{"title":"地方政党结盟在全国选举中的非法利益","authors":"O. Borcan","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWAA005","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n How do central politicians in young democracies secure electoral support at grassroots level? I show that alignment with local governments is instrumental in swaying national elections through, inter alia, electoral fraud. A regression discontinuity design with Romanian local elections and a president impeachment referendum in 2012 uncovers higher referendum turnouts in localities aligned with the government coalition—the impeachment initiators. Electoral forensics tests present abnormal vote count distributions across polling stations, consistent with ballot stuffing. The alignment effect, driven by rural localities, may explain the clientelistic government transfers found in this context and documented worldwide. (JEL D72, D73, H77)","PeriodicalId":225808,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"85 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"9","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Illicit Benefits of Local Party Alignment in National Elections\",\"authors\":\"O. Borcan\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/JLEO/EWAA005\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\n How do central politicians in young democracies secure electoral support at grassroots level? I show that alignment with local governments is instrumental in swaying national elections through, inter alia, electoral fraud. A regression discontinuity design with Romanian local elections and a president impeachment referendum in 2012 uncovers higher referendum turnouts in localities aligned with the government coalition—the impeachment initiators. Electoral forensics tests present abnormal vote count distributions across polling stations, consistent with ballot stuffing. The alignment effect, driven by rural localities, may explain the clientelistic government transfers found in this context and documented worldwide. (JEL D72, D73, H77)\",\"PeriodicalId\":225808,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization\",\"volume\":\"85 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-05-04\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"9\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWAA005\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWAA005","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The Illicit Benefits of Local Party Alignment in National Elections
How do central politicians in young democracies secure electoral support at grassroots level? I show that alignment with local governments is instrumental in swaying national elections through, inter alia, electoral fraud. A regression discontinuity design with Romanian local elections and a president impeachment referendum in 2012 uncovers higher referendum turnouts in localities aligned with the government coalition—the impeachment initiators. Electoral forensics tests present abnormal vote count distributions across polling stations, consistent with ballot stuffing. The alignment effect, driven by rural localities, may explain the clientelistic government transfers found in this context and documented worldwide. (JEL D72, D73, H77)