Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation最新文献

{"title":"Ambiguous Contracts","authors":"Paul Dütting, M. Feldman, Daniel Peretz","doi":"10.48550/arXiv.2302.07621","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2302.07621","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we introduce a model of ambiguous contracts, capturing many real-life scenarios where agents engage in contractual relations that leave some degree of uncertainty. In this paper we introduce a model of ambiguous contracts, capturing many real-life scenarios where agents engage in contractual relations that leave some degree of uncertainty. Our starting point is the celebrated hidden-action model and the classic notion of a contract, where the principal commits to an outcome-contingent payment scheme for incentivizing an agent to take a costly action.","PeriodicalId":210555,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121264009","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Reduction from Chores Allocation to Job Scheduling","authors":"Xin Huang, Erel Segal-Halevi","doi":"10.1145/3580507.3597676","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3580507.3597676","url":null,"abstract":"We consider allocating indivisible chores among agents with different cost functions, such that all agents receive a cost of at most a constant factor times their maximin share.","PeriodicalId":210555,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"34 47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123081770","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Axiomatization of Random Utility Model with Unobservable Alternatives","authors":"Haruki Kono, Kota Saito, Alec Sandroni","doi":"10.1145/3580507.3597792","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3580507.3597792","url":null,"abstract":"The random utility model is one of the most fundamental models in discrete choice analysis in economics. Although Falmagne (1978) obtained an axiomatization of the random utility model, his characterization requires strong observability of choices, i.e., the frequencies of choices must be observed from all subsets of the set of alternatives. Little is known, however, about the axiomatization when the frequencies on some choice sets are not observable. In fact, the problem of obtaining a tight characterization appears to be out of reach in most cases in view of a related NP-hard problem. We consider the following incomplete dataset. Let X be a finite set of alternatives. Let X* ⊆ X bea set of unobservable alternatives. Let D ⊆ 2X be the set of choice sets. We assume that the choice frequency ρ(D, x) is unobservable (i.e., not defined) if and only if x ∈ X* or D ∉ D. Let M* ≡ {(D,x)|x ∈ D ∈ 2X and [x ∈ X* or D ∉ D]} be the set of all pairs (D,x) such that ρ(D, x) is not observable. To state our theorem, for any ρ and (D, x) ∈ M ≡ {(D, x) ∈ D × X | x ∈ D}, define a Block-Marschak polynomial by K(ρ, D, x) = ΣE:E⊇D(−1)|ED|ρ(E,x).","PeriodicalId":210555,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"189 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116338193","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Universally Robust Information Aggregation for Binary Decisions","authors":"Itai Arieli, Y. Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Konstantin Zabarnyi","doi":"10.1145/3580507.3597710","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3580507.3597710","url":null,"abstract":"We study a setting with a decision maker making a binary decision by aggregating information from symmetric agents. Each agent provides the decision maker a recommendation depending on her private signal about the hidden state. We assume that agents are truthful - an agent recommends guessing the more likely state based on her information. This assumption is natural if the agents are unaware of how the decision-maker will aggregate their recommendations. While the decision maker has a prior distribution over the hidden state and knows the marginal distribution of each agent's private signal, the correlation between these signals is chosen adversarially. The decision maker's goal is choosing an information aggregation rule that is robustly optimal.","PeriodicalId":210555,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127174830","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Extreme Points and First-Order Stochastic Dominance: Theory and Applications","authors":"K. Yang, Alexander Zentefis","doi":"10.1145/3580507.3597719","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3580507.3597719","url":null,"abstract":"We characterize the extreme points of first-order stochastic dominance (FOSD) intervals and show how these intervals are at the heart of many topics in economics. An FOSD interval is a set of distributions that dominate a distribution and are simultaneously dominated by another distribution, in the sense of FOSD. The convexity of FOSD intervals means that their extreme points are fundamental to understanding their properties. We show that a distribution is an extreme point of an FOSD interval if and only if the distribution either coincides with one of the FOSD bounds or is flat. Wherever the distribution is flat, at least one end of the flat portion must be attached to one of the FOSD bounds.","PeriodicalId":210555,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122082534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Robust and Verifiable Proportionality Axioms for Multiwinner Voting","authors":"Markus Brill, Jannik Peters","doi":"10.1145/3580507.3597785","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3580507.3597785","url":null,"abstract":"When selecting a subset of candidates (a so-called committee) based on the preferences of voters, proportional representation is often a major desideratum. When going beyond simplistic models such as party-list or district-based elections, it is surprisingly challenging to capture proportionality formally. As a consequence, the literature has produced numerous competing criteria of when a selected committee qualifies as proportional. Two of the most prominent notions are proportionality for solid coalitions (PSC) [Dummett, 1984] and extended justified representation (EJR) [Aziz et al., 2017]. Both definitions guarantee proportional representation to groups of voters with very similar preferences; such groups are referred to as solid coalitions by