Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation最新文献

{"title":"Incentives for Exploration at Market Equilibrium","authors":"Eren Ozbay, Vijay Kamble","doi":"10.1145/3580507.3597748","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3580507.3597748","url":null,"abstract":"In several online marketplaces, the qualities of value-providing supply units (e.g., sellers, workers, service providers) are unknown when they join the platform. Ensuring efficient matchmaking in such markets may require identifying the higher-quality supply units, which requires a certain amount of exploration, i.e., matching with new supply units with uncertain qualities despite the availability of known high-quality supply. In the absence of centralized incentives that subsidize such myopically suboptimal matching choices, a natural question is whether competitive forces in the market may generate adequate incentives for such exploratory behavior amongst customers. The intuition is that established high-quality supply units may naturally demand higher equilibrium prices due to congestion compared to novices, effectively incentivizing customers to participate in exploration. This paper aims to understand the extent to which such intuition is well-founded.","PeriodicalId":210555,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122618828","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Good, The Bad and The Picky: Reference Dependence and the Reversal of Product Ratings","authors":"Tommaso Bondi, M. Rossi, Ryan Stevens","doi":"10.1145/3580507.3597751","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3580507.3597751","url":null,"abstract":"We study the impact of consumer quality-based self-selection on online reviews. Consumers differ in their expertise, which has two effects. First, expertise is instrumental to choice: Experts purchase better products than Non-Experts. Second, because of their superior choices, Experts endogenously form higher reference points, which leads them to post harsher ratings for a given quality. Combined, these two facts imply a bias against higher-quality products. When this bias gets large, ratings are non-monotonic in quality: lower-quality products can obtain higher ratings than superior alternatives, thanks to the lower standard they are held to.","PeriodicalId":210555,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122256901","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Capacity Planning in Stable Matching: An Application to School Choice","authors":"F. Bobbio, Margarida Carvalho, Andrea Lodi, Ignacio Rios, Alfredo Torrico","doi":"10.1145/3580507.3597771","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3580507.3597771","url":null,"abstract":"Centralized mechanisms are becoming the standard approach to solve several assignment problems. Examples include the allocation of students to schools (school choice), high-school graduates to colleges, residents to hospitals and refugees to cities. In most of these markets, a desirable property of the assignment is stability, which guarantees that no pair of agents has incentive to circumvent the matching. Using school choice as our matching market application, we introduce the problem of jointly allocating a school capacity expansion and finding the best stable matching for the students in the expanded market. We analyze theoretically the problem, focusing on the trade-off behind the multiplicity of student-optimal assignments, and the problem complexity. Since the theoretical intractability of the problem precludes the adaptation of classical approaches to solve it efficiently, we generalize existent mathematical programming formulations of stability constraints to our setting. These generalizations result in integer quadratically-constrained programs, which are computationally hard to solve. In addition, we propose a novel mixed-integer linear programming formulation that is exponentially-large on the problem size. We show that the stability constraints can be separated in linear time, leading to an effective cutting-plane method. We evaluate the performance of our approaches in a detailed computational study, and we find that our cutting-plane method outperforms mixed-integer programming solvers applied to existent formulations extended to our problem setting. We also propose two heuristics that are effective for large instances of the problem. Finally, we use the Chilean school choice system data to demonstrate the impact of capacity planning under stability conditions. Our results show that each additional school seat can benefit multiple students. On the one hand, we can focus on access by prioritizing extra seats that benefit previously unassigned students; on the other hand, we can focus on merit by allocating extra seats that benefit several students via chains of improvement. These insights empower the decision-maker in tuning the matching algorithm to provide a fair application-oriented solution.","PeriodicalId":210555,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"74 11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116406915","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Opportunity Hunters: A Model of Competitive Sequential Inspections","authors":"Ran Eilat, Z. Neeman, Eilon Solan","doi":"10.1145/3580507.3597760","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3580507.3597760","url":null,"abstract":"There are many economic situations in which players compete to identify an uncertain event, or an \"opportunity.\" Once an opportunity appears, seizing it quickly is critical. For example, two firms may consider the introduction of a new technology into a market, which may either be ripe for the technology or not. The first firm to identify that the market is ripe and act benefits greatly. However, acting if the market is not ripe generates large losses, and checking market conditions is costly. Other natural contexts in which competition for opportunities occurs include innovation, patenting, launching new products, selling assets, head hunting, and dating. What is common to all these examples is that the right moment to act depends on identifying an unobservable event, while taking the other player's strategy into account.","PeriodicalId":210555,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"101 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123396765","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Optimal Indirect Regulation of Externalities","authors":"Zi Yang Kang","doi":"10.1145/3580507.3597672","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3580507.3597672","url":null,"abstract":"To regulate goods that generate externalities upon consumption, textbook analyses typically---and