Selfishness as a Potential Cause of Crime - A Prison Experiment

T. Chmura, C. Engel, Markus Englerth
{"title":"Selfishness as a Potential Cause of Crime - A Prison Experiment","authors":"T. Chmura, C. Engel, Markus Englerth","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2239027","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"For a rational choice theorist, the absence of crime is more difficult to explain than its presence. Arguably, the expected value of criminal sanctions, i.e. the product of severity times certainty, is often below the expected benefit. We rely on a standard theory from behavioral economics, inequity aversion, to offer an explanation. This theory could also explain how imperfect criminal sanctions deter crime. The critical component of the theory is aversion against outperforming others. To test this theory, we exploit that it posits inequity aversion to be a personality trait. We can therefore test it in a very simple standard game. Inequity averse individuals give a fraction of their endowment to another anonymous, unendowed participant. We have prisoners play this game, and compare results to findings from a meta-study of more than 100 dictator games with non-prisoners. Surprisingly, results do not differ, not even if we only compare with other dictator games among close-knit groups. To exclude social proximity as an explanation, we retest prisoners on a second dictator game where the recipient is a charity. Prisoners give more, not less.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2013-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"8","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2239027","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8

Abstract

For a rational choice theorist, the absence of crime is more difficult to explain than its presence. Arguably, the expected value of criminal sanctions, i.e. the product of severity times certainty, is often below the expected benefit. We rely on a standard theory from behavioral economics, inequity aversion, to offer an explanation. This theory could also explain how imperfect criminal sanctions deter crime. The critical component of the theory is aversion against outperforming others. To test this theory, we exploit that it posits inequity aversion to be a personality trait. We can therefore test it in a very simple standard game. Inequity averse individuals give a fraction of their endowment to another anonymous, unendowed participant. We have prisoners play this game, and compare results to findings from a meta-study of more than 100 dictator games with non-prisoners. Surprisingly, results do not differ, not even if we only compare with other dictator games among close-knit groups. To exclude social proximity as an explanation, we retest prisoners on a second dictator game where the recipient is a charity. Prisoners give more, not less.
自私是犯罪的潜在原因——一项监狱实验
对于理性选择理论家来说,犯罪的不存在比犯罪的存在更难解释。可以说,刑事制裁的预期价值,即严重性乘以确定性的产物,往往低于预期收益。我们依靠行为经济学中的一个标准理论——厌恶不平等——来提供解释。这一理论也可以解释不完善的刑事制裁是如何遏制犯罪的。该理论的关键组成部分是对超越他人的厌恶。为了验证这一理论,我们利用它假设不平等厌恶是一种人格特质。因此,我们可以在一个非常简单的标准游戏中进行测试。反对不平等的个人将捐赠的一小部分捐给另一个匿名的、没有捐赠的参与者。我们让囚犯玩这个游戏,并将结果与100多个非囚犯独裁者游戏的元研究结果进行比较。令人惊讶的是,结果并没有什么不同,即使我们只将其与其他组织紧密的群体之间的独裁者游戏进行比较。为了排除社会亲近作为一种解释,我们在第二个独裁者游戏中对囚犯进行了重新测试,其中接受者是慈善机构。囚犯付出的更多,而不是更少。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信