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Competition policy and the labor share 竞争政策与劳动份额
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 2023-07-11 DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewad008
Amit Zac, Carola Casti, C. Decker, Ariel Ezrachi
{"title":"Competition policy and the labor share","authors":"Amit Zac, Carola Casti, C. Decker, Ariel Ezrachi","doi":"10.1093/jleo/ewad008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewad008","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Recent years have seen intense debate about the causes of the observed decline in the labor share. We extend this inquiry by investigating whether the design and enforcement of competition law and policy are associated with changes in the labor share. Using a panel of 22 industries in 12 OECD economies, we find a positive statistical association between the effectiveness of competition policy and changes in the labor share over the period 1995–2005. This suggests a potential link between the design and effectiveness of competition policy and the labor share, and more broadly to distributional outcomes. Our results reinforce the importance of accounting for country-specific factors, including the design and enforcement of local laws, when examining dynamics in the labor share. The analysis implies that effective competition law and policy could mitigate the decline of the labor share, particularly in settings characterized by low levels of labor protection and limited labor bargaining power. (JEL: E21, E24, E64, J01, J21, K21, L40).","PeriodicalId":225808,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121934120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The role of personal and impersonal relational contracts on partner selection and efficiency 个人和非个人关系契约对合作伙伴选择和效率的作用
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 2023-07-04 DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewad011
Manuel Muñoz-Herrera, Ernesto Reuben
{"title":"The role of personal and impersonal relational contracts on partner selection and efficiency","authors":"Manuel Muñoz-Herrera, Ernesto Reuben","doi":"10.1093/jleo/ewad011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewad011","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this article, we use a laboratory experiment to study the effects of relational contracts on market efficiency in environments with different degrees of contract enforceability and market competition. By exogenously varying the communication protocol, we create relational contracts that are more personal or impersonal. On the one hand, personal relational contracts improve efficiency by promoting trust and coordination. On the other hand, impersonal relational contracts increase efficiency by facilitating the severance of trading relationships when more productive competitors enter the market. Therefore, the overall effect on market efficiency depends on the relative importance of competition and agreement enforceability (JEL D91, L22, L14).","PeriodicalId":225808,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"125 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121698943","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Peer pressure and discrimination: evidence from international cricket 同侪压力与歧视:来自国际板球的证据
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 2023-06-29 DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewad010
A. Nilesh Fernando, Siddharth Eapen George
{"title":"Peer pressure and discrimination: evidence from international cricket","authors":"A. Nilesh Fernando, Siddharth Eapen George","doi":"10.1093/jleo/ewad010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewad010","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We study how peers affect in-group bias. Exploiting several umpiring reforms in international cricket matches—where two umpires make independent decisions in each other’s presence—we show that home-team umpires are less biased when working with a neutral colleague, that is, one who is neither a national of the home nor the foreign team. This temporary debiasing is driven by the social pressure umpires feel to be impartial in the presence of neutral peers. Performance evaluation by visually non-salient monitors does not reduce bias, suggesting that physical presence is an important component of debiasing and peer influence. (JEL J71, J15, D91)","PeriodicalId":225808,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125321659","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Product liability and firm owners’ delegation to overconfident managers 产品责任与企业所有者对过度自信管理者的授权
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 2023-05-19 DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewad007
Tim Friehe, C. Pham
{"title":"Product liability and firm owners’ delegation to overconfident managers","authors":"Tim Friehe, C. Pham","doi":"10.1093/jleo/ewad007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewad007","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article analyzes the socially optimal liability allocation when strictly liable Cournot firms delegate their safety and output choices to managers whose potential biases are chosen by firm owners and consumers misperceive product risks. Firm owners always hire managers who are overconfident about their product safety’s effectiveness in reducing product-related accident risk. However, the extent of overconfidence depends on consumers’ risk perceptions and the allocation of liability. As a result, the socially optimal liability allocation hinges on whether consumers underestimate or overestimate product risk. When consumers overestimate product risks, firms should be held liable for all losses incurred by consumers. However, when consumers underestimate risk, firms should only be held liable for a part of consumer losses. We also show that, in some circumstances, negligence produces socially more desirable outcomes than strict liability (JEL: K13, L13, L14).","PeriodicalId":225808,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127079422","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Anti-money-laundering oversight and banks’ reporting of suspicious transactions: some empirical evidence 反洗钱监管与银行可疑交易报告:一些经验证据
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 2023-04-13 DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewad004
M. Gara, Francesco Manaresi, D. Marchetti, M. Marinucci
{"title":"Anti-money-laundering oversight and banks’ reporting of suspicious transactions: some empirical evidence","authors":"M. Gara, Francesco Manaresi, D. Marchetti, M. Marinucci","doi":"10.1093/jleo/ewad004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewad004","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We investigate the relation between anti-money-laundering (AML) inspections and banks’ ability and effort to identify and report suspicious transactions. We do so by using detailed data from the Bank of Italy and the Italian Financial Intelligence Unit, which include information on (i) authorities’ on-site inspections and enforcement actions, (ii) quantity and quality of suspicious transactions reports filed by banks before and after inspections, and (iii) reports’ investigative follow-ups. We document an increase in banks’ reporting after an inspection. Crucially, the increase is not concentrated among low-quality reports, but is spread to reports which are relevant from both a financial and an investigative point of view. We thus overall observe a rise in the information conveyed by AML reports after the authorities’ intervention. On the mechanism of the effect, we provide some suggestive evidence that inspections induce an increase of both banks’ reporting effort as well as screening skills (JEL G28, K23, L51, M21).","PeriodicalId":225808,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133304087","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Congressional Leadership Dilemma 国会领导层的困境
