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Lateral Moves, Promotions, and Task-Specific Human Capital: Theory and Evidence 横向调动、晋升和特定任务人力资本:理论与证据
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 2019-08-27 DOI: 10.1093/JLEO/EWZ017
Xin Jin, Michael Waldman
{"title":"Lateral Moves, Promotions, and Task-Specific Human Capital: Theory and Evidence","authors":"Xin Jin, Michael Waldman","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWZ017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWZ017","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper studies the link between lateral mobility and promotions. The first part of the paper extends the theoretical literature by incorporating lateral moves into a job assignment model with task-specific human capital accumulation. The model thus predicts that workers who are laterally moved in one period are more likely to be subsequently promoted and experience larger wage growth compared with workers who are not laterally moved. In addition, workers with very high levels of education are less likely to be laterally moved compared with workers with lower levels of education. We test the model’s predictions using a large employer–employee linked panel dataset on senior managers in a sample of large US firms during the period 1981 to 1985. Our findings support the theoretical predictions and show the importance of lateral mobility in wage and promotion dynamics. (JEL J31, M51)","PeriodicalId":225808,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"1976 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128013477","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 14
Ideal Point Estimation in Political Hierarchies: A Framework and an Application to the US Executive Branch 政治等级制度中的理想点估计:一个框架及其在美国行政部门的应用
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 2019-08-13 DOI: 10.1093/JLEO/EWZ015
Alex Acs
{"title":"Ideal Point Estimation in Political Hierarchies: A Framework and an Application to the US Executive Branch","authors":"Alex Acs","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWZ015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWZ015","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article develops a procedure for estimating the ideal points of actors in a political hierarchy, such as a public bureaucracy. The procedure is based on a spatial auditing model and is motivated by the idea that while agents within a political hierarchy are typically segregated in different policy fiefdoms, they are bound to a common principal that can scrutinize their policy proposals through selective reviews, or audits. The theoretical model shows how a principal’s decision to audit an agent’s proposal can reveal both actors’ spatial preferences, despite the strategic nature of the interaction. Empirical identification of the ideal points comes from leveraging settings where elections replace principals over time, but not agents. Although the procedure is quite general, I provide an illustration using data on federal regulatory policymaking in the United States and recover ideal point estimates for presidents and agencies across three administrations.","PeriodicalId":225808,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"107 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114230385","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Executive Influence on State Supreme Court Justices: Strategic Deference in Reappointment States 行政对州最高法院法官的影响:连任州的战略遵从
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 2019-07-01 DOI: 10.1093/JLEO/EWZ005
T. Gray
{"title":"Executive Influence on State Supreme Court Justices: Strategic Deference in Reappointment States","authors":"T. Gray","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWZ005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWZ005","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 State supreme court justices are often the final arbiters of cases in their jurisdictions. Yet, in states that grant governors the power to selectively reappoint supreme court justices, justices’ independence is limited. These governors are able to monitor justices’ decisions and are empowered to remove justices whose jurisprudence conflicts with the governor’s preferences. This power gives governors substantial influence over judicial decision-making by justices eligible for another term on the bench. I test this proposition on an exhaustive set of state supreme court criminal appeals from 1995 to 2010, and show that votes by justices who need to be reappointed covary with executive preferences, and more than votes by justices ineligible for reappointment. These effects are stable across time within a justice’s term so long as the serving governor may one day be their reappointer. I also show that these shifting individual votes lead to changes in outcomes for defendants.","PeriodicalId":225808,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"314 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122319483","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Never too Late: Gender Quotas in the Final Round of a Multistage Tournament 为时未晚:多阶段锦标赛最后一轮的性别配额
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 2019-04-22 DOI: 10.1093/JLEO/EWZ003
E. Czibor, S. Martinez
{"title":"Never too Late: Gender Quotas in the Final Round of a Multistage Tournament","authors":"E. Czibor, S. Martinez","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWZ003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWZ003","url":null,"abstract":"Affirmative action policies have been shown to induce talented women to compete in laboratory contexts. However, evidence from actual policy changes is more ambiguous. While existing laboratory experiments have exclusively analyzed gender quotas in one-shot tournaments, we focus on a setting that models real life examples, such as quotas in corporate boards, more closely: quotas implemented at the final round of a multistage elimination contest. We find that later-stage quotas increase female participation already in the first round of the tournament, showing that women are responsive to changes in the option value of continued competition. Quotas also increase high-ability women’s representation among the final-stage competitors without significantly reducing entry among men, thereby promoting diversity without harming efficiency. We provide evidence for the importance of relative performance beliefs in determining the response to quotas among both genders.","PeriodicalId":225808,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128912612","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
Auctioning Class Action Representation 拍卖集体诉讼代理
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 2019-04-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3329380
A. Klement, Moran Ofir
{"title":"Auctioning Class Action Representation","authors":"A. Klement, Moran Ofir","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3329380","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3329380","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Class actions feature severe agency problems, resulting from the divergence of interests between class members and the class attorney. This article proposes a novel mechanism for selecting the class attorney and aligning her interests with those of the represented class. The mechanism applies a combined percentage and hourly litigation fee structure, suggested by Polinsky, Mitchell A., and Daniel L. Rubinfeld. 2003. “Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients,” 5 Am Law Econ Rev 165, in which lawyers earn a percentage of the class’ common fund, and bear the same percentage over their time investment. To maximize the expected payoff for the class, we supplement this fee structure with a preliminary two stages auction, in which the role of the lawyer is tendered using competitive bidding. We prove that the proposed auction approximates the highest possible net payoff for the class as the number of lawyers who compete for the right to represent the class increases. The percentage taken by the lawyer would be the lowest possible, and the winning lawyer would be the one who produces the highest expected net payoff for the class. We then extend the model to cases where the attorney files the class action is compensated for her pre-filing investment, and to settlements (JEL K41, K22)","PeriodicalId":225808,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"72 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115546292","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Quality Review of Mass Adjudication: A Randomized Natural Experiment at the Board of Veterans Appeals, 2003–16 大规模裁决的质量审查:退伍军人上诉委员会的随机自然实验，2003-16
