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The Welfare-Enhancing Role of Parental Leave Mandates 育儿假法令的福利促进作用
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 2018-11-14 DOI: 10.1093/JLEO/EWY021
S. Bastani, Tomer Blumkin, Luca Micheletto
{"title":"The Welfare-Enhancing Role of Parental Leave Mandates","authors":"S. Bastani, Tomer Blumkin, Luca Micheletto","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWY021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWY021","url":null,"abstract":"A major factor that contributes to persistent gender variation in labor market outcomes is women’s traditional role in the household. Child-related absences from work imply that women accumulate less job experience, are more prone to career discontinuities and, hence, suffer a motherhood penalty. We highlight how the gender-driven career/family segmentation of the labor market may create a normative justification for parental leave rules as a means to enhance efficiency in the labor market and alleviate the gender wage gap. (JEL D82, H21, J31, J83)","PeriodicalId":225808,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131651932","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Corrigendum to: Bid Rigging and Entry Deterrence in Public Procurement: Evidence from an Investigation into Collusion and Corruption in Quebec 公共采购中的投标操纵和进入威慑:来自魁北克省串通和腐败调查的证据
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 2018-08-24 DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewy020
{"title":"Corrigendum to: Bid Rigging and Entry Deterrence in Public Procurement: Evidence from an Investigation into Collusion and Corruption in Quebec","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/jleo/ewy020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewy020","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":225808,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128539057","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Appraising the “Merger Price” Appraisal Rule 评估“并购价格”评估规则
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 2018-08-21 DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewy016
A. Choi, E. Talley
{"title":"Appraising the “Merger Price” Appraisal Rule","authors":"A. Choi, E. Talley","doi":"10.1093/jleo/ewy016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewy016","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":225808,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"112 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124070064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
The Effect of Social Norms on Bribe Offers 社会规范对贿赂行为的影响
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 2018-07-20 DOI: 10.1093/JLEO/EWY015
K. Abbink, E. Freidin, Lata Gangadharan, Rodrigo Moro
{"title":"The Effect of Social Norms on Bribe Offers","authors":"K. Abbink, E. Freidin, Lata Gangadharan, Rodrigo Moro","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWY015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWY015","url":null,"abstract":"We report a sequential bribery game to disentangle the effect of descriptive social norms among public officials on bribe offers by firms. Participants who knew that they were interacting with a partner from a group with a majority of corrupt (as opposed to honest) partners offered twice as many bribes. This effect of norms occurred independently of strategic considerations and the possibility of being sanctioned. Indeed, the effect of sanctions was not significant. These findings highlight a causal connection from perceptions of bribery to actual behavior.","PeriodicalId":225808,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127072377","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 26
Clueless Politicians: On Policymaker Incentives for Information Acquisition in a Model of Lobbying 愚钝的政治家:论游说模型中决策者获取信息的动机
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 2018-07-13 DOI: 10.1093/JLEO/EWY009
Christopher S. Cotton, Cheng Li
{"title":"Clueless Politicians: On Policymaker Incentives for Information Acquisition in a Model of Lobbying","authors":"Christopher S. Cotton, Cheng Li","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWY009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWY009","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a model of policymaking in which a politician decides how much expertise to acquire or how informed to become about issues before interest groups (IGs) engage in monetary lobbying. For a range of issues, the policymaker (PM) prefers to remain less informed about policy than may be socially optimal, even when acquiring expertise or better information is costless. Such a strategy leads to more-intense lobbying competition and larger political contributions. We identify a novel benefit of campaign finance reform, showing how contribution limits decrease the incentives that PMs have to remain under-informed on the issues on which they vote. The analysis goes on to allow for a fully general information strategy in the spirit of Bayesian Persuasion. In the case of symmetric IGs, a PM’s optimal strategy maximizes the probability he is “on the fence” when deciding between policies.","PeriodicalId":225808,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132600324","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 13
Corruption and Sensitive Soccer Games: Cross-Country Evidence 腐败和敏感的足球比赛:跨国证据
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 2018-07-05 DOI: 10.1093/JLEO/EWY013
Guy Elaad, Alex Krumer, J. Kantor
{"title":"Corruption and Sensitive Soccer Games: Cross-Country Evidence","authors":"Guy Elaad, Alex Krumer, J. Kantor","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWY013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWY013","url":null,"abstract":"We utilize data from sensitive soccer games in 75 countries between the years 2001 and 2013. In these games one team was in immediate danger of relegation to a lower division (Team A) and another team was not affected by the result (Team B). Using within-country variation, our difference-in-difference analysis reveals that the more corrupt the country, according to Corruption Perceptions Index, the higher is the probability that Team A would achieve the desired result in the sensitive games relative to achieving this result in other, non-sensitive games against the same team. We also find that in the later stages of the following year, the probability that Team A would lose against Team B compared to losing against a similar team (usually better than Team B) is significantly higher in more corrupt countries than in less corrupt countries. This result serves as evidence of quid pro quo behavior.","PeriodicalId":225808,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"2016 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131406072","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 18
