{"title":"对外部性征税而不伤害穷人","authors":"Mallesh M. Pai, P. Strack","doi":"10.1145/3580507.3597765","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"When consumption of a good causes externalities, market outcomes may be inefficient. Economists have long recognized this and suggested as a remedy a \"Pigouvian tax\" equal to the monetary equivalent of the harm done to others. Despite their intuitive appeal, Pigouvian taxes are rarely seen in practice. Conversely, public discourse often involves regulations such as consumption caps or even prohibition of the activity, which economists consider \"non-market\" solutions. Can natural preferences of the planner justify this?","PeriodicalId":210555,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"5","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Taxing Externalities Without Hurting the Poor\",\"authors\":\"Mallesh M. Pai, P. Strack\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/3580507.3597765\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"When consumption of a good causes externalities, market outcomes may be inefficient. Economists have long recognized this and suggested as a remedy a \\\"Pigouvian tax\\\" equal to the monetary equivalent of the harm done to others. Despite their intuitive appeal, Pigouvian taxes are rarely seen in practice. Conversely, public discourse often involves regulations such as consumption caps or even prohibition of the activity, which economists consider \\\"non-market\\\" solutions. Can natural preferences of the planner justify this?\",\"PeriodicalId\":210555,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation\",\"volume\":\"20 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-07-07\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"5\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/3580507.3597765\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3580507.3597765","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
When consumption of a good causes externalities, market outcomes may be inefficient. Economists have long recognized this and suggested as a remedy a "Pigouvian tax" equal to the monetary equivalent of the harm done to others. Despite their intuitive appeal, Pigouvian taxes are rarely seen in practice. Conversely, public discourse often involves regulations such as consumption caps or even prohibition of the activity, which economists consider "non-market" solutions. Can natural preferences of the planner justify this?