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Networks of Injustice and Worker Mobilisation at Walmart 沃尔玛的不公正网络和工人动员
ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-07-01 DOI: 10.1111/irj.12103
A. Wood
{"title":"Networks of Injustice and Worker Mobilisation at Walmart","authors":"A. Wood","doi":"10.1111/irj.12103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/irj.12103","url":null,"abstract":"This article investigates the use of Internet networks during the recent mobilisation of Californian Walmart workers. The findings of this case study suggest that Internet-based mass self-communication networks (Facebook, YouTube, etc.) can complement traditional organising techniques. Mass self-communication networks ameliorate many of the weaknesses identified by previous studies of Internet networks. In particular, these types of networks can help overcome negative dispositions towards unions, increase the density of communication and the level of participation among members, create a collective identity congruent with trade unionism, facilitate organisation and spread ‘swarming actions’ which are effective at leveraging symbolic power. Moreover, unions may be well suited to providing crucial strategic oversight and coordination to wider worker networks.","PeriodicalId":215232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"12 5","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117393610","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 61
Equity-Based Incentives and Collaboration in the Modern Multibusiness Firm 现代多元企业的股权激励与合作
ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-04-04 DOI: 10.1002/SMJ.2392
J. Oxley, Gurupdesh Pandher
{"title":"Equity-Based Incentives and Collaboration in the Modern Multibusiness Firm","authors":"J. Oxley, Gurupdesh Pandher","doi":"10.1002/SMJ.2392","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/SMJ.2392","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the role of equity-based incentives in fostering cross-business-unit collaboration in multibusiness firms. We develop a formal agency model in which headquarters offers equity and profit incentives to business-unit managers with the objective of maximizing total expected firm returns. The resulting compensation contract provides a rich mechanism for aggregating value from collaborative interactions across business units, aligning managers’ efforts with the firm’s growth prospects and organization structure, and managing the dual risk in profits and firm market value. The inclusion of equity incentives elicits higher levels of own-unit and collaborative efforts over the profits-only contract. Our results suggest that equity-based incentives are most beneficial when profitability is uncertain relative to long-term growth prospects, in firms pursuing related diversification strategies, and in periods of rising equity markets.","PeriodicalId":215232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131733541","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 20
Are Companies Maintaining Social Benefits in Constrained Economic Times? 在经济受限的情况下，企业能否维持社会福利?
ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-03-13 DOI: 10.1108/S2040-7246(2012)0000002011
María Dolores Vidal Salazar, Vera Ferrón‐Vílchez, Eulogio Cordón-Pozo
{"title":"Are Companies Maintaining Social Benefits in Constrained Economic Times?","authors":"María Dolores Vidal Salazar, Vera Ferrón‐Vílchez, Eulogio Cordón-Pozo","doi":"10.1108/S2040-7246(2012)0000002011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/S2040-7246(2012)0000002011","url":null,"abstract":"Is the current economic crisis affecting the quality of working conditions within organisations? More specifically, due to constrained economic times, are organisations reducing the social benefits they offer to employees? This study analyses whether the current situation of economic downturn influences companies’ maintenance of social benefits. Social benefits are those remunerations in kind voluntarily offered by an employer beyond what is established in labour laws and collective agreements.","PeriodicalId":215232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120927114","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Linkages between Employee Motivation and Customer Satisfaction within Higher Learning Institutions in the City of Buea in Cameroon 喀麦隆布埃亚市高等院校员工激励与客户满意度的关系
ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-03-05 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2574147
Professor Alain Ndedi, Marcelus U. Ajonina, Cynthia E. Elonge
{"title":"Linkages between Employee Motivation and Customer Satisfaction within Higher Learning Institutions in the City of Buea in Cameroon","authors":"Professor Alain Ndedi, Marcelus U. Ajonina, Cynthia E. Elonge","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2574147","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2574147","url":null,"abstract":"The main focus of this empirical research is to gauge “the impact of employee motivation on customer satisfaction. This study was carried out at some higher institutions in the city of Buea, South West Region of Cameroon, and examined the role employee motivation has to play in the success or failure of most private higher institutions in the city of Buea. Furthermore, the research investigated the relationship between employee motivation and student satisfaction in one part, but also as motivation components needed by higher learning institutions management to achieve student satisfaction and how the motivation of the institution personnel, namely administration staff and lecturers can affects the students. The population of the research was three private higher institutions in Buea; Higher Institute of Management Studies (HIMS), Catholic University Institute of Buea (CUIB) and Saint Monica University (SMU). The sample of the study was fifty-eight (58) respondents from the above three institutions who answered the questionnaires. Secondary data related to the literature on employee motivation, customer satisfaction, and higher learning institutions were used to support the content of the research. The study revealed that, employee motivation has an impact on student satisfaction thus some of the recommendations highlighted the need to motivate employees.","PeriodicalId":215232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"109 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126869468","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Why Organizations Fail: Models and Cases 为什么组织失败:模型和案例
ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-02-01 DOI: 10.1257/JEL.54.1.137
Luis Garicano, Luis Rayo
{"title":"Why Organizations Fail: Models and Cases","authors":"Luis Garicano, Luis Rayo","doi":"10.1257/JEL.54.1.137","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/JEL.54.1.137","url":null,"abstract":"Organizations fail due to incentive problems (agents do not want to act in the organization's interests) and bounded rationality problems (agents do not have the necessary information to do so). This survey uses recent advances in organizational economics to illuminate organizational failures along these two dimensions. We combine reviews of the literature with simple models and case discussions. Specifically, we consider failures related to short-termism and the allocation of authority, both of which are instances of \"multitasking problems\"; communication failures in the presence of both soft and hard information due to incentive misalignments; resistance to change due to vested interests and rigid cultures; and failures related to the allocation of talent and miscommunication due to bounded rationality. We find that the organizational economics literature provides parsimonious explanations for a large range of economically significant failures. ( JEL D21, D23, D82, D83, M10)","PeriodicalId":215232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129529776","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 74
