对外部性征税而不伤害穷人

Mallesh M. Pai, P. Strack
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引用次数: 5

摘要

当一种商品的消费导致外部性时,市场结果可能是低效的。经济学家们早就认识到这一点,并建议采用“庇古税”作为补救措施,该税相当于对他人造成的伤害的货币等价物。尽管庇古税在直觉上很有吸引力,但在实践中却很少见到。相反,公共话语通常涉及诸如消费上限甚至禁止活动等法规,经济学家认为这是“非市场”解决方案。规划者的自然偏好能证明这一点吗?
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Taxing Externalities Without Hurting the Poor
When consumption of a good causes externalities, market outcomes may be inefficient. Economists have long recognized this and suggested as a remedy a "Pigouvian tax" equal to the monetary equivalent of the harm done to others. Despite their intuitive appeal, Pigouvian taxes are rarely seen in practice. Conversely, public discourse often involves regulations such as consumption caps or even prohibition of the activity, which economists consider "non-market" solutions. Can natural preferences of the planner justify this?
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