{"title":"Facecraft: Race Reification in Psychological Research With Faces.","authors":"Joel E Martinez","doi":"10.1177/17456916231194953","DOIUrl":"10.1177/17456916231194953","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Faces are socially important surfaces of the body on which various meanings are attached. The widespread physiognomic belief that faces inherently contain socially predictive value is why they make a generative stimulus for perception research. However, critical problems arise in studies that simultaneously investigate faces and race. Researchers studying race and racism inadvertently engage in various research practices that transform faces with specific phenotypes into straightforward representatives of their presumed race category, thereby taking race and its phenotypic associations for granted. I argue that research practices that map race categories onto faces using bioessentialist ideas of racial phenotypes constitute a form of racecraft ideology, the dubious reasoning of which presupposes the reality of race and mystifies the causal relation between race and racism. In considering how to study racism without reifying race in face studies, this article places these practices in context, describes how they reproduce racecraft ideology and impair theoretical inferences, and then suggests counterpractices for minimizing this problem.</p>","PeriodicalId":19757,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Psychological Science","volume":" ","pages":"182-194"},"PeriodicalIF":10.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41208127","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Olivier Desmedt, Olivier Luminet, Pierre Maurage, Olivier Corneille
{"title":"Discrepancies in the Definition and Measurement of Human Interoception: A Comprehensive Discussion and Suggested Ways Forward.","authors":"Olivier Desmedt, Olivier Luminet, Pierre Maurage, Olivier Corneille","doi":"10.1177/17456916231191537","DOIUrl":"10.1177/17456916231191537","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Interoception has been the subject of renewed interest over the past 2 decades. The involvement of interoception in a variety of fundamental human abilities (e.g., decision-making and emotional regulation) has led to the hypothesis that interoception is a central transdiagnostic process that causes and maintains mental disorders and physical diseases. However, interoception has been inconsistently defined and conceptualized. In the first part of this article, we argue that the widespread practice of defining interoception as the processing of signals originating from within the body and limiting it to specific physiological pathways (lamina I spinothalamic afferents) is problematic. This is because, in humans, the processing of internal states is underpinned by other physiological pathways generally assigned to the somatosensory system. In the second part, we explain that the consensual dimensions of interoception are empirically detached from existing measures, the latter of which capture loosely related phenomena. This is detrimental to the replicability of findings across measures and the validity of interpretations. In the general discussion, we discuss the main insights of the current analysis and suggest a more refined way to define interoception in humans and conceptualize its underlying dimensions.</p>","PeriodicalId":19757,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Psychological Science","volume":" ","pages":"76-98"},"PeriodicalIF":10.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10226740","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Helene M Loos, Benoist Schaal, Bettina M Pause, Monique A M Smeets, Camille Ferdenzi, S Craig Roberts, Jasper de Groot, Katrin T Lübke, Ilona Croy, Jessica Freiherr, Moustafa Bensafi, Thomas Hummel, Jan Havlíček
{"title":"Past, Present, and Future of Human Chemical Communication Research.","authors":"Helene M Loos, Benoist Schaal, Bettina M Pause, Monique A M Smeets, Camille Ferdenzi, S Craig Roberts, Jasper de Groot, Katrin T Lübke, Ilona Croy, Jessica Freiherr, Moustafa Bensafi, Thomas Hummel, Jan Havlíček","doi":"10.1177/17456916231188147","DOIUrl":"10.1177/17456916231188147","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Although chemical signaling is an essential mode of communication in most vertebrates, it has long been viewed as having negligible effects in humans. However, a growing body of evidence shows that the sense of smell affects human behavior in social contexts ranging from affiliation and parenting to disease avoidance and social threat. This article aims to (a) introduce research on human chemical communication in the historical context of the behavioral sciences; (b) provide a balanced overview of recent advances that describe individual differences in the emission of semiochemicals and the neural mechanisms underpinning their perception, that together demonstrate communicative function; and (c) propose directions for future research toward unraveling the molecular principles involved and understanding the variability in the generation, transmission, and reception of chemical signals in increasingly ecologically valid conditions. Achieving these goals will enable us to address some important societal challenges but are within reach only with the aid of genuinely interdisciplinary approaches.</p>","PeriodicalId":19757,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Psychological Science","volume":" ","pages":"20-44"},"PeriodicalIF":10.