Partisanship, Political Institutions, and Debt Issues 党派关系、政治制度和债务问题
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 2018-06-23 DOI: 10.1093/JLEO/EWY010
Zachary Peskowitz, Suhas A. Sridharan
{"title":"Partisanship, Political Institutions, and Debt Issues","authors":"Zachary Peskowitz, Suhas A. Sridharan","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWY010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWY010","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the effect of gubernatorial partisanship on municipal bond issues in the United States using a regression discontinuity design. Our unique dataset of individual bond issues allows us to precisely measure the issuing behavior of different entity types—states, state authorities, and localities—and examine how the response of debt issues to gubernatorial partisanship varies across jurisdictions. The election of Democratic governors results in higher levels of debt issuance, with an annual per capita increase of approximately $73–$147 in states that lack debt referenda requirements. In states with debt referenda requirements, the estimated per capita annual effect of a Democratic governor is approximately $23–$28. We find that governors are not able to circumvent debt referenda requirements by issuing debt through state authorities or local governments.","PeriodicalId":225808,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114822583","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Bid Rigging and Entry Deterrence in Public Procurement: Evidence from an Investigation into Collusion and Corruption in Quebec 公共采购中的串通投标和进入威慑:来自魁北克省串通和腐败调查的证据
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 2018-02-01 DOI: 10.1093/JLEO/EWY011
R. Clark, Decio Coviello, J. Gauthier, Artyom Shneyerov
{"title":"Bid Rigging and Entry Deterrence in Public Procurement: Evidence from an Investigation into Collusion and Corruption in Quebec","authors":"R. Clark, Decio Coviello, J. Gauthier, Artyom Shneyerov","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWY011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWY011","url":null,"abstract":"We study the impact of an investigation into collusion and corruption to learn about the organization of cartels in public procurement auctions. Our focus is on MontrealÂ’s asphalt industry, where there have been allegations of bid rigging, market segmentation, complementary bidding and bribes to bureaucrats, and where, in 2009, a police investigation was launched. We collect procurement data and use a difference-in-difference approach to compare outcomes before and after the investigation in Montreal and in Quebec City, where there have been no allegations of collusion or corruption. We find that entry and participation increased, and that the price of procurement decreased. We then decompose the price decrease to quantify the importance of two aspects of cartel organization, coordination and entry deterrence, for collusive pricing. We find that the latter explains only a small part of the decrease.","PeriodicalId":225808,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130367275","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 37
Cooperation in Hierarchical Organizations: An Incentive Perspective 层级组织中的合作:激励视角
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 1992-04-01 DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDJOURNALS.JLEO.A037041
Hideshi Itoh
{"title":"Cooperation in Hierarchical Organizations: An Incentive Perspective","authors":"Hideshi Itoh","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDJOURNALS.JLEO.A037041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDJOURNALS.JLEO.A037041","url":null,"abstract":"\"Failures of cooperation\" is one of the six recurring patterns of weakness in productivity performance in the United States pointed out by the MIT Commission on Industrial Productivity (Dertouzos et al.). The commission discusses a lack of cooperation at various levels-within firms, between labor and management, in vertical relationships such as producer-consumer and producer-supplier linkages, and among firis in the same industry segment. For example, the commission ascribes the failure of cooperation within the firm to excessive specialization, multiple layers of bureaucracy, and little lateral flow of information. These features are the major ingredients of what was once considered (and has still been considered by many) as the most effective organizational structure: hierarchy based on extensive division of labor. In this structure the production process is divided into many distinct tasks, each of which is made the sole responsibility of a specialist who is only adept at the performance of that task, and coordination among tasks is a specialized job of upper management. The deviation from such an organizational structure seems evident, however. In the field of human resource man-","PeriodicalId":225808,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1992-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128699334","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 213
OUP accepted manuscript OUP接受稿件
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewac006
{"title":"OUP accepted manuscript","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/jleo/ewac006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewac006","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":225808,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"180 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114848427","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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