Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation最新文献

{"title":"Feature Based Dynamic Matching","authors":"Yi-Liang Chen, Yashodhan Kanoria, Akshit Kumar, Wenxin Zhang","doi":"10.1145/3580507.3597797","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3580507.3597797","url":null,"abstract":"Motivated by matching platforms that match agents in a centralized manner, we introduce a model of dynamic two-sided matching where both demand and supply are heterogeneous with many types and the pool of supply units is limited. We model heterogeneity on the two sides of the market by i.i.d. demand weight vectors and i.i.d. supply feature vectors, with possibly different distributions. The matching of a demand-supply pair generates a utility that depends on their weight and feature vectors. To reflect the realistic structure of a heterogeneous matching market while also avoid impossibility results, we consider various levels of assumptions (in particular, the spatial structure) on matching utilities and feature distributions. The goal of the centralized platform is to dynamically assign supply units to sequentially arriving demand units in order to maximize utility. Many popular heuristic policies are either sub-optimal (like the myopic policy) or computationally inefficient (like the certainty equivalent policy). We propose a forward-looking supply-aware policy dubbed Simulate-Optimize-Assign-Repeat (SOAR) that combines practicality and strong theoretical guarantee. Inspired by model predictive control (MPC), SOAR leverages the power of simulation to balance between producing immediate high match utility and preserving valuable supply for future demands. We use regret as our performance metric for matching policies, specifically the additive loss relative to the utility per match achievable in the continuum limit (n → ∞). Under mild regularity assumptions on the offline matching instances, we prove that SOAR achieves the optimal regret scaling (up to a log factor). We further characterize the optimal regret scaling for interesting classes of problems with additional model structure, in particular, two classes of utility functions: (i) the \"spatial utilities\", namely the negative p-th power of the Euclidean distance between the supply and demand vectors where p ≥ 1; and (ii) the dot-product utility (equivalently p = 2 of (i)), and two classes of distributions: (i) both supply and demand distributions are smooth (a more stringent assumption) and (ii) supply and demand distributions are supported over compact sets (a mild assumption). En route to proving our guarantees we develop a novel framework for analyzing the performance of our SOAR policy which may be of wider applicability and independent interest. As a corollary of our techniques, we also resolve an open problem posed in Kanoria 2022.","PeriodicalId":210555,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123419231","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"On the Timing of Auctions: The Effects of Complementarities on Bidding, Participation, and Welfare","authors":"Alex P. Arsenault-Morin, H. A. Arslan, Matthew Gentry","doi":"10.1145/3580507.3597690","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3580507.3597690","url":null,"abstract":"Large corporations, local governments, and state agencies often seek suppliers for various different contracts through a sequence of auction rounds. In these extensive procurement markets, bidders frequently participate in multiple auctions held simultaneously or in different periods, submitting bids and winning contracts. Additionally, factors such as economies of scale, capacity limitations, and overlapping work periods can cause a bidder's cost of completing multiple projects to differ from the sum of their costs for each project individually. These non-additivities, which we refer to generically as complementarities, lead to changes in bidders' relative competitiveness over time, influenced by the characteristics of both current and previously won contracts. These dynamics can impact how and for which auctions bidders ultimately decide to bid. Consequently, by strategically timing auctions across periods, the procurer can exploit these strategic effects to enhance both their own expenses and overall efficiency in the procurement process. Currently, very little is known about this aspect of procurement design.","PeriodicalId":210555,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125783934","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Pricing Optimal Outcomes in Coupled and Non-Convex Electricity Markets","authors":"Mete cSeref Ahunbay, M. Bichler, Johannes Knörr","doi":"10.1145/3580507.3597732","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3580507.3597732","url":null,"abstract":"According to the fundamental theorems of welfare economics, any competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient. Unfortunately, competitive equilibrium prices only exist under strong assumptions such as perfectly divisible goods and convex preferences. In many real-world markets, participants have non-convex preferences and the allocation problem needs to consider complex constraints. Electricity markets are a prime example, but similar problems appear in many real-world markets, which has led to a growing literature in market design.","PeriodicalId":210555,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127296815","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Measure of Complexity for Strategy-Proof Mechanisms","authors":"Lea Nagel, Roberto Saitto","doi":"10.1145/3580507.3597691","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3580507.3597691","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a measure of strategic complexity for strategy-proof mechanisms. In particular, we characterize a class of implementations for which we provide a complete ranking in terms of their strategic complexity, in a well-defined sense. The class---which we call essential frames---includes virtually all strategy-proof mechanisms used in practice.","PeriodicalId":210555,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116722049","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Centralized Versus Decentralized Pricing Controls for Dynamic Matching Platforms","authors":"A. Aouad, Omer Saritac, Chiwei Yan","doi":"10.1145/3580507.3597788","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3580507.3597788","url":null,"abstract":"Online service platforms have transformed how customers and suppliers connect in real-time, using centralized dispatch and pricing systems. However, by acting as \"central planners\", platforms risk undermining the workers' flexibility endorsed by the gig economy. Hence, there has been significant scrutiny on the classification of gig workers as independent contractors and their