ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)最新文献_第5页

Risk Taking in Competition: Evidence from Match Play Golf Tournaments 竞赛中的风险承担:来自高尔夫比赛的证据

ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2014-04-04 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2429009

Serkan Ozbeklik, Janet Kiholm Smith

引用次数: 24

Innovation Without Me: Why Employees Do (Not) Participate in Organizational Innovation Communities 没有我的创新:为什么员工不(不)参与组织创新社区

ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2014-03-01 DOI: 10.1111/radm.12042

Anke Wendelken, Frank Danzinger, Christiane Rau, K. Moeslein

{"title":"Innovation Without Me: Why Employees Do (Not) Participate in Organizational Innovation Communities","authors":"Anke Wendelken, Frank Danzinger, Christiane Rau, K. Moeslein","doi":"10.1111/radm.12042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/radm.12042","url":null,"abstract":"A key issue in community research is the set of motivations stimulating individuals to participate and contribute voluntarily to communities. This article examines the motivations of employees, who are traditionally not involved in the innovation process, to (not) participate in organizational innovation communities. Building on an in‐depth single case study, we aim to answer the following research questions: (1) What motivates participants of organizational innovation communities to participate? and (2) What motivates nonparticipants of organizational innovation communities to not participate? We find and categorize multiple factors that motivate non‐research and development employees to participate and to not participate. Moreover, we find an overlap as well as differences in the set of motivations of participants and nonparticipants. With nonparticipants normally being a large but barely explicitly recognized group, we argue that the found deviations contribute to the understanding of motivations in the context of organizational innovation communities and allow for direct design implications for innovation managers.","PeriodicalId":215232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"174 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133282907","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 57

Homogenous Contracts for Heterogeneous Agents: Aligning Salesforce Composition and Compensation 异质代理的同质契约:调整销售人员组成和补偿

ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2014-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2399268

Øystein Daljord, S. Misra, Harikesh S. Nair

{"title":"Homogenous Contracts for Heterogeneous Agents: Aligning Salesforce Composition and Compensation","authors":"Øystein Daljord, S. Misra, Harikesh S. Nair","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2399268","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2399268","url":null,"abstract":"Observed contracts in the real-world are often very simple, partly reflecting the constraints faced by contracting firms in making the contracts more complex. We focus on one such rigidity, the constraints faced by firms in fine-tuning contracts to the full distribution of heterogeneity of its employees. We explore the implication of these restrictions for the provision of incentives within the firm. Our application is to salesforce compensation, in which a firm maintains a salesforce to market its products. Consistent with ubiquitous real-world business practice, we assume the firm is restricted to fully or partially set uniform commissions across its agent pool. We show this implies an interaction between the composition of agent types in the contract and the compensation policy used to motivate them, leading to a \"contractual externality\" in the firm and generating gains to sorting. This paper explains how this contractual externality arises, discusses a practical approach to endogenize agents and incentives at a firm in its presence, and presents an empirical application to salesforce compensation contracts at a US Fortune 500 company that explores these considerations and assesses the gains from a salesforce architecture that sorts agents into divisions to balance firm-wide incentives. Empirically, we find the restriction to homogenous plans significantly reduces the payoffs of the firm relative to a fully heterogeneous plan when it is unable to optimize the composition of its agents. However, the firm's payoffs come very close to that of the fully heterogeneous plan when it can optimize both composition and compensation. Thus, in our empirical setting, the ability to choose agents mitigates partially the loss in incentives from the restriction to uniform contracts. We conjecture this may hold more broadly.","PeriodicalId":215232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125627690","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4

Earnings Progression and the Workforce Investment Act: Evidence from Washington State 收入增长和劳动力投资法案:来自华盛顿州的证据

ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-10-01 DOI: 10.1111/irel.12038

Colleen K. Chrisinger

引用次数: 7

Negativity Bias and Task Motivation: Testing the Effectiveness of Positively versus Negatively Framed Incentives 负性偏见与任务动机:积极框架激励与消极框架激励的有效性检验

ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-09-23 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1817902

