reform federal policy to make appropriate use of mandates, guidance which reveals that many mandates are inappropriate.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"231 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131680263","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 22
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