Information Acquisition, Resource Allocation and Managerial Incentives 信息获取、资源配置与管理激励
ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2007595
O. Ozbas, Heikki Rantakari
{"title":"Information Acquisition, Resource Allocation and Managerial Incentives","authors":"O. Ozbas, Heikki Rantakari","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2007595","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2007595","url":null,"abstract":"A manager's compensation contract and the level of resources available to him jointly influence his incentives to acquire information about different investment alternatives as well as his resource allocate decisions. We show that the optimal compensation contract induces investment allocations that are more aggressive than the first-best allocation conditional on available information. The optimal level of resources may be set above or below the first-best level, depending on whether desired total investment increases or decreases with information. Both types of equilibrium investment distortions are used to motivate information acquisition by the manager. Finally, we show that choice of the level of resources can be delegated to the manager without any loss in efficiency through appropriately linking managerial compensation to the level of resources requested.","PeriodicalId":215232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116897635","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Equity-based Compensation of Outside Directors and Corporate Disclosure Quality 外部董事股权报酬与公司信息披露质量
ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2014-12-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1858862
P. Sengupta, Suning Zhang
{"title":"Equity-based Compensation of Outside Directors and Corporate Disclosure Quality","authors":"P. Sengupta, Suning Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1858862","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1858862","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the relation between a firm’s disclosure quality and equity-based compensation of independent members of the board of directors. The dimensions of disclosure quality we focus on are management’s earnings guidance and information flow through financial analysts. Using both levels and changes specifications, we find the average ratio of equity-based pay to total pay of independent board members to be positively related to a firm’s disclosure quality. Our findings are robust to the inclusion of management's equity-based compensation, other governance measures, and financial controls, and robust to instrumental variable tests of endogeneity. Furthermore, we find directors' equity-based compensation to be negatively associated with the firm's cost of equity capital. Our results are consistent with equity-based compensation providing incentives to independent directors to push for better disclosure quality.","PeriodicalId":215232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"247 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121677903","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 49
Optimal Effort Incentives in Dynamic Tournaments 动态比赛中的最优努力激励
ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2014-10-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2504918
A. Klein, A. Schmutzler
{"title":"Optimal Effort Incentives in Dynamic Tournaments","authors":"A. Klein, A. Schmutzler","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2504918","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2504918","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes two-stage rank-order tournaments. A principal decides (i) how to spread prize money across the two periods, (ii) how to weigh performance in the two periods when awarding the second period prize, and (iii) whether to reveal performance after the first period. The information revelation policy depends exclusively on properties of the effort cost function. The principal always puts a positive weight on first-period performance in the second period. The size of the weight and the optimal prizes depend on properties of the observation error distribution; they should be chosen so as to strike a balance between the competitiveness of first- and second-period tournaments. In particular, the principal sets no first-period prize unless the observations in period one are considerably more precise than in period two.","PeriodicalId":215232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116158386","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 29
Does Mentor's Ability Matter for Compensation? 导师的能力对薪酬有影响吗?
ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2014-09-16 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2276746
Georgios Farfaras, Ivan Stetsyuk
{"title":"Does Mentor's Ability Matter for Compensation?","authors":"Georgios Farfaras, Ivan Stetsyuk","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2276746","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2276746","url":null,"abstract":"We use an agency model with moral hazard and adverse selection to study the effect of a mentor's ability on the compensation of his mentees. An agent who is trained by a mentor of higher ability receives valuable experience that increases not only his productivity but also his output sensitivity to effort. In our model's equilibrium, the greater productivity translates into higher total compensation, and the greater output sensitivity of effort leads to stronger incentives. We test these predictions by using data from college football coaches and we find strong empirical support for our hypotheses. Football coaches who have previously worked as assistants to head coaches of superior ability, are on average more productive. We find that, 1% increase in mentor's performance (our proxy for mentor's ability) increases head coach's total compensation by $7,800. Finally, head coaches who had better mentors received on average stronger incentives in the form of bonus payments, a result which is consistent with our model's predictions.","PeriodicalId":215232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129161580","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Effects of Relative Performance Information on Individuals’ Satisfaction with the Work Itself 相对绩效信息对个人工作本身满意度的影响
ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2014-07-29 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2473821
R. Marley, Lee Kersting
{"title":"The Effects of Relative Performance Information on Individuals’ Satisfaction with the Work Itself","authors":"R. Marley, Lee Kersting","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2473821","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2473821","url":null,"abstract":"Organizations have a vested interest in minimizing employee turnover. Because prior empirical evidence demonstrates that task satisfaction is negatively related to employee turnover, this study examines whether relative performance information (RPI) can be used to reduce employee turnover by empirically testing the Job Characteristics Model’s feedback proposition (Hackman & Oldham, 1976) to determine whether individuals receiving RPI report higher task satisfaction than individuals not receiving RPI. In an experiment where student participants proxied as production workers in a mundane, effort-intensive task, the presence or absence of RPI was manipulated. Consistent with the prediction of the Job Characteristics Model, this study’s results demonstrate that providing RPI to individuals improves their task satisfaction, contributing to the body of literature that empirically validates theory. Further, this study’s findings should also be of interest to organizations seeking to reduce employee turnover.","PeriodicalId":215232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114849727","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
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