Executive Influence on State Supreme Court Justices: Strategic Deference in Reappointment States

Abstract

State supreme court justices are often the final arbiters of cases in their jurisdictions. Yet, in states that grant governors the power to selectively reappoint supreme court justices, justices’ independence is limited. These governors are able to monitor justices’ decisions and are empowered to remove justices whose jurisprudence conflicts with the governor’s preferences. This power gives governors substantial influence over judicial decision-making by justices eligible for another term on the bench. I test this proposition on an exhaustive set of state supreme court criminal appeals from 1995 to 2010, and show that votes by justices who need to be reappointed covary with executive preferences, and more than votes by justices ineligible for reappointment. These effects are stable across time within a justice’s term so long as the serving governor may one day be their reappointer. I also show that these shifting individual votes lead to changes in outcomes for defendants.