信息获取、资源配置与管理激励

O. Ozbas, Heikki Rantakari
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引用次数: 2

摘要

管理者的薪酬契约和可获得的资源水平共同影响着管理者获取不同投资选择信息的动机以及管理者的资源配置决策。我们证明了在现有信息条件下,最优补偿契约诱导的投资分配比第一优分配更具侵略性。资源的最优水平可以设置在第一最佳水平之上或之下,这取决于期望的总投资是随着信息的增加而增加还是减少。这两种类型的均衡投资扭曲都被用来激励管理者获取信息。最后,我们表明,通过适当地将管理层薪酬与所要求的资源水平联系起来,可以将资源水平的选择委托给管理者,而不会降低效率。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Information Acquisition, Resource Allocation and Managerial Incentives
A manager's compensation contract and the level of resources available to him jointly influence his incentives to acquire information about different investment alternatives as well as his resource allocate decisions. We show that the optimal compensation contract induces investment allocations that are more aggressive than the first-best allocation conditional on available information. The optimal level of resources may be set above or below the first-best level, depending on whether desired total investment increases or decreases with information. Both types of equilibrium investment distortions are used to motivate information acquisition by the manager. Finally, we show that choice of the level of resources can be delegated to the manager without any loss in efficiency through appropriately linking managerial compensation to the level of resources requested.
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