地方政党结盟在全国选举中的非法利益

O. Borcan
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引用次数: 9

摘要

年轻民主国家的中央政治家如何确保基层选民的支持?我表明,与地方政府结盟,在通过选举欺诈等方式影响全国选举方面发挥了重要作用。2012年罗马尼亚地方选举和总统弹劾公投的回归不连续设计揭示了与政府联盟(弹劾发起者)一致的地方的公投投票率更高。选举取证测试显示,各投票站的计票分布异常,与选票填塞一致。由农村地区驱动的结盟效应可能解释了在这种背景下发现并在世界范围内记录的裙带式政府转移。(凝胶d72, d73, h77)
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Illicit Benefits of Local Party Alignment in National Elections
How do central politicians in young democracies secure electoral support at grassroots level? I show that alignment with local governments is instrumental in swaying national elections through, inter alia, electoral fraud. A regression discontinuity design with Romanian local elections and a president impeachment referendum in 2012 uncovers higher referendum turnouts in localities aligned with the government coalition—the impeachment initiators. Electoral forensics tests present abnormal vote count distributions across polling stations, consistent with ballot stuffing. The alignment effect, driven by rural localities, may explain the clientelistic government transfers found in this context and documented worldwide. (JEL D72, D73, H77)
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