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 2023-02-27 DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewad001
Christian Fong
{"title":"The Congressional Leadership Dilemma","authors":"Christian Fong","doi":"10.1093/jleo/ewad001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewad001","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Previous theories assume that congressional party leaders internalize the welfare of the parties they lead. Accordingly, existing work deemphasizes the role of agency problems in explaining the conditions under which parties grant more political resources to their leaders. To show how agency problems can still arise even when the party leader wants only to maximize collective goods and stay in office, I offer a model that borrows two ideas from models of political accountability: leaders vary in quality and giving the leader more resources makes it more difficult to remove her. The model implies that the party faces a tradeoff between maximizing the leader’s capacity to produce collective goods and preserving its ability to remove low-quality leaders from office. This theory offers novel predictions, integrates existing results as implications of a single theory, and explains why the leader’s resources sometimes change even as the political context remains the same (JEL D72: Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior).","PeriodicalId":225808,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122558797","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
International politics and oil trade: evidence from Russian oil exports 国际政治与石油贸易:来自俄罗斯石油出口的证据
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 2023-02-25 DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewad005
S. Mityakov, Margarita Portnykh, K. Tsui
{"title":"International politics and oil trade: evidence from Russian oil exports","authors":"S. Mityakov, Margarita Portnykh, K. Tsui","doi":"10.1093/jleo/ewad005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewad005","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Oil is often considered a “political” good affected by the changes in international political relations. Using a novel dataset on Russian oil-exporting companies over 1999–2011, we find that a worsening in political relations between Russia and an oil-importing country results in a considerable reduction in oil shipments by Russian oil exporting firms into that country, the effect being stronger for state-owned firms. Using leadership changes in oil importing countries as exogenous shocks to political relations, we show that this relationship is causal. However, total exports revenue of Russian oil exporting firms is not affected much, as they seem to be able to recover losses incurred in one market by increasing their sales in other markets. At the same time, the countries importing oil from Russia (especially the ones heavily dependent on Russian oil) see their total oil and energy imports decline (JEL F51, F65, G15, Q34).","PeriodicalId":225808,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"14 6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116790516","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Vulnerability to tax enforcement and spillovers of corruption: cross-industry evidence from China 税收执法脆弱性与腐败溢出:来自中国的跨行业证据
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 2022-09-27 DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewac019
Shawn Xiaoguang Chen
{"title":"Vulnerability to tax enforcement and spillovers of corruption: cross-industry evidence from China","authors":"Shawn Xiaoguang Chen","doi":"10.1093/jleo/ewac019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewac019","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The article investigates the cross-industry spillover effect of tax enforcement and corruption. I propose a two-sector optimal tax administration model by incorporating vulnerability to tax enforcement (VTE) and corruption into the Allingham–Sandmo framework. Based on two large surveys of Chinese firms, I test the model by using industrial capital-intensity as a proxy for firms’ VTE and exploiting turnover of prefectural secretaries of the Communist Party of China between 2000 and 2007 as a driving force of corruption. The findings suggest capital-intensive industries, which are vulnerable to tougher enforcement, pay higher effective tax rates, and, therefore, have stronger incentives to bribe in order to reduce their tax burden. The bribery produces negative spillovers that raise the effective tax rates of their labor-intensive counterparts. Further evidence confirms that older prefectural secretaries are prone to be corrupt and exhibit stronger tenure effects both on the effective tax rates and on firms’ corruption expenditure (JEL H21, H26, H32, D22, D73).","PeriodicalId":225808,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132661327","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Does corruption hinder female political participation? Evidence from a measure against organized crime 腐败是否阻碍了女性参政?打击有组织犯罪的证据
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 2022-09-14 DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewac015
A. L. Baraldi, Carla Ronza
{"title":"Does corruption hinder female political participation? Evidence from a measure against organized crime","authors":"A. L. Baraldi, Carla Ronza","doi":"10.1093/jleo/ewac015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewac015","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article analyzes the effect of anti-corruption measures on female political empowerment. We exploit a measure that prescribes the dissolution of city councils for mafia infiltration, leading to an exogenous decrease in the level of corruption within local government. We find that the percentage of female councilors and aldermen elected after compulsory administrations, as well as the probability of a female mayor, sharply increases relative to the control group; the effect of the measure is decreasing over time. The evidence suggests that the most likely mechanism mediating the result relies on the reduction in the voter bias against women as policymakers rather than the (self-)selection of women (JEL D72, D78, J16, J71, I38).","PeriodicalId":225808,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128525306","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
The Benefits of Trade Secret Legal Protection: Evidence from Firms’ Cost Structure Decisions 商业秘密法律保护的利益:来自企业成本结构决策的证据
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 2022-08-05 DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewac013
F. Gao, Xue Wang, Benda Yin
{"title":"The Benefits of Trade Secret Legal Protection: Evidence from Firms’ Cost Structure Decisions","authors":"F. Gao, Xue Wang, Benda Yin","doi":"10.1093/jleo/ewac013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewac013","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We investigate whether better trade secret legal protection permits a firm to shift resources from protecting trade secrets to expanding its fixed operation capacity, thus reducing cost elasticity. We employ the staggered adoption of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD) by US state courts as a plausibly exogenous shock that improves trade secret legal protection. We find a reduction, on average, in cost elasticity in firms headquartered in the IDD recognition states relative to those in non-affected states. This change in cost structure is concentrated in firms with trade secrets. These results highlight that the optimal choice of fixed resources is affected by the extent of trade secret protection. Further, we find that firm value is higher for trade secret firms after the IDD adoption. Overall, our empirical evidence suggests that trade secret legal protection is beneficial for firms with trade secrets. ","PeriodicalId":225808,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123507899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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