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Political Agency and Implementation Subsidies with Imperfect Monitoring 监督不完善的政治代理与执行补贴
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 2021-04-05 DOI: 10.31235/osf.io/ydfbs
B. Blumenthal
{"title":"Political Agency and Implementation Subsidies with Imperfect Monitoring","authors":"B. Blumenthal","doi":"10.31235/osf.io/ydfbs","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/ydfbs","url":null,"abstract":"Voters are frequently ill-equipped to monitor politicians' actions. Politicians are expected to implement projects, whose benefits sometimes partially accrue to interest groups and not entirely to voters. Since implementing projects is costly, interest groups have an incentive to subsidise policy-making. This paper shows how these considerations interact in a two-period political agency model with moral hazard and adverse selection. I show how the existence of self-interested interest groups and their involvement in the policy-making process affect voters' welfare. I also show why voters do not fully monitor politicians in the presence of interest groups that might capture projects' benefits.","PeriodicalId":225808,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"253 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125711392","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Political Consequences of Economic Hardship: State Economic Activity and Polarization in American Legislatures 经济困难的政治后果:州经济活动和美国立法机构的两极分化
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 2020-12-23 DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewaa023
Haritz Garro
{"title":"Political Consequences of Economic Hardship: State Economic Activity and Polarization in American Legislatures","authors":"Haritz Garro","doi":"10.1093/jleo/ewaa023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewaa023","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Previous literature has explored the effects of economic conditions on voting behavior. In this article, I analyze how the economy affects legislative polarization. Using recently available state legislator ideal point estimates, I find a strong negative relationship between state economic activity and political polarization. States that fared worse economically have experienced greater increases in legislative polarization. I show this relationship is causal by employing an instrumental variables strategy. The instrument isolates exogenous variation in state economic activity by exploiting time-series variation in oil prices, which differentially affects individual states according to their economic dependence on oil production. The estimated polarization effects are stronger for Republicans. The findings have implications for understanding the interaction between the economy and political outcomes. (JEL H7, H83).","PeriodicalId":225808,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130612439","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Electoral Systems, Selection, and Re-election:Evidence from Italian Municipalities 选举制度、选举和连任:来自意大利市政当局的证据
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 2020-12-14 DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewaa024
G. Gulino
{"title":"Electoral Systems, Selection, and Re-election:Evidence from Italian Municipalities","authors":"G. Gulino","doi":"10.1093/jleo/ewaa024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewaa024","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Using micro-level data on local Italian elections and exploiting a discontinuity at a population cutoff, I study the effect of electoral systems on politician selection and re-election. Evidence shows that the mayor’s probability of re-election is 25 percentage points higher in majoritarian systems than in proportional systems. Ruling coalitions elected under the majoritarian system enjoy a stable and long-lasting majority, attract more central transfers, and invest more in public libraries. While mayors elected under the two different electoral systems do not differ in any observable characteristics, they do tend to embark on a different political careers once they lose their municipal office. Surprisingly, mayors elected under the proportional system have a higher probability of being elected to regional offices after their mandate.\u0000 (JEL D72, H70, P16)","PeriodicalId":225808,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114227916","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
Media and Crime Perceptions: Evidence from Mexico 媒体与犯罪认知:来自墨西哥的证据
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 2020-08-04 DOI: 10.1093/JLEO/EWAA010
A. A. Ramírez-Álvarez
{"title":"Media and Crime Perceptions: Evidence from Mexico","authors":"A. A. Ramírez-Álvarez","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWAA010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWAA010","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article examines whether individuals’ crime perceptions and crime avoidance behavior respond to changes in crime news coverage. I use data from Mexico, where major media groups agreed to reduce coverage of violence in March 2011. Using a unique dataset on national news content and machine learning techniques, I document that after the Agreement, crime news coverage on television, radio, and newspapers decreases relative to the national homicide rate. Using survey data, I find robust evidence that crime perceptions respond to this change in content. After the Agreement, individuals with higher media exposure are less likely to report that they feel insecure and that their country, state, or municipality is insecure, relative to individuals with lower media exposure. Finally, I show that smaller changes on conspicuous consumption and food consumed outside the home accompany these changes in crime perceptions; while I do not find effects on stated crime avoidance behavior. (JEL: D83, K42, L82).","PeriodicalId":225808,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"63 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116800060","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
But-for Causation and the Implementability of Compensatory Damages Rules 但对因果关系和可执行性的补偿损害赔偿规则
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 2020-07-01 DOI: 10.1093/JLEO/EWZ014
U. Schweizer
{"title":"But-for Causation and the Implementability of Compensatory Damages Rules","authors":"U. Schweizer","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWZ014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWZ014","url":null,"abstract":"A damages rule is called compensatory if it requires compensation of each party who complied with the due care standard for harm caused by deficient precaution of the other party. The two main contributions of this article are as follows. First, we show that any Nash equilibrium of the game induced by a compensatory damages rule enhances welfare compared to the welfare that would have been attained if both parties had complied. This is true irrespective of whether the due care standards are set at their socially optimal level. Second, we provide a general result for evaluating the conditions under which courts have sufficient information to implement compensatory damages rules. This is the case when the available evidence allows courts to determine whether the injurer’s precaution choice was the but-for cause of any harm to the victim. The exact levels of precaution and harm need not be observable (JEL K13).","PeriodicalId":225808,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129934128","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Social Welfare Programs and Trust: Evidence from Six Latin American Cities 社会福利项目与信任:来自六个拉丁美洲城市的证据
