ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Worker Characteristics and Wage Differentials: Evidence from a Gift-Exchange Experiment","authors":"Florian Englmaier, Sebastian Strasser, J. Winter","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1955268","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1955268","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract There is ample empirical evidence indicating that a substantial fraction of the population exhibits social preferences. Recent work also shows that social preferences influence the effectiveness of incentives in labor relations. Hence, when making contracting decisions, employers should take into account that workers are heterogeneous with respect to both their productivity and their social preferences. This paper presents causal evidence that they do. In a real-effort experiment, we elicit measures of workers’ productivity and trustworthiness and make this information available to potential employers. Our data show that employers pay significant wage premia for both traits. Firms make highest profits with trustworthy workers, in particular with highly productive and trustworthy workers. We also document differences in the strength of gift-exchange across worker types. In particular, output levels of trustworthy workers are higher and much less dispersed than those of not-trustworthy workers.","PeriodicalId":215232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116017453","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"League-Table Incentives and Price Bubbles in Experimental Asset Markets","authors":"S. Cheung, A. Coleman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1849459","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1849459","url":null,"abstract":"We study experimental markets in which participants face incentives modeled upon those prevailing in markets for managed funds. Each participant's portfolio is periodically evaluated at market value and ranked in a league table according to short-term paper returns. Those who rank highly attract a larger share of new fund inflows. Under conditions in which prices are close to intrinsic value, the effect of incentives is mild. However under conditions in which markets are prone to bubble, mispricing is greatly exacerbated by incentives. Even in experienced markets, prices climb to levels clearly indicative of speculation and do not always crash back.","PeriodicalId":215232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132132172","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Total Reward in the UK in the Public and Private Sectors","authors":"A. Danzer, P. Dolton","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1820947","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1820947","url":null,"abstract":"Recent controversy has surrounded the relative value of public and private sector remuneration. We define a comprehensive measure of Total Reward (TR) which includes not just pay, but pensions and other 'benefits in kind', evaluate it as the present value of the sum of all these payments over the lifetime and compare it in the UK public and private sectors. Our results suggest that TR is equalized over the lifecycle for men while women have a clear TR advantage in the public sector by the end of their career. We suggest that the current controversy over public-private sector pension differentials and the perennial issues of public/private sector pay gaps requires a life time perspective and that the concept of TR is appropriate.","PeriodicalId":215232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125191825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Rating Alignment, Rating Shopping and Reputation of Credit Rating Agencies: Evidence from the Subprime Crisis","authors":"A. Croce, S. Lugo, R. Faff","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1817092","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1817092","url":null,"abstract":"This paper compares conflict of interest incentives and reputational concerns of credit rating agencies (CRAs) in the context of the subprime crisis. We argue that, during up-market periods, ratings levels are affected by both a strong tendency for alignment across CRAs and ratings “shopping” by issuers, while, during periods of economic slowdown, these distortions disappear since CRAs are then more concerned about their long-run reputation. We test our hypotheses by analyzing the gap between Moodys and S&Ps ratings on US residential, subprime mortgage-backed securities before and after the 2007 crisis. Overall, our results show a clear reduction in ratings alignment. Moreover, we find strong evidence that harsher downgrades came from S&P, which had higher ratings before the crisis, and that the gap reduction is strongly correlated with the rating gap before the crisis. We interpret this as evidence that CRAs try to “reverse the gap”, to reduce the impact on their (relative) reputation. Finally, we find that harsher downgrades tend to occur for securities not jointly rated and that the relation between downgrades and initial rating is significantly different across the two agencies, this being consistent with the rating shopping hypothesis.","PeriodicalId":215232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126475973","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Comparative Analysis of Corporate Takeover Laws and Their Applications","authors":"S. Gurpur, V. Paranjape, B. Ronald, Nikhil Fulambarkar, Jina Baruah, C. Beerannavar","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1999163","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1999163","url":null,"abstract":"This research work is a Project assigned to the research team of Symbiosis Law School, Pune by ITC Limited to understand the takeover regulations and procedures in the United States of America, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Australia, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore. The importance of the rule-making process in determining the substantive regulatory outcome was also studied by the team. The study demonstrates how historical events, economic, regulatory & legislative structures and judicial & administrative mechanisms have impacted take-over deals in the above jurisdictions. The Introductory Chapter deals with the definition of Takeover, how it differs from Mergers, advantages of Takeover, related theories, risks involved and posits the scope of present study of Takeovers. Each of the subsequent seven chapters specifically deals with the historical perspectives, relevant statutes, regulations, prominent and landmark cases in the national context of United States of America, United Kingdom, European Union (mainly France & Germany), Australia, Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia.The concluding chapter captures the summary with similarities, differences and best practices. The vast difference in the legal, judicial and regulatory framework and the processes in takeover processes in the given jurisdictions is presented in a table format in the Annexure as Ready-Reference.","PeriodicalId":215232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"218 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115523595","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Gifts and Gifting","authors":"G. Davies, S. Whelan, A. Foley, M. Walsh","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-2370.2009.00271.