Dummett and as cohesive groups by Aziz et al. However, they lose their bite when groups are only almost solid or cohesive.","PeriodicalId":210555,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130304795","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Informationally Robust Cheap-Talk","authors":"Itai Arieli, R. Gradwohl, Rann Smorodinsky","doi":"10.1145/3580507.3597705","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3580507.3597705","url":null,"abstract":"We study the robustness of cheap-talk equilibria to infinitesimal private information of the receiver in a model with a binary state-space and state-independent sender-preferences.","PeriodicalId":210555,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"113 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131770534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Incentive Compatibility in the Auto-bidding World","authors":"Yeganeh Alimohammadi, Aranyak Mehta, Andres Perlroth","doi":"10.1145/3580507.3597725","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3580507.3597725","url":null,"abstract":"Auto-bidding has recently become a popular feature in ad auctions. This feature enables advertisers to simply provide high-level constraints and goals to an automated agent, which optimizes their auction bids on their behalf. These auto-bidding intermediaries interact in a decentralized manner in the underlying auctions, leading to new interesting practical and theoretical questions on auction design, for example, in understanding the bidding equilibrium properties between auto-bidder intermediaries for different auctions. In this paper, we examine the effect of different auctions on the incentives of advertisers to report their constraints to the auto-bidder intermediaries. More precisely, we study whether canonical auctions such as first price auction (FPA) and second price auction (SPA) are auto-bidding incentive compatible (AIC): whether an advertiser can gain by misreporting their constraints to the autobidder.","PeriodicalId":210555,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"75 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128707987","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Multi-Agent Contract Design: How to Commission Multiple Agents with Individual Outcomes","authors":"Matteo Castiglioni, A. Marchesi, N. Gatti","doi":"10.1145/3580507.3597793","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3580507.3597793","url":null,"abstract":"We study hidden-action principal-agent problems with multiple agents. These are problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme (called contract) in order to incentivize some agents to take costly, unobservable actions that lead to favorable outcomes. Previous works study models where the principal observes a single outcome determined by the actions of all the agents. This considerably limits the contracting power of the principal, since payments can only depend on the joint result achieved by the agents. In this paper, we consider a model in which each agent determines their own individual outcome as an effect of their action only, the principal observes all the individual outcomes separately, and they perceive a reward that jointly depends on all these outcomes. This considerably enhances the principal's contracting capabilities, by allowing them to pay each agent on the basis of their individual result. We analyze the computational complexity of finding principal-optimal contracts, revolving around two properties of principal's rewards, namely IR-supermodularity and DR-submodularity. The former captures settings with increasing returns, where the rewards grow faster as the agents' effort increases, while the latter models the case of diminishing returns, in which rewards grow slower instead. These naturally model diseconomies and economies of scale. We first address basic instances in which the principal knows everything about the agents, and, then, more general Bayesian instances where each agent has their own private type determining their features, such as action costs and how actions stochastically determine individual outcomes. As a preliminary result, we show that finding an optimal contract in a non-Bayesian instance can be reduced in polynomial time to a maximization problem over a matroid having a particular structure. This is needed to prove our main positive results in the rest of the paper. We start by analyzing non-Bayesian instances, where we first prove that the problem of computing a principal-optimal contract is inapproximable with either IR-supermodular or DR-submodular rewards. Nevertheless, we show that in the former case the problem becomes polynomial-time solvable under some mild regularity assumptions, while in the latter case it admits a polynomial-time (1 − 1/e)-approximation algorithm. In conclusion, we extend our positive results to Bayesian instances. First, we show that the principal's optimization problem can be approximately solved by means of a linear formulation. This is non-trivial since in general the problem may not admit a maximum, but only a supremum. Then, by working on such a linear formulation, we provide algorithms based on the ellipsoid method that (almost) match the guarantees obtained for non-Bayesian instances.","PeriodicalId":210555,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122803345","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Multi-Channel Auction Design in the Autobidding World","authors":"Gagan Aggarwal, Andres Perlroth, Junyao Zhao","doi":"10.48550/arXiv.2301.13410","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2301.13410","url":null,"abstract":"Over the past few years, more and more Internet advertisers have started using automated bidding for optimizing their advertising campaigns. Such advertisers have an optimization goal (e.g. to maximize conversions), and some constraints (e.g. a budget or an upper bound on average cost per conversion), and the automated bidding system optimizes their auction bids on their behalf. Often, these advertisers participate on multiple advertising channels and try to optimize across these channels. A central question that remains unexplored is how automated bidding affects optimal auction design in the multi-channel setting.","PeriodicalId":210555,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129092933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}