ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)最新文献

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Covertly Concealed 'Jumper' Managers’ Ignorance, Distrust, and Amoral Careerist Mismanagement 暗地里隐藏的“跳楼经理”的无知、不信任和不道德的野心家管理不善
ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2907581
Reuven Shapira
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