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2370.2009.00271.x","url":null,"abstract":"The terms gift and gifting are rarely formally defined, but are associated with something given without receiving payment, often in the expectation of reciprocation and of changing the relationship with the recipient. Extensive prior work across a number of disciplines tends to focus on gifting as a process and shows a broad conceptualization of the gift construct to include actions as diverse as charitable giving, tipping, self-gifting and volunteering, where relationship development and reciprocation are largely irrelevant. As a way to develop the area, two proposals are made: first, that gifting research should recognize two different types of gift, transactional and relational; and second, that the exchange paradigm and its underpinning social exchange theory should become central in developing understanding of relational gifting. The authors argue that empirical researchers may usefully revisit the relational paradigm, but by adopting a more quantitative, modelling approach, and the paper illustrates how this might be achieved.","PeriodicalId":215232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114196602","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Do External Sources Generate Greater Investor Awareness that Can Affect a Firm's Value and Cost of Capital?","authors":"R. Clemons","doi":"10.1108/14757701011094580","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/14757701011094580","url":null,"abstract":"Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to examine whether focused attention on a firm by an external organization, group, or influential analyst generates greater investor awareness that can affect a firm's value and cost of capital. This study is motivated by contemporary research that provides support for the hypothesis that investors have limited attention. Prior studies have focused on how investors' limited attention has influenced their analysis of firm-specific financial data. The studies have shown that investors may have limited attention and hence pay more attention to the more salient financial statement items. This paper extends this stream of research by empirically testing to determine if external sources attract investors' limited attention to a firm. Design/methodology/approach - The paper examines the published monthly Center for Financial Research and Analysis (CFRA) research reports from 1998 through 2004 that identify firms experiencing operational problems and/or using unusual or aggressive accounting practices. To provide evidence that information appearing in CFRA research reports has not already been impounded into a firm's stock price prior to the publication of the CFRA research report, the paper tests for abnormal returns around the publication of the CFRA research reports. Second, to provide evidence that the firms' cost of capital decreases after the publication date of the CFRA research reports, the paper tests for a decrease in the bid-ask spreads after firms appear on the CFRA research reports. Findings - Support was found for the hypothesis that firms experience a significant decline in their market value in the days surrounding their appearance on the CFRA research reports. For a sample of 892 firms, the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for a two-day window around a firm's appearance on a CFRA research report is -1.89 percent, and the CARs for a seven-day window around a firm's appearance on a CFRA research report is -3.50 percent. Originality/value - The paper's findings suggest that the information from the fundamental analysis conducted by the Center for Financial Research and Analysis has not already been impounded into a firm's stock price before its appearance on a CFRA research report. Although the paper found a decrease in the mean difference in the bid-ask spread change, it cannot provide statistically significant support for the hypothesis that a firm's cost of capital decreases after appearing on a CFRA research report.","PeriodicalId":215232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115091725","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Combining Financial and Organizational Incentives to Better Align Individual Behaviour with Organizational Goals","authors":"Philipp Meyer-Doyle, Marshall W. Meyer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1690229","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1690229","url":null,"abstract":"Much of the existing literature has focused on financial incentives to align individual behaviour with organizational goals, based on the assumption that individual behaviour is largely motivated by expected pecuniary payoffs. However, past and more recent economic developments show that financial incentives can induce myopic behaviour, and thereby financial incentives alone appear to be aligning individual behaviour with organizational goals too myopically. In this paper, we embrace the idea that individual behaviour is also socially embedded and motivated in order to explore incentives that are geared towards producing long-term oriented behaviour. Specifically, we focus on incentives stem from an individual’s social embeddedness in an organization. We define such ‘organizational incentives’ and discuss their theoretical foundations. However, as we show, organizational incentives alone motivate individual behaviour that is too hyperopic (overly concerned with the long-term survival of the organization). Therefore, we argue that the organization is best served by combining individualistic financial incentives with the socially embedded organizational incentives to motivate individual behaviour which is neither myopic nor hyperopic and which is more in line with organizational goals. We discuss how firms can adjust their financial and organizational incentives accordingly and combine them effectively, and what factors foster an effective combination of financial and organizational incentives.","PeriodicalId":215232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125657507","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Social, Environmental, Ethical and Trust (SEET) Issues in Banking: An Overview","authors":"Andreas G. F. Hoepner, John O. S. Wilson","doi":"10.4337/9781849806107.00037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781849806107.00037","url":null,"abstract":"Interest in Social, Environmental, Ethical and Trust (SEET) in banking has experienced a rapid growth over the last decade. This paper provides the first overview of SEET issues in banking. The overview introduces international initiatives such as: the United Nations Environmental Programme Finance Initiative; the Equator Principles; and the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment, which highlighted the importance of SEET issues to the financial services industry. Finally, we provide a structured review of the small, but important literature on SEET issues in banking. Our overview is timely given the increasing importance of trust and environmental phenomena to the financial services industry. Consequently, the material presented in this overview is of relevance to academics, policy makers and practitioners alike.","PeriodicalId":215232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"73 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130187537","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"R&D Strategy, Performance and Earnings Management","authors":"Dhaoui Abderrazak, O. Yousfi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1677350","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1677350","url":null,"abstract":"The current paper studies the determinants of R&D strategy and analyzes the effects of R&D decentralization on financial performance and earnings management. We use a sample of 160 U.S. Multinational companies (MNCs) between 2001 and 2006. Our results provide evidence that MNCs decentralize their R&D to improve firm profitability but mangers can take advantages to get some private and non transferable benefits which increases earnings management. Moreover, it seems that the presence of institutional investors and the use of performance-based compensation encourage managers to decentralize their R&D to increase earnings management.","PeriodicalId":215232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126322761","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}