Kelly Goldsmith, R. Dhar

{"title":"Negativity Bias and Task Motivation: Testing the Effectiveness of Positively versus Negatively Framed Incentives","authors":"Kelly Goldsmith, R. Dhar","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1817902","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1817902","url":null,"abstract":"People are frequently challenged by goals that demand effort and persistence. As a consequence, philosophers, psychologists, economists, and others have studied the factors that enhance task motivation. Using a sample of undergraduate students and a sample of working adults, we demonstrate that the manner in which an incentive is framed has implications for individuals' task motivation. In both samples we find that individuals are less motivated when an incentive is framed as a means to accrue a gain (positive framing) as compared with when the same incentive is framed as a means to avoid a loss (negative framing). Further, we provide evidence for the role of the negativity bias in this effect, and highlight specific populations for whom positive framing may be least motivating. Interestingly, we find that people's intuitions about when they will be more motivated show the opposite pattern, with people predicting that positively framed incentives will be more motivating than negatively framed incentives. We identify a lay belief in the positive correlation between enjoyment and task motivation as one possible factor contributing to the disparity between predicted and actual motivation as a result of the framing of the incentive. We conclude with a discussion of the managerial implications for these findings.","PeriodicalId":215232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"34 671","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131588439","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 64

Indirect Incentives of Hedge Fund Managers 对冲基金经理的间接激励

ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-03-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2233514

Jongha Lim, Berk A. Sensoy, M. Weisbach

{"title":"Indirect Incentives of Hedge Fund Managers","authors":"Jongha Lim, Berk A. Sensoy, M. Weisbach","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2233514","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2233514","url":null,"abstract":"Indirect incentives exist in the money management industry when good current performance increases future inflows of new capital, leading to higher future fees. We quantify the magnitude of indirect performance incentives for hedge fund managers. Flows respond quickly and strongly to performance; lagged performance has a monotonically decreasing impact on flows as lags increase up to two years. Conservative estimates indicate that indirect incentives for the average fund are four times as large as direct incentives from incentive fees and returns to managers' own investment in the fund. For new funds, indirect incentives are seven times as large as direct incentives. Combining direct and indirect incentives, for each dollar generated for their investors in a given year, managers receive close to another dollar in direct performance fees plus the present value of future fees over the expected life of the fund. Older and capacity constrained funds have considerably weaker relations between future flows and performance, leading to weaker indirect incentives. There is no evidence that direct contractual incentives are stronger when market-based indirect incentives are weaker.","PeriodicalId":215232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121357354","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 72

Collective and Individual Conflicts in the Workplace: Evidence from France 工作场所的集体和个人冲突:来自法国的证据

ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-01-01 DOI: 10.1111/irel.12013

Jeremy Tanguy

引用次数: 8

The Path to and Lessons from the Economic Crisis in Estonia: Employee Compensation Development 爱沙尼亚经济危机的路径与教训:雇员薪酬发展

ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2012-11-15 DOI: 10.15157/TPEP.V20I2.839

Janno Reiljan

引用次数: 0

The Effects of Trust and Budget-Based Controls on Budget Gaming and Budget Value 信任和预算控制对预算博弈和预算价值的影响

ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2012-08-17 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2201249

Theresa Libby, Murray R. Lindsay

{"title":"The Effects of Trust and Budget-Based Controls on Budget Gaming and Budget Value","authors":"Theresa Libby, Murray R. Lindsay","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2201249","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2201249","url":null,"abstract":"Proponents of “beyond budgeting” suggest the major control problem in organizations today is the use of budgets for both planning and performance evaluation (Hope and Fraser 2003). Rigidly evaluating and rewarding managers relative to budget targets set at the beginning of the year motivates managers to play budgetary games which taints the budgeting and forecasting process. Contrary to this view, a recent survey of North American budgeting practices by Libby and Lindsay (2010) indicates a large proportion of the organizations sampled continue to use budgets for performance evaluation and control purposes and also offer budget-based bonuses to their managers as an incentive to perform. In addition, a large proportion of these firms appeared to be finding ways to get good value out of the budgeting process even though results indicated a negative correlation between budget value and managers’ perceptions of the degree to which budget gaming occurs in their organizations. The objective of the current study is to provide some insight into what drives higher versus lower budget value from the point of view of the business unit managers. Based on a review of the academic and practitioner literatures, we develop and test a theoretical model of the antecedents of budget gaming and budget value using additional data collected in the Libby and Lindsay (2010) survey. Results indicate good prior period performance is associated with less budget gaming, high budget emphasis is associated with higher budget gaming and increased interpersonal trust between lower and higher levels of management is negatively associated with budget gaming. By splitting the sample into high and low trust groups, we are able to show that lower level manager’s trust in higher level managers is key to explaining perceptions of budget value in our sample.","PeriodicalId":215232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114785381","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 10

Design and Implementation of Pay for Performance 绩效薪酬的设计与实施

ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2012-01-29 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1995093

Michael J. Gibbs

引用次数: 11