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ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)最新文献

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Will Asset Managers Survive the Advent of Robots? An Optimal Contracting Approach 资产管理公司能否在机器人时代幸存下来?最优契约方法
ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-10-13 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3710509
Vincent Tena
{"title":"Will Asset Managers Survive the Advent of Robots? An Optimal Contracting Approach","authors":"Vincent Tena","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3710509","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3710509","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we study the adoption of automation technology in asset management. We build a principal-agent model in continuous time in which delegation of asset management to an agent is subject to moral hazard and will become automatable at an uncertain time. While the characteristics and the advent of the automation technology are exogenous and publicly observable, automation may not be as efficient as the agent. We derive an optimal long-term contract that adjusts the provision of incentives to the availability of such a technology so that automation impacts the agent since the contracting date. Our model suggests that the empirically observed layoffs that accompany the emergence of an automation technology may have a contractual foundation. Compared to the situation where automation is never feasible, we predict that (1) some poor performers are kept employed longer only to be instantaneously substituted at the technology advent, and (2) bonuses are front-loaded and then dropped once the technology becomes available.","PeriodicalId":215232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117172044","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Culture, Motivational Attributes and Employees’ Perception towards CSR Practices: Evidence from Pakistan 文化、动机属性和员工对企业社会责任实践的感知:来自巴基斯坦的证据
ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-12-20 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3510948
S. Jabeen, D. Siddiqui
{"title":"Culture, Motivational Attributes and Employees’ Perception towards CSR Practices: Evidence from Pakistan","authors":"S. Jabeen, D. Siddiqui","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3510948","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3510948","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this paper is to analyze the employees–corporate social responsibility (CSR) relationship by studying the influence of two cultural values – collectivism and masculinity –on the formation of CSR perceptions. We adopted theoretical framework proposed by Hur and Kim (2017), in which Hofstede’s cultural framework was proposed to explain the effect of the cultural values on employees’ perceptions of CSR practices with the mediatory role of motivational attributions. To establish this framework empirically on Pakistan, a survey questionnaire was used to collect data from 190 employees’ in Pakistan. Data analysis was performed using SEM and CFA. The results indicate that collectivistic (masculine) values were positively (negatively) related to perceptions of CSR. Furthermore, intrinsic attributions of CSR initiatives mediate the positive relationship between collectivism and CSR perceptions and the negative relationship between masculinity and CSR perceptions. These findings suggest that managers must seek to understand employees’ cultural characteristics and the attributions of CSR motivations in order to engage them in driving CSR practices effectively and displaying a positive image of organization.","PeriodicalId":215232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132126053","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Why Pay for Jobs (and Not for Tasks)? 为什么要为工作付费(而不是为任务付费)?
ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-08-30 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3294890
Achim I. Czerny, M. Fosgerau, P. Jost, Jos N. van Ommeren
{"title":"Why Pay for Jobs (and Not for Tasks)?","authors":"Achim I. Czerny, M. Fosgerau, P. Jost, Jos N. van Ommeren","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3294890","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3294890","url":null,"abstract":"Consider a principal who assigns a job with two tasks to two identical agents. Monitoring the agents’ efforts is costly. Therefore the principal rewards the agents based on their (noisy) relative outputs. This study addresses the question of whether the principal should evaluate the outputs of each task separately and award two winner prizes, one for each task, or whether it is better to award only one winner prize to the agent who performs the best over the two tasks. There are two countervailing effects. First, there is a prize-diluting effect, because for a given budget, the prizes will be smaller when there are two winner prizes than when there is only one winner prize. The prize-diluting effect reduces the agents’ incentives to invest their effort when there are two winner prizes. Second, there is a noise effect because the noisiness of the evaluation is reduced when there are two winner prizes. The main contribution of this study is to show that the prize-diluting effect dominates the noise effect. Hence, in general, principals will award prizes for combined tasks, and not for separate tasks. Several extensions are considered to test the robustness of this dominance result.","PeriodicalId":215232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114564551","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Investment Choice with Managerial Incentive Schemes 管理激励计划下的投资选择
ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-08-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3430234
Shubhro Sarkar, Suchismita Tarafdar