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11720269/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10152562","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Evolution of Developmental Theories Since Piaget: A Metaview.","authors":"Philippe Rochat","doi":"10.1177/17456916231186611","DOIUrl":"10.1177/17456916231186611","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>History counts and cannot be overlooked. As a case in point, the origins of major theoretical tensions in the field of developmental psychology are traced back to Piaget (1896-1980), who paved the way to major discoveries regarding the origins and development of cognition. His theory framed much of the new ideas on early cognitive development that emerged in the 1970s, in the footsteps of the 1960s' cognitive revolution. Here, I retrace major conceptual changes since Piaget and provide a metaview on empirical findings that may have triggered the call for such changes. Nine theoretical views and intuitions are identified, all in strong reaction to some or all of the four cornerstone assumptions of Piaget's developmental account (i.e., action realism, domain generality, stages, and late representation). As a result, new and more extreme stances are now taken in the nature-versus-nurture debate. These stances rest on profoundly different, often clashing theoretical intuitions that keep shaping developmental research since Piaget.</p>","PeriodicalId":19757,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Psychological Science","volume":" ","pages":"921-930"},"PeriodicalIF":10.5,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10011226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Konrad Lehmann, Dimitris Bolis, Karl J Friston, Leonhard Schilbach, Maxwell J D Ramstead, Philipp Kanske
{"title":"An Active-Inference Approach to Second-Person Neuroscience.","authors":"Konrad Lehmann, Dimitris Bolis, Karl J Friston, Leonhard Schilbach, Maxwell J D Ramstead, Philipp Kanske","doi":"10.1177/17456916231188000","DOIUrl":"10.1177/17456916231188000","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Social neuroscience has often been criticized for approaching the investigation of the neural processes that enable social interaction and cognition from a passive, detached, third-person perspective, without involving any real-time social interaction. With the emergence of <i>second-person neuroscience</i>, investigators have uncovered the unique complexity of neural-activation patterns in actual, real-time interaction. Social cognition that occurs during social interaction is fundamentally different from that unfolding during social observation. However, it remains unclear how the neural correlates of social interaction are to be interpreted. Here, we leverage the active-inference framework to shed light on the mechanisms at play during social interaction in second-person neuroscience studies. Specifically, we show how counterfactually rich mutual predictions, real-time bodily adaptation, and policy selection explain activation in components of the default mode, salience, and frontoparietal networks of the brain, as well as in the basal ganglia. We further argue that these processes constitute the crucial neural processes that underwrite bona fide social interaction. By placing the experimental approach of second-person neuroscience on the theoretical foundation of the active-inference framework, we inform the field of social neuroscience about the mechanisms of real-life interactions. We thereby contribute to the theoretical foundations of empirical second-person neuroscience.</p>","PeriodicalId":19757,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Psychological Science","volume":" ","pages":"931-951"},"PeriodicalIF":10.5,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11539477/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10346343","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Too Anecdotal to Be True? Mechanical Turk Is Not All Bots and Bad Data: Response to Webb and Tangney (2022).","authors":"Melissa G Keith, Alexander S McKay","doi":"10.1177/17456916241234328","DOIUrl":"10.1177/17456916241234328","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In response to Webb and Tangney (2022) we call into question the conclusion that data collected on Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk) was \"at best-only 2.6% valid\" (p. 1). We suggest that Webb and Tangney made certain choices during the study-design and data-collection process that adversely affected the quality of the data collected. As a result, the anecdotal experience of these authors provides weak evidence that MTurk provides low-quality data as implied. In our commentary we highlight best practice recommendations and make suggestions for more effectively collecting and screening online panel data.</p>","PeriodicalId":19757,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Psychological Science","volume":" ","pages":"900-907"},"PeriodicalIF":10.5,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140050024","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Leo Tiokhin, Karthik Panchanathan, Paul E Smaldino, Daniël Lakens
{"title":"Shifting the Level of Selection in Science.","authors":"Leo Tiokhin, Karthik Panchanathan, Paul E Smaldino, Daniël Lakens","doi":"10.1177/17456916231182568","DOIUrl":"10.1177/17456916231182568","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Criteria for recognizing and rewarding scientists primarily focus on individual contributions. This creates a conflict between what is best for scientists' careers and what is best for science. In this article, we show how the theory of multilevel selection provides conceptual tools for modifying incentives to better align individual and collective interests. A core principle is the need to account for indirect effects by shifting the level at which selection operates from individuals to the groups in which individuals are embedded. This principle is used in several fields to improve collective outcomes, including animal husbandry, team sports, and professional organizations. Shifting the level of selection has the potential to ameliorate several problems in contemporary science, including accounting for scientists' diverse contributions to knowledge generation, reducing individual-level competition, and promoting specialization and team science. We discuss the difficulties associated with shifting the level of selection and outline directions for future development in this domain.