often exclusively---focus on the Pigouvian approach. As first demonstrated by Pigou (1920), a tax on each consumer equal to the marginal external damage that he causes induces him to internalize the true social impact of his consumption and restores market efficiency. However, the Pigouvian approach assumes that the amount of externality that each consumer generates can be measured and directly taxed, which is rarely the case in reality. On one hand, empirical work has shown that the amount of externality that each consumer generates is often heterogeneous: vehicle emissions per mile traveled, for example, differ not only across different vehicle types, but also within vehicles of the same make, model, and model year. On the other hand, prohibitive technological costs preclude the accurate measurement of emissions for individual vehicles.","PeriodicalId":210555,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"72 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128367381","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"EFX: A Simpler Approach and an (Almost) Optimal Guarantee via Rainbow Cycle Number","authors":"Hannaneh Akrami, N. Alon, B. Chaudhury, J. Garg, K. Mehlhorn, R. Mehta","doi":"10.1145/3580507.3597799","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3580507.3597799","url":null,"abstract":"The existence of EFX allocations is a fundamental open problem in discrete fair division. Since the general problem has been elusive, progress is made on two fronts: (i) proving existence when the number of agents is small, and (ii) proving the existence of relaxations of EFX. In this paper, we improve and simplify the state-of-the-art results on both fronts with new techniques.","PeriodicalId":210555,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"216 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121876057","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Equity Pay in Networked Teams","authors":"Krishna Dasaratha, B. Golub, Anant Shah","doi":"10.1145/3580507.3597754","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3580507.3597754","url":null,"abstract":"Equity compensation is widely used to motivate members of a team, such as a startup, to work toward a common goal. A natural question, about which little is known, is how the structure of collaborations should influence the design of equity compensation. We analyze this problem in a standard quadratic-payoffs network game model of production with heterogeneous complementarities. Each member of the team chooses a level of costly effort. This effort makes a \"standalone\" contribution to the firm's output, but there are also production complementarities: some pairs of workers generate an output proportional to the product of their efforts. In our model, the pattern of these complementarities is exogenously given and defines a network.","PeriodicalId":210555,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"288 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114529236","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Chunking Tasks for Present-Biased Agents","authors":"J. Halpern, Aditya Saraf","doi":"10.1145/3580507.3597816","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3580507.3597816","url":null,"abstract":"Everyone puts things off sometimes. How can we combat this tendency to procrastinate? A well-known technique used by instructors is to break up a large project into more manageable chunks. But how should this be done best? Here we study the process of chunking using the graph-theoretic model of present bias introduced by Kleinberg and Oren [2014]. We first analyze how to optimally chunk single edges within a task graph, given a limited number of chunks. We show that for edges on the shortest path, the optimal chunking makes initial chunks easy and later chunks progressively harder. For edges not on the shortest path, optimal chunking is significantly more complex, but we provide an efficient algorithm that chunks the edge optimally. We then use our optimal edge-chunking algorithm to optimally chunk task graphs. We show that with a linear number of chunks on each edge, the biased agent's cost can be exponentially lowered, to within a constant factor of the true cheapest path. Finally, we extend our model to the case where a task designer must chunk a graph for multiple types of agents simultaneously. The problem grows significantly more complex with even two types of agents, but we provide optimal graph chunking algorithms for two types. Our work highlights the efficacy of chunking as a means to combat present bias.","PeriodicalId":210555,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126054179","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Impact of Privacy Protection on Online Advertising Markets","authors":"Miguel Alcobendas, Shunto Kobayashi, Ke Shi, M. Shum","doi":"10.1145/3580507.3597712","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3580507.3597712","url":null,"abstract":"Online privacy protection has gained momentum in recent years and spurred both government policies and private initiatives. A hallmark of this movement is the ongoing removal of third-party cookies - a device widely adopted to track online user behavior and implement targeted ads - from web browsers. Although intended to protect internet users, banning third-party cookies may hamper advertiser's ability to target consumers effectively and impose potentially huge economic costs on online advertisers. As online ads lose their value, web publishers' advertisement revenue - a vital component of their bottom lines - may decrease and threaten their businesses.","PeriodicalId":210555,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"24 8","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"113962685","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Taxing Externalities Without Hurting the Poor","authors":"Mallesh M. Pai, P. Strack","doi":"10.1145/3580507.3597765","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3580507.3597765","url":null,"abstract":"When consumption of a good causes externalities, market outcomes may be inefficient. Economists have long recognized this and suggested as a remedy a \"Pigouvian tax\" equal to the monetary equivalent of the harm done to others. Despite their intuitive appeal, Pigouvian taxes are rarely seen in practice. Conversely, public discourse often involves regulations such as consumption caps or even prohibition of the activity, which economists consider \"non-market\" solutions. Can natural preferences of the planner justify this?","PeriodicalId":210555,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125272368","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}