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 2020-07-01 DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewz018
Alberto Chong, Vanessa Ríos-Salas, Hugo Nopo
{"title":"Social Welfare Programs and Trust: Evidence from Six Latin American Cities","authors":"Alberto Chong, Vanessa Ríos-Salas, Hugo Nopo","doi":"10.1093/jleo/ewz018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewz018","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Using individual-level data that are representative at the city level for six Latin American capital cities (Bogota, Buenos Aires, Caracas, Lima, Montevideo, and San José), we find that participation in government social welfare programs is negatively associated to trust, a result that is robust to the inclusion of individual risk measures and a broad array of controls. Our findings support the notion that low take-up rates may be linked to stigma and not to high transaction costs as commonly suggested (JEL D01, O12, O10).","PeriodicalId":225808,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131424494","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
The Illicit Benefits of Local Party Alignment in National Elections 地方政党结盟在全国选举中的非法利益
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 2020-05-04 DOI: 10.1093/JLEO/EWAA005
O. Borcan
{"title":"The Illicit Benefits of Local Party Alignment in National Elections","authors":"O. Borcan","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWAA005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWAA005","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 How do central politicians in young democracies secure electoral support at grassroots level? I show that alignment with local governments is instrumental in swaying national elections through, inter alia, electoral fraud. A regression discontinuity design with Romanian local elections and a president impeachment referendum in 2012 uncovers higher referendum turnouts in localities aligned with the government coalition—the impeachment initiators. Electoral forensics tests present abnormal vote count distributions across polling stations, consistent with ballot stuffing. The alignment effect, driven by rural localities, may explain the clientelistic government transfers found in this context and documented worldwide. (JEL D72, D73, H77)","PeriodicalId":225808,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"85 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125968016","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
The Direct Effect of Corporate Law on Entrepreneurship 公司法对企业家精神的直接影响
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 2020-03-18 DOI: 10.31235/osf.io/967ph
Jorge Guzmán
{"title":"The Direct Effect of Corporate Law on Entrepreneurship","authors":"Jorge Guzmán","doi":"10.31235/osf.io/967ph","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/967ph","url":null,"abstract":"I study how corporate law affects entrepreneurship by focusing on the experience of U.S. states who updated their corporate code to the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA), a compendium of legal best practices. States adopting the MBCA saw the number of new local corporations increase by 26%, on average. About half of this was substitution from other firm types, and the rest was net new firms. States that only partially adopted the MBCA saw no benefit, and the largest increases are concentrated in regions with ex-ante lower quality law.","PeriodicalId":225808,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127825939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
The Fact-Law Distinction: Strategic Factfinding and Lawmaking in a Judicial Hierarchy 事实与法律的区别:司法等级制度下的战略性事实发现与立法
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 2020-03-03 DOI: 10.1093/JLEO/EWAA019
Sepehr Shahshahani
{"title":"The Fact-Law Distinction: Strategic Factfinding and Lawmaking in a Judicial Hierarchy","authors":"Sepehr Shahshahani","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWAA019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWAA019","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 A fundamental but understudied procedural institution of American law is that appellate courts defer more to trial courts’ findings of fact than to their conclusions of law. I formally model this procedural institution, showing how trial courts use factfinding to achieve their preferred outcome and how appellate courts craft rules in anticipation of trial courts’ strategic factfinding. Trial courts do not always report facts truthfully. Appellate courts do not commit to consistent rules, but consistent rules may emerge in equilibrium, creating a misleading appearance of judicial commitment to legal consistency. Preference divergence between trial and appellate courts has a nonmonotonic effect on factfinding. Fact deference can explain suboptimal rulemaking and reversals even when there is no uncertainty about the likelihood of review or the reviewing court’s ideal rule. The model is also useful in understanding why the institution of fact deference persists. Applications to policing and other domains are discussed. (JEL K40, K41, D02)","PeriodicalId":225808,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132728879","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Partnership as Experimentation 作为实验的伙伴关系
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 2019-11-01 DOI: 10.1093/JLEO/EWZ007
Cihan Artunç, T. Guinnane
{"title":"Partnership as Experimentation","authors":"Cihan Artunç, T. Guinnane","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWZ007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWZ007","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Recent research disputes the view that the joint-stock corporation played a crucial role in historical economic development, but retains the idea that the costless firm dissolution implicit in non-corporate forms deterred investment. A multi-armed bandit model demonstrates the benefits of costless dissolution in an environment where potential business partners are not fully informed. Experimentation creates a spike in dissolution rates early in firms’ lives, as less productive matches break down and agents look for better matches. Many of the better matches adopt the corporate form, whose higher dissolution cost functions as a commitment device. We test the model’s predictions using firm-level data on 12,000 enterprises established in Egypt between 1910 and 1949. The partnership reflected a trade-off between committing to a partner and sorting into potentially better matches, fostering the formation of more productive enterprises (JEL D21, D22, L26, N15, O16).","PeriodicalId":225808,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124896914","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
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