freedom in decisions that directly influence their earnings, such as prices. To alleviate such concerns, several platforms in the ride-hailing industry have adopted or tested decentralized pricing schemes, where workers set prices flexibly. However, this approach presents a complex trade-off. On the one hand, platforms' pricing systems enable an efficient matching process by balancing demand and supply. Individual suppliers' pricing decisions may overlook market-wide effects on supply-demand equilibrium. On the other hand, suppliers possess private information about their preferences and costs that platforms cannot easily infer and use for price discrimination. Decentralized pricing can accommodate supplier-side heterogeneity, potentially increasing workers' participation in the market.","PeriodicalId":210555,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"113992633","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Mediated Communication with Transparent Motives","authors":"Roberto Corrao, Yifan Dai","doi":"10.1145/3580507.3597808","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3580507.3597808","url":null,"abstract":"We study optimal information mediation in sender-receiver communication games where the sender has transparent motives: she only cares about the receiver's actions and beliefs. An uninformed mediator cannot directly take the relevant decision in place of the receiver, but can credibly commit to information transmission policies. By the revelation principle, the mediator acts \"as-if\" selecting a communication equilibrium outcome of the sender-receiver game to maximize her expected payoff.","PeriodicalId":210555,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121867431","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Targeting versus Competition in Marketplace Design: Evidence from Geotargeted Internet Ads","authors":"Bo Cowgill, Cosmina L. Dorobantu","doi":"10.1145/3580507.3597721","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3580507.3597721","url":null,"abstract":"How should market designers trade off targeting and competition? We study a natural experiment in the release of new targeting technology for online ads. A platform in our study introduced targeting into select geographic markets based on a discontinuity in local characteristics. We find that advertisers used new targeting to avoid low quality ad inventory. This led to a reduction in ad impressions. When advertisers avoided this inventory, they retreated into smaller, less competitive ad auctions featuring fewer bidders for available ad space. The reduction in competition lowered click prices in the treated areas. Nonetheless, the effects on platform revenue growth were positive. Better targeting improved the consumer experience of advertising. This led to higher consumer clickthrough rates, which raised the platform's revenue by increasing the quantity of clicks sold. The higher click volumes offset the revenue effects of the decrease in prices.","PeriodicalId":210555,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114992279","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Choice Architecture, Privacy Valuations, and Selection Bias in Consumer Data","authors":"Tesary Lin, Avner Strulov-Shlain","doi":"10.1145/3580507.3597674","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3580507.3597674","url":null,"abstract":"Companies often deploy some form of \"choice architecture\" when collecting consumer data, designed to nudge consumers towards sharing more private information. This study examines when an emphasis on maximizing the volume of data shared when deploying choice architecture can alter the composition of the collected data, hence creating a trade-off between the quantity and representativeness of data collected. To this end, we ran a large-scale choice experiment to elicit consumers' incentive-compatible valuation for their private Facebook data while randomizing the choice frames they encountered. Within participants, we elicited WTA using a multiple-price list, followed by a free-text entry. Across participants, we randomized the choice default and the price anchor. The default varied between opt-in, opt-out, and active choice. Price anchor was the range of prices in the multiple price list, which was either $0--$50 (low) or $50--$100 (high).","PeriodicalId":210555,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128317423","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Information Design of a Delegated Search","authors":"Yangge Xiao, Zhenyu Hu, Shouqiang Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.4249165","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4249165","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we study a problem where a principal (e.g., a hiring manager, pharma company, advisor) delegates to an agent (e.g., a recruiter, biotech startup, student) a sequential search task spanning a time horizon of finite discrete periods. In each period, an agent's search generates an outcome of a priori uncertain value, whose distribution is publicly known. The agent bears the search cost and decides when to terminate the search. Once terminated, the principal and agent split the value from the search according to a pre-specified fraction. The realized value of each search outcome is only observable to the principal but not to the agent. Leveraging the information advantage, the principal designs an information policy to strategically provide the agent with some information about the search results over time.","PeriodicalId":210555,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127946085","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Estimating Effects of Long-Term Treatments","authors":"Shan Huang, Chen Wang, Yuan Yuan, Jinglong Zhao, Jingjing Zhang","doi":"10.1145/3580507.3597701","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3580507.3597701","url":null,"abstract":"Randomized controlled trials (RCTs), also known as A/B tests, have become the gold standard for evaluating the effectiveness of product changes on digital platforms. Accurately estimating the effects of long-term treatments still remains a challenge. Product updates such as new user interfaces or recommendation algorithms are intended to persist in the system for an extended period. However, A/B testing is typically conducted for short durations, often less than two weeks, to facilitate rapid product iterations. Conducting lengthy experiments to capture the long-term impact of product changes becomes impractical due to potential negative impacts on user experiences, high opportunity costs associated with user traffic, and delays in decision-making processes.","PeriodicalId":210555,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114189710","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}