Robust and Verifiable Proportionality Axioms for Multiwinner Voting

Abstract

When selecting a subset of candidates (a so-called committee) based on the preferences of voters, proportional representation is often a major desideratum. When going beyond simplistic models such as party-list or district-based elections, it is surprisingly challenging to capture proportionality formally. As a consequence, the literature has produced numerous competing criteria of when a selected committee qualifies as proportional. Two of the most prominent notions are proportionality for solid coalitions (PSC) [Dummett, 1984] and extended justified representation (EJR) [Aziz et al., 2017]. Both definitions guarantee proportional representation to groups of voters with very similar preferences; such groups are referred to as solid coalitions by Dummett and as cohesive groups by Aziz et al. However, they lose their bite when groups are only almost solid or cohesive.