Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation最新文献

In Defense of Liquid Democracy 捍卫流动民主

Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2023-07-07 DOI: 10.1145/3580507.3597817

Daniel Halpern, J. Halpern, A. Jadbabaie, Elchanan Mossel, A. Procaccia, Manon Revel

引用次数: 7

Cost Based Nonlinear Pricing 基于成本的非线性定价

Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2023-07-07 DOI: 10.1145/3580507.3597697

D. Bergemann, T. Heumann, S. Morris

引用次数: 0

Deep Learning Based Causal Inference for Large-Scale Combinatorial Experiments: Theory and Empirical Evidence 基于深度学习的大规模组合实验因果推理:理论与经验证据

Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2023-07-07 DOI: 10.1145/3580507.3597718

Zikun Ye, Zhiqi Zhang, Dennis Zhang, Heng Zhang, Renyu Zhang

{"title":"Deep Learning Based Causal Inference for Large-Scale Combinatorial Experiments: Theory and Empirical Evidence","authors":"Zikun Ye, Zhiqi Zhang, Dennis Zhang, Heng Zhang, Renyu Zhang","doi":"10.1145/3580507.3597718","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3580507.3597718","url":null,"abstract":"Large-scale online platforms launch hundreds of randomized experiments (a.k.a. A/B tests) every day to iterate their operations and marketing strategies, while the combinations of these treatments are typically not exhaustively tested. It triggers an important question of both academic and practical interests: Without observing the outcomes of all treatment combinations, how to estimate the causal effect of any treatment combination and identify the optimal treatment combination? We develop a novel framework combining deep learning and double machine learning to estimate the causal effect of any treatment combination for each user on the platform when observing only a small subset of treatment combinations. Our proposed framework (called debiased deep learning, DeDL) exploits Neyman orthogonality and combines interpretable and flexible structural layers in deep learning. We prove theoretically that this framework yields consistent and asymptotically normal estimators under mild assumptions, thus allowing for identifying the best treatment combination when only observing a few combinations. To empirically validate our method, we then collaborate with a large-scale video-sharing platform and implement our framework for three experiments involving three treatments where each combination of treatments is tested. When only observing a subset of treatment combinations, our DeDL approach significantly outperforms other benchmarks to accurately estimate and infer the average treatment effect (ATE) of any treatment combination and to identify the optimal treatment combination.","PeriodicalId":210555,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"103 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117294153","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Equitable stable matchings under modular assessment 模块化评估下的公平稳定匹配

Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2023-07-07 DOI: 10.1145/3580507.3597684

A. Alkan, Kemal Yildiz

引用次数: 0

Graphon Games with Multiple Equilibria: Analysis and Computation 具有多重均衡的图形博弈:分析与计算

Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2023-07-07 DOI: 10.1145/3580507.3597666

Kiran Rokade, F. Parise

{"title":"Graphon Games with Multiple Equilibria: Analysis and Computation","authors":"Kiran Rokade, F. Parise","doi":"10.1145/3580507.3597666","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3580507.3597666","url":null,"abstract":"Large networks of decision makers (players) are ubiquitous in the modern world due to the ease of connectivity between people and computers alike. Naturally, the decisions of players in these networks are influenced by the decisions of their neighbours. These situations can be modeled as network games. When we consider games played on very large networks, two problems emerge: (i) the network may be unknown, (ii) the network may be very large in size and hence computing the Nash equilibria of such network games can be prohibitive. To obviate these issues, the framework of graphon games was introduced in [1] to model interactions among a continuum of players (mapped in [0,1]). A graphon is a function W : [0, 1]2 → [0,1], where W(x,y) represents the strength of the connection between infinitesimal players x, y ∈ [0,1]. A graphon can also be seen as a model for sampling random networks. Building on this second interpretation, [1] showed that the Nash equilibria of graphon games (graphon equilibria) are good approximations of the Nash equilibria of network games in which agents interact according to a network sampled from the graphon (sampled network equilibria). We here generalize such convergence results beyond games with a unique equilibrium and provide new results on computing graphon equilibria when the graphon game has some structure.","PeriodicalId":210555,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129317735","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Regret and Information Avoidance 后悔与信息回避

Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2023-07-07 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4269560

Zichang Wang

引用次数: 0

Online Resource Allocation with Buyback: Optimal Algorithms via Primal-Dual 带回购的在线资源分配:基于原始对偶的最优算法

Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2023-07-07 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4245468

Farbod Ekbatani, Yiding Feng, Rad Niazadeh

{"title":"Online Resource Allocation with Buyback: Optimal Algorithms via Primal-Dual","authors":"Farbod Ekbatani, Yiding Feng, Rad Niazadeh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.4245468","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4245468","url":null,"abstract":"Motivated by applications in cloud computing spot markets and selling banner ads on popular websites, we study the online resource allocation problem with costly buyback. To model this problem, we consider the classic edge-weighted fractional online matching problem with a tweak, where the decision maker can recall (i.e., buyback) any fraction of an offline resource that is pre-allocated to an earlier online vertex; however, by doing so not only the decision maker loses the previously allocated reward (which equates the edge-weight), it also has to pay a non-negative constant factor f of this edge-weight as an extra penalty. Parameterizing the problem by the buyback factor f, our main result is obtaining optimal competitive algorithms for all possible values of f through a novel primal-dual family of algorithms. We establish the optimality of our results by obtaining separate lower-bounds for each of small and large buyback factor regimes, and showing how our primal-dual algorithm exactly matches this lower-bound by appropriately tuning a parameter as a function of f. The optimal competitive ratio Γgen(f) and the optimal competitive ratio Γdet-int(f) of deterministic integral algorithms are as follows, [EQUATION] where W−1 : [−1/e, 0) → (−∞, −1] is the non-principal branch of the Lambert W function.","PeriodicalId":210555,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"180 6","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114017965","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Existence of Myopic-Farsighted Stable Sets in Matching Markets 匹配市场中近视-远视稳定集的存在性

Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2023-07-07 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4354768

Battal Doğan, Lars Ehlers

{"title":"Existence of Myopic-Farsighted Stable Sets in Matching Markets","authors":"Battal Doğan, Lars Ehlers","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.4354768","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4354768","url":null,"abstract":"We consider decentralized one-to-one matching markets with myopic and farsighted agents. We study myopic-farsighted stable sets that are internally and externally stable when myopic agents only care about their immediate payoffs, while farsighted agents take into account further possible reactions and care about their long-run payoffs when considering possible deviations. We constructively prove the existence of myopic-farsighted stable sets for any problem where there are farsighted agents only on one side of the market, while there may be myopic agents on both sides. We prove that a myopic-farsighted stable set may not exist when there are farsighted agents on both sides of the market and there is at least one myopic agent. Our analysis is in contrast to the earlier literature which considers only the extreme cases where either all agents are myopic, or all agents are farsighted, or all agents on one side are myopic and all agents on the other side are farsighted. Our results have several implications pertaining to core-stability and singleton stable sets, and yield numerous results from the literature as immediate corollaries. Finally, we extend several results to weakly stable sets and to many-to-one matching markets.","PeriodicalId":210555,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"87 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127995893","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Dynamic Concern for Misspecification 动态关注不规范

Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2023-07-07 DOI: 10.1145/3580507.3597804

Giacomo Lanzani

引用次数: 0

Re-examining Moral Hazard under Inattention: New Evidence from Behavioral Data in Auto Insurance 重新审视疏忽下的道德风险:来自汽车保险行为数据的新证据

Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2023-07-07 DOI: 10.1145/3580507.3597805

Yizhou Jin

引用次数: 0