</p>","PeriodicalId":19757,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Psychological Science","volume":" ","pages":"908-920"},"PeriodicalIF":10.5,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11539478/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9911809","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Incomparability and Incommensurability in Choice: No Common Currency of Value?","authors":"Lukasz Walasek, Gordon D A Brown","doi":"10.1177/17456916231192828","DOIUrl":"10.1177/17456916231192828","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Models of decision-making typically assume the existence of some common currency of value, such as utility, happiness, or inclusive fitness. This common currency is taken to allow comparison of options and to underpin everyday choice. Here we suggest instead that there is no universal value scale, that incommensurable values pervade everyday choice, and hence that most existing models of decision-making in both economics and psychology are fundamentally limited. We propose that choice objects can be compared only with reference to specific but nonuniversal \"covering values.\" These covering values may reflect decision-makers' goals, motivations, or current states. A complete model of choice must accommodate the range of possible covering values. We show that abandoning the common-currency assumption in models of judgment and decision-making necessitates rank-based and \"simple heuristics\" models that contrast radically with conventional utility-based approaches. We note that if there is no universal value scale, then Arrow's impossibility theorem places severe bounds on the rationality of individual decision-making and hence that there is a deep link between the incommensurability of value, inconsistencies in human decision-making, and rank-based coding of value. More generally, incommensurability raises the question of whether it will ever be possible to develop single-quantity-maximizing models of decision-making.</p>","PeriodicalId":19757,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Psychological Science","volume":" ","pages":"1011-1030"},"PeriodicalIF":10.5,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11539466/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10112260","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Critical Perspective on Neural Mechanisms in Cognitive Neuroscience: Towards Unification.","authors":"Sander van Bree","doi":"10.1177/17456916231191744","DOIUrl":"10.1177/17456916231191744","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>A central pursuit of cognitive neuroscience is to find neural mechanisms of cognition, with research programs favoring different strategies to look for them. But what is a neural mechanism, and how do we know we have captured them? Here I answer these questions through a framework that integrates Marr's levels with philosophical work on mechanism. From this, the following goal emerges: What needs to be explained are the computations of cognition, with explanation itself given by mechanism-composed of algorithms and parts of the brain that realize them. This reveals a delineation within cognitive neuroscience research. In the <i>premechanism stage</i>, the computations of cognition are linked to phenomena in the brain, narrowing down where and when mechanisms are situated in space and time. In the <i>mechanism stage</i>, it is established how computation emerges from organized interactions between parts-filling the premechanistic mold. I explain why a shift toward mechanistic modeling helps us meet our aims while outlining a road map for doing so. Finally, I argue that the explanatory scope of neural mechanisms can be approximated by effect sizes collected across studies, not just conceptual analysis. Together, these points synthesize a mechanistic agenda that allows subfields to connect at the level of theory.</p>","PeriodicalId":19757,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Psychological Science","volume":" ","pages":"993-1010"},"PeriodicalIF":10.5,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11539489/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10114217","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Talking About the Absent and the Abstract: Referential Communication in Language and Gesture.","authors":"Elena Luchkina, Sandra Waxman","doi":"10.1177/17456916231180589","DOIUrl":"10.1177/17456916231180589","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Human language permits us to call to mind objects, events, and ideas that we cannot witness directly, either because they are absent or because they have no physical form (e.g., people we have not met, concepts like justice). What enables language to transmit such knowledge? We propose that a referential link between words, referents, and mental representations of those referents is key. This link enables us to form, access, and modify mental representations even when the referents themselves are absent (\"absent reference\"). In this review we consider the developmental and evolutionary origins of absent reference, integrating previously disparate literatures on absent reference in language and gesture in very young humans and gesture in nonhuman primates. We first evaluate when and how infants acquire absent reference during the process of language acquisition. With this as a foundation, we consider the evidence for absent reference in gesture in infants and in nonhuman primates. Finally, having woven these literatures together, we highlight new lines of research that promise to sharpen our understanding of the development of reference and its role in learning about the absent and the abstract.</p>","PeriodicalId":19757,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Psychological Science","volume":" ","pages":"978-992"},"PeriodicalIF":10.5,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10879458/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10032511","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}