{"title":"Cournot, Stackelberg和Hotelling Competition","authors":"Hak Choi","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2712958","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper shows that Stackelberg has turned the Cournot competitors into monopolists, to result in Bertrand’s equilibrium, and to fall into a prisoner’s dilemma. This paper then applies Hotelling’s theory to break the dilemma.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"81 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Cournot, Stackelberg and Hotelling Competition\",\"authors\":\"Hak Choi\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/SSRN.2712958\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper shows that Stackelberg has turned the Cournot competitors into monopolists, to result in Bertrand’s equilibrium, and to fall into a prisoner’s dilemma. This paper then applies Hotelling’s theory to break the dilemma.\",\"PeriodicalId\":231496,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"81 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2016-01-08\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2712958\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2712958","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper shows that Stackelberg has turned the Cournot competitors into monopolists, to result in Bertrand’s equilibrium, and to fall into a prisoner’s dilemma. This paper then applies Hotelling’s theory to break the dilemma.
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