{"title":"Investment Choice with Managerial Incentive Schemes","authors":"Shubhro Sarkar, Suchismita Tarafdar","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3430234","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3430234","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we show that firms might get an additional strategic benefit from using marginal-cost-reducing investments in conjunction with strategic delegation. While both these instruments allow firms to “aggressively” participate in product market competition, we show that they act as substitutes or complements depending on whether they are chosen simultaneously or sequentially. Given that the use of such instruments is inseparably linked with a Prisoner’s Dilemma kind of situation, our analysis shows a way to mitigate at least to some extent such effects, through their simultaneous use. We find that the unique Nash equilibrium of the game with commitment comprises both players choosing the instruments simultaneously. In case the instruments are chosen without commitment, an asymmetric equilibrium is shown to exist in addition to the simultaneous protocol, yielding unequal payoffs.","PeriodicalId":215232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"135 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123780015","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Incentivizing Learning-by-Doing: The Role of Compensation Schemes 激励在实践中学习:薪酬计划的作用
ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-05-01 DOI: 10.3386/W25799
Joshua Graff Zivin, Lisa B. Kahn, Matthew Neidell
{"title":"Incentivizing Learning-by-Doing: The Role of Compensation Schemes","authors":"Joshua Graff Zivin, Lisa B. Kahn, Matthew Neidell","doi":"10.3386/W25799","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W25799","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we examine the impact of pay-for-performance incentives on learning-by-doing. We exploit personnel data on fruit pickers paid under two distinct compensation contracts: a standard piece rate plan and a piece rate plan with an extra one-time bonus tied to output. Under the bonus contract, we observe bunching of performance just above the bonus threshold, suggesting workers distort their behavior in response to the discrete bonus. Such bunching behavior increases as workers gain experience. At the same time, the bonus contract induces considerable learning-by-doing for workers throughout the productivity distribution, and these improvements significantly outweigh the losses to the firm from the distortionary bunching. In contrast, under the standard piece rate contract, we find minimal evidence of bunching and only small performance improvements at the bottom of the productivity distribution. Our results suggest that contract design can help foster learning on the job. This underscores the importance of dynamic considerations in principal-agent models.","PeriodicalId":215232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130983023","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Self Directed Learning with Hidden Action: A Quadratic Model with an Implication for the Skills Gap 隐含行动的自主学习:一个暗示技能差距的二次元模型
ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-04-17 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3373752
A. Mariño
{"title":"Self Directed Learning with Hidden Action: A Quadratic Model with an Implication for the Skills Gap","authors":"A. Mariño","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3373752","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3373752","url":null,"abstract":"This paper considers a hidden action agency model in which an agent can be incentivized to simultaneously work and self train to increase productivity. We determine conditions under which the principal wants to incentivize concurrent working and training and conditions under which the agent would want to participate. Next we consider outside hiring as an alternative to internal working and training. We discuss the conditions under which the agent and the principal would be better off with internal and concurrent work and training as opposed to a pre-work training program, and we provide a reason for the skills gap. The results are also applicable to multitasking between work effort and capital maintenance effort.","PeriodicalId":215232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130503514","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
The Compensation Hypothesis Revisited and Reversed 补偿假说的重新审视与逆转
ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-04-16 DOI: 10.1111/1467-9477.12191
Andreas Bergh
{"title":"The Compensation Hypothesis Revisited and Reversed","authors":"Andreas Bergh","doi":"10.1111/1467-9477.12191","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9477.12191","url":null,"abstract":"This note describes how research on the link between globalization and openness has changed over time. Early contributions assumed that countries develop welfare states to compensate for volatility caused by economic openness (the compensation hypothesis). Recent findings have cast doubts on several steps in the causal chain implied by the compensation hypothesis. In many ways economic openness has been shown to be particularly beneficial for countries with high taxes and high income equality. Countries with large welfare states can use economic openness to mitigate some of the unintended side-effects of social protection and high taxes. The compensation hypothesis can thus be reformulated: Through trade, the citizens in large welfare states can enjoy some of the benefits associated with cheap labor and high wage dispersion despite their domestic economy being characterized by the opposite.","PeriodicalId":215232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"80 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134343936","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 11
Hidden Gems: Do Compensation Disclosures Reveal Performance Expectations? 隐藏的宝藏:薪酬披露是否揭示了业绩预期?
ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-04-03 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3223711
C. Fee, Zhi Li, Qiyuan Peng
{"title":"Hidden Gems: Do Compensation Disclosures Reveal Performance Expectations?","authors":"C. Fee, Zhi Li, Qiyuan Peng","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3223711","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3223711","url":null,"abstract":"We find that a new compensation disclosure item on expected payouts from performance-based stock grants contains incremental information of a firm’s future performance. Firms that disclose the most optimistic expected payment significantly outperform over the next two years, while the least optimistic firms underperform. Investors and analysts are slow to process the embedded information and are later surprised around earnings announcement days. A portfolio long stocks of the most optimistic firms and short the least optimistic ones earns significant positive post-disclosure abnormal returns. The result is more pronounced when the embedded “soft” information differs from the more visible earnings news.","PeriodicalId":215232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"63 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128009047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Conceiving, Designing and Trailing a Short‐Form Measure of Job Quality: A Proof‐Of‐Concept Study 构思、设计和跟踪工作质量的简短形式测量:概念验证研究
ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-01-01 DOI: 10.1111/irj.12241
Alan Felstead, D. Gallie, F. Green, G. Henseke
{"title":"Conceiving, Designing and Trailing a Short‐Form Measure of Job Quality: A Proof‐Of‐Concept Study","authors":"Alan Felstead, D. Gallie, F. Green, G. Henseke","doi":"10.1111/irj.12241","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/irj.12241","url":null,"abstract":"The government has accepted the Taylor Review's recommendation that it should report annually on job quality in the UK. This article argues that three principles need to be followed in choosing the right measures and shows how these principles have been used to create a short job quality quiz (www.howgoodismyjob.com).","PeriodicalId":215232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127073533","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 23
All you Need is Love: The Effect of Moral Support on Performance 你所需要的只是爱:精神支持对表现的影响
ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-07-23 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3214533
Fabrizio Colella, P. Dalton, G. Giusti
{"title":"All you Need is Love: The Effect of Moral Support on Performance","authors":"Fabrizio Colella, P. Dalton, G. Giusti","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3214533","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3214533","url":null,"abstract":"This study presents evidence on the role of moral support on performance in a competitive environment. We take advantage of an unusual change in the Argentinean football legislation. In August 2013, as a matter of National security, the Argentinean government forced all the teams of the first division to play their games with only home team supporters. Supporters of the visiting teams were not allowed to be in stadiums during league games. We estimate the effect of this exogenous variation of supporters on team performance, and we find that visiting teams are, on average, about 20% more likely to lose without their supporters. Moreover, we find that the lack of supporters of the visiting team increased the score differential between the home team and the visitor. The effect of the ban is stronger for big teams, who have the highest number of supporters when playing away. In addition, we find no evidence of changes of referees' decisions due to the ban, suggesting that the effect on team performance is due to the loss of moral support rather than a change in referees hostility. As placebo test, we run the analysis using contemporaneous cup matches, where the visiting team supporters were allowed to attend. We find no effect of the ban on the cup games, which provides additional empirical support to our findings. Our results offer unique and novel empirical evidence of the importance on moral support on performance.","PeriodicalId":215232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117098029","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
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