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ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)最新文献

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The Self-Concordance Model: The Effects of Autonomy, Effort and Goal Progress on Subjective Well-Being in the US and Russia 自我和谐模型:自主性、努力和目标进展对美国和俄罗斯主观幸福感的影响
ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-11-28 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2879337
Dmitry D. Suchkov
{"title":"The Self-Concordance Model: The Effects of Autonomy, Effort and Goal Progress on Subjective Well-Being in the US and Russia","authors":"Dmitry D. Suchkov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2879337","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2879337","url":null,"abstract":"How one perceives one’s own level of autonomy has important consequences for motivational features of goal pursuit and well-being during this process. We tested the hypothesis, inspired by Self-Determination Theory, and the Self-Concordance model, that pursuit of self-concordant goals, emanating from autonomous motivation results in an increase of well-being. This study employed a prospective design assessing several variables related to the goal: intended effort, actual effort, and progress in achieving. In accordance with the self-concordance model, these variables mediated the influence of the autonomy of the goal on well-being during the process of achievement. We replicated the model using SEM methodology, on both the US (N = 200) and the Russian (N = 410) samples. The additional modifications we made in the model kept the main logic of the previous research. Implications and future directions are discussed.","PeriodicalId":215232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126733919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
90 Cents of Every 'Pay-For-Performance' Dollar Are Paid for Luck 每一美元的“绩效工资”中有90美分是为运气买单的
ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-09-11 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2837504
Moshe Levy
{"title":"90 Cents of Every 'Pay-For-Performance' Dollar Are Paid for Luck","authors":"Moshe Levy","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2837504","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2837504","url":null,"abstract":"We empirically estimate that approximately 90% of standard option-based compensation constitutes pay-for-luck. This value is very robust, and stems from the inherent fact that chance plays a dominant role in determining firm performance. The impact of a manager on her expected compensation via the improvement of firm performance is low, hence, in contrast to common wisdom, standard option-based compensation does not constitute a strong motivating force for rational managers. Indexing and a high strike price can double an option’s motivational power.","PeriodicalId":215232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123645335","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Peer Information and Risk-Taking Under Competitive and Non-Competitive Pay Schemes 竞争性和非竞争性薪酬计划下的同行信息和风险承担
ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-08-01 DOI: 10.3386/W22486
Philip Brookins, Jennifer Brown, Dmitry Ryvkin
{"title":"Peer Information and Risk-Taking Under Competitive and Non-Competitive Pay Schemes","authors":"Philip Brookins, Jennifer Brown, Dmitry Ryvkin","doi":"10.3386/W22486","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W22486","url":null,"abstract":"Incentive schemes that reward participants based on their relative performance are often thought to be particularly risk-inducing. Using a novel, real-effort task experiment in the laboratory, we find that the relationship between incentives and risk-taking is more nuanced and depends critically on the availability of information about peers’ strategies and outcomes. Indeed, we find that when no peer information is available, relative rewards schemes are associated with significantly less risk-taking than non-competitive rewards. In contrast, when decision-makers receive information about their peers’ actions and/or outcomes, relative incentive schemes are associated with more risk-taking than non-competitive schemes. The nature of the feedback—whether subjects receive information about peers’ strategies, outcomes, or both—also affects risk-taking. We find no evidence that competitors imitate their peers when they face only feedback about other subjects’ risk-taking strategies. However, decision-makers take more risk when they see the gaps between their performance score and their peers’ scores grow. Combined feedback about peers’ strategies and performance—from which subjects may assess the overall relationship between risk-taking and success—is associated with more risk-taking when rewards are based on relative performance; we find no similar effect for non-competitive rewards.","PeriodicalId":215232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131033976","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
Buyback Behaviour and the Option Funding Hypothesis 回购行为与期权融资假说
ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-05-31 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2787581
R. Sonika, M. Shackleton
{"title":"Buyback Behaviour and the Option Funding Hypothesis","authors":"R. Sonika, M. Shackleton","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2787581","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2787581","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We study how stock option grants are funded through share repurchases under conditions of option exercisability and moneyness. Using daily repurchase disclosures by U.K. firms, we corroborate our hypothesis that driven by flexibility, firms repurchase early in an option schedule while options are out-of-money and before becoming exercisable. Our findings show that when daily stock prices are below weighted average option exercise price and when options are not immediately exercisable, firms (a) increase daily repurchase volume (value), (b) increase repurchase frequency, and (c) have lower relative repurchase prices. We further evidence this by examining the change in treasury regulation that enabled firms to hold on to repurchased shares rather than cancelling them. Our findings show a strong support for option funding motives in the post-treasury regulation period when repurchase flexibility is greater.","PeriodicalId":215232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131119659","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Labor Unions and Political Mobilization: Diminishing Returns of Repetitious Contact 工会与政治动员:重复接触的收益递减
ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-04-01 DOI: 10.1111/irel.12137
J. Lamare
{"title":"Labor Unions and Political Mobilization: Diminishing Returns of Repetitious Contact","authors":"J. Lamare","doi":"10.1111/irel.12137","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/irel.12137","url":null,"abstract":"Voter mobilization by unions has garnered some attention from scholars, and is seen as an important political tool. Unions often mobilize voters repeatedly across several campaigns; however, the literature treats mobilization as a singular event. This paper empirically analyzes turnout of 85,064 registered voters over 14 months at five election intervals in Los Angeles, exploring whether union-led mobilization is subject to diminishing returns across multiple elections. Results indicate that diminishing returns occur; three or more contacts are no more beneficial than one or two. Contact in recent elections is more effective than distant contact, and results differ slightly by contact type.","PeriodicalId":215232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120988347","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Designing Contracts for the Global Fund: Lessons from the Theory of Incentives 全球基金契约设计:激励理论的启示
ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-02-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2740556
Liam Wren-Lewis
{"title":"Designing Contracts for the Global Fund: Lessons from the Theory of Incentives","authors":"Liam Wren-Lewis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2740556","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2740556","url":null,"abstract":"This paper uses contract theory to suggest simple contract designs that could be used by the Global Fund. Using a basic model of procurement, we lay out five alternative options and consider when each is likely to be most appropriate. The rest of the paper then discusses how one can build a realworld contract from these theoretical foundations, and how these contracts should be adapted to different contexts when the basic assumptions do not hold. Finally, we provide a synthesis of these various results with the aim of guiding policy makers as to when and how ‘results-based’ incentive contracts can be used in practice.","PeriodicalId":215232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126276732","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Target Ratcheting, Short-Term Salaries and the Ratchet Effect 目标棘轮、短期薪酬及棘轮效应
ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-11-30 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2641118
M. Krebs
{"title":"Target Ratcheting, Short-Term Salaries and the Ratchet Effect","authors":"M. Krebs","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2641118","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2641118","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes the relation between target ratcheting and the ratchet effect. Empirical results are mixed about the extent to which target ratcheting leads to a ratchet effect. My contention is to show that short-term salaries mediate the relation between ratcheting targets and the ratchet effect. Anecdotal evidence indicates that firms differ in the amount of periods for which they keep salaries fixed. Accordingly, I distinguish between long-term and short-term salaries depending on whether salaries consider past performance. Firms have to adjust salaries and/or targets for retention purposes after persistent shocks in the economic environment. The analysis suggests that 1) short-term salaries can dampen, increase or even completely offset ratchet effects induced by ratcheting targets, and 2) the extent of the ratchet effect is independent of asymmetries of target adjustments after positive and negative variances if a firm applies short-term salaries. These insights help to explain the mixed evidence about the ratchet effect and provide new arguments for empirical studies in the field of target ratcheting.","PeriodicalId":215232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121942434","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Promotion Incentives, Performance Pay, and Human Capital Acquisition 晋升激励、绩效薪酬与人力资本获取
ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-10-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2701331
Jan-Oliver Strych
{"title":"Promotion Incentives, Performance Pay, and Human Capital Acquisition","authors":"Jan-Oliver Strych","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2701331","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2701331","url":null,"abstract":"The paper provides empirical evidence how promotion incentives and performance pay are related to nonverifiable human capital acquisition contingent on its grade of firm specificity. Consistent with Prendergast (1993), I document that promotion incentives are positively related to nonverifiable firm-specific human capital acquisition whereas individual performance pay (i.e., piece rates or productivity payments) is not related to such acquisition. If human capital is general rather than firm-specific, i.e., can also be utilized in other firms (Becker, 1962), I find that individual performance pay is positively related to such general human capital acquisition and there is no such relation for promotion incentives.","PeriodicalId":215232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116796100","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Consequences of Performance Measurement System: The Case of Sri Lankan Water Board 绩效评估系统的后果:斯里兰卡水务局的案例
ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-09-01 DOI: 10.21102/WJM.2015.09.62.08
D. Fie, Dayananda Ambalangodage, K. Gunawardana
{"title":"Consequences of Performance Measurement System: The Case of Sri Lankan Water Board","authors":"D. Fie, Dayananda Ambalangodage, K. Gunawardana","doi":"10.21102/WJM.2015.09.62.08","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21102/WJM.2015.09.62.08","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this study was to investigate the extent to which PMS influences employee behavior, organizational capabilities, and organizational performance. A questionnaire was used to collect data from 223 managerial employees of Sri Lankan Water Board. PMS was tested against employee behavior, organizational capabilities, and organizational performance via regression analysis. The findings of this study revealed moderate positive relationship between PMS and its consequences. The relationships were statistically significant. Consequences were categorized as employee behavior, organizational capabilities, and organizational performance. This study offers an understanding of existing literature relating to PMS and its consequences. The study was instrumental in testing the relationship between PMS and its consequences by using the survey data collected from Sri Lankan Water Board.","PeriodicalId":215232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116627109","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
The Shaping of Bank Incentive Structures by Strategic Factors Relating to the Drivers of Long-term Value Creation and Sustainability: A Stakeholder Perspective 与长期价值创造和可持续性驱动相关的战略因素对银行激励结构的塑造:利益相关者视角
ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-07-22 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2754505
F. Laurens
{"title":"The Shaping of Bank Incentive Structures by Strategic Factors Relating to the Drivers of Long-term Value Creation and Sustainability: A Stakeholder Perspective","authors":"F. Laurens","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2754505","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2754505","url":null,"abstract":"The role of bankers’ perverse incentives in contributing to the global financial crisis that started in 2007 has increased the need for empirical evidence on the efficacy of bank incentive structures to adequately align the interests of stakeholders. This qualitative study investigated the bonus phenomenon, targeting the financial services industry, and explored what the drivers are for sustainable value creation from the perspective of bank employee stakeholders who contribute to such value creation. The study presented the following strategic factors which enhance the efficacy of a bank incentive structure: (1) the alignment of incentives structures with the long-term objectives of the firm; (2) defining the governing objective of incentive structures as maximization of the long-term value of the firm; (3) risk-adjustment of incentive structures; and (4) alignment of incentive structures with the interests of all relevant stakeholders.","PeriodicalId":215232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"310 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115689917","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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