美国司法部,反垄断司公开圆桌会议系列:竞争与监管的关系,第二次圆桌会议-同意令:全球反垄断研究所评论,乔治梅森大学安东宁·斯卡利亚法学院

Tad Lipsky, Joshua D. Wright, D. Ginsburg, John M. Yun
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引用次数: 0

摘要

该评论概述了适用于机构考虑是否通过同意令或诉讼解决案件的基本经济分析。它描述了过去的经验与政府反托拉斯法规要求变更或终止由于时间的流逝或影响市场的重大变化,以及某些法规的有效性在反垄断的目标服务问题时甚至初始条目。该评论指出,在激烈的竞争中,与机构过度依赖同意法令有关的某些对消费者利益的危险,并建议机构保持警惕,作为防止这种危险的保障。最后,《意见》指出,与结构性救济不同,所谓的行为救济具有持续的潜在价值,特别是在纵向收购的情况下,同时认识到结构性救济被适当地接受为更可取的救济模式,特别是在涉及横向收购的情况下。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division Public Roundtable Series on the Relationship between Competition and Regulation, Second Roundtable – On Consent Decrees: Comment of the Global Antitrust Institute, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University
The Comment outlines the basic economic analysis that applies to agency consideration of whether to resolve cases by consent decree or by litigation. It describes past experience with government antitrust decrees that required modification or termination due to the passage of time or significant changes in the affected markets, as well as certain decrees whose effectiveness in serving antitrust objectives was questionable even at the time of initial entry. The Comment points out certain dangers to the consumer interest in vigorous competition that are associated with excessive agency reliance on consent decrees, and recommends institutional vigilance as a safeguard against such dangers. Finally, the Comment notes the continuing potential value of so-called conduct remedies, as distinct from structural remedies, particularly in the context of vertical acquisitions, while recognizing that structural remedies are properly accepted as the preferable mode of relief, especially in cases involving horizontal acquisitions.
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