腐败和敏感的足球比赛:跨国证据

Guy Elaad, Alex Krumer, J. Kantor
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引用次数: 18

摘要

我们利用了2001年至2013年间75个国家的敏感足球比赛数据。在这些比赛中,一支球队有降级到较低级别的危险(a队),而另一支球队没有受到结果的影响(B队)。使用国内变化,我们的差异分析显示,根据腐败感知指数,国家越腐败,相对于在与同一支球队的其他非敏感比赛中取得预期结果,a队在敏感比赛中取得预期结果的可能性就越高。我们还发现,在第二年的后期阶段,在腐败程度较高的国家,A队输给B队的概率明显高于输给类似球队(通常比B队强)的概率。这一结果可作为交换条件行为的证据。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Corruption and Sensitive Soccer Games: Cross-Country Evidence
We utilize data from sensitive soccer games in 75 countries between the years 2001 and 2013. In these games one team was in immediate danger of relegation to a lower division (Team A) and another team was not affected by the result (Team B). Using within-country variation, our difference-in-difference analysis reveals that the more corrupt the country, according to Corruption Perceptions Index, the higher is the probability that Team A would achieve the desired result in the sensitive games relative to achieving this result in other, non-sensitive games against the same team. We also find that in the later stages of the following year, the probability that Team A would lose against Team B compared to losing against a similar team (usually better than Team B) is significantly higher in more corrupt countries than in less corrupt countries. This result serves as evidence of quid pro quo behavior.
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