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 2019-03-29 DOI: 10.1093/JLEO/EWZ001
Daniel E. Ho, Cassandra Handan-Nader, D. Ames, D. Marcus
{"title":"Quality Review of Mass Adjudication: A Randomized Natural Experiment at the Board of Veterans Appeals, 2003–16","authors":"Daniel E. Ho, Cassandra Handan-Nader, D. Ames, D. Marcus","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWZ001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWZ001","url":null,"abstract":"We study a unique natural experiment, during which 5-10% of draft opinions by judges of the Board of Veterans Appeals (BVA) were randomly selected for “quality review” by a team of full-time staff attorneys for nearly 15 years. This performance program had the express goals of measuring accuracy and reducing reversal rates on appeal. In cases of legal error, the quality review team wrote memoranda to judges to permit correction before opinions were issued. We use rich internal administrative data on nearly 600,000 cases from 2002-2016 to provide the first rigorous study of this review process. With precise estimates, we show that the program had no appreciable effect on reducing appeals or reversals. Based on internal records, we demonstrate that this inefficacy is likely by design, as meeting the performance measure of “accuracy” was at cross-purposes with error correction. These findings inform longstanding questions of law, organization, and bureaucracy, including performance management, standards of review, and the institutional design of mass adjudication.","PeriodicalId":225808,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125631693","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Exchange in the Absence of Legal Enforcement: Reputation and Multilateral Punishment under Uncertainty 缺乏法律执行的交换:不确定性下的声誉与多边惩罚
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 2019-03-01 DOI: 10.1093/JLEO/EWY026
Aidin Hajikhameneh, Jared Rubin
{"title":"Exchange in the Absence of Legal Enforcement: Reputation and Multilateral Punishment under Uncertainty","authors":"Aidin Hajikhameneh, Jared Rubin","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWY026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWY026","url":null,"abstract":"Principal-agent problems can reduce gains from exchange available in long distance trade. One solution historically used to mitigate such problems is multilateral punishment, whereby groups of principals jointly punish cheating agents by giving them bad reputations. But how does such punishment work when there is uncertainty regarding whether an agent actually cheated or was just the victim of bad luck? And how might such uncertainty be mitigated—or exacerbated—by non-observable, pro-social behavioral characteristics? We address these questions by designing a simple modified trust game with uncertainty and the capacity for principals to employ multilateral punishment. Our experimental results indicate that a modest amount of uncertainty has little effect on overall welfare: while part of the surplus is destroyed by uncertainty, principals are also more willing to trust agents with bad reputations, thereby increasing the frequency of welfare-enhancing exchange.","PeriodicalId":225808,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115022142","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
The Effects of Electoral Incentives on Fiscal Policy: Evidence from a Legislative Change at the Local Government Level 选举激励对财政政策的影响:来自地方政府层面立法变革的证据
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 2019-01-18 DOI: 10.1093/JLEO/EWY027
Linda Veiga, F. Veiga
{"title":"The Effects of Electoral Incentives on Fiscal Policy: Evidence from a Legislative Change at the Local Government Level","authors":"Linda Veiga, F. Veiga","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWY027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWY027","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes how electoral incentives shape fiscal policy, focusing on the introduction of mayoral term limits in Portugal. Applying a difference-in-differences approach, we find evidence that when a municipality has a term-limited (TL) mayor, it experiences a fall in revenues and expenditures. The effect seems to be driven by lower effort of lame-duck mayors, relative to reelection-eligible ones, to implement new investments and to obtain conditional grants from the central government, especially in election years. Although lame ducks are less opportunistic in general, the results suggest that opportunism may not decrease in municipalities whose TL mayors resign before the end of their terms and are replaced by their (eligible) vice-mayors.","PeriodicalId":225808,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123781679","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
Legal Rasputins? Law Clerk Influence on Voting at the US Supreme Court 法律妖?法律助理对美国最高法院投票的影响
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 2019-01-02 DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewy024
Adam Bonica, Adam Chilton, Jacob Goldin, K. Rozema, M. Sen
{"title":"Legal Rasputins? Law Clerk Influence on Voting at the US Supreme Court","authors":"Adam Bonica, Adam Chilton, Jacob Goldin, K. Rozema, M. Sen","doi":"10.1093/jleo/ewy024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewy024","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":225808,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"156 9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125915966","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Communication and the Optimality of Hierarchy in Organizations 沟通与组织层级的最优性
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 2018-12-26 DOI: 10.1093/JLEO/EWY025
Huanxing Yang, Lan Zhang
{"title":"Communication and the Optimality of Hierarchy in Organizations","authors":"Huanxing Yang, Lan Zhang","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWY025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWY025","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies optimal organization structures in multidivisional organizations with more than two divisions. The decisions of individual divisions need to be adapted to local conditions but also be coordinated. Information about local conditions is held by division managers who communicate strategically. In this setting, in addition to centralized and decentralized organizations, a hierarchical organization may arise in which divisions are organized into groups, and decisions are made by group managers. Our central result is that when the needs for coordination are intermediate, such a hierarchical organization performs better than centralization or decentralization. We then compare Ms-form hierarchy (in which mutually more dependent divisions are grouped together) and Mw-form hierarchy (in which mutually less dependent divisions are grouped together). Somewhat surprisingly, an Mw-form is sometimes preferred over an Ms-form hierarchy. (JEL D23, D83, L23)","PeriodicalId":225808,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125718776","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
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