{"title":"EROTICS AS A BRANCH OF PHILOSOPHY","authors":"Georgina Rabassó","doi":"10.21814/eps.4.1.191","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21814/eps.4.1.191","url":null,"abstract":"The figure and discourse of Diotima of Mantinea in Plato’s Symposium had a decisive influence on the Western tradition of women’s thought and on the foundation of a “hidden” branch of philosophy: Erotics, that is, the philosophical consideration of love, sexuality, gender identity, interpersonal relationships and particularly relationships of philia such as friendship. Although Erotics was not established as one of the canonical subdivisions of philosophy, numerous texts and theories prove its existence from antiquity to the present day. Diotima and other female philosophers make it clear that the Western tradition of women’s thought maintained a constant interest in the issues of Erotics. Making Erotics visible as a branch of philosophy situates the contributions of women thinkers in the philosophical canon, thereby transforming it.","PeriodicalId":191510,"journal":{"name":"Ethics, Politics & Society","volume":"39 3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129467676","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"O QUE DEVEM AS MULHERES FAZER?","authors":"Gabriele Flamigni","doi":"10.21814/eps.4.1.192","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21814/eps.4.1.192","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this paper is to enquire if the Stoics consider certain social activities appropriate only for men or women, a much-debated question in the scholarship. Here it is argued that the Stoics are not committed to gendered divisions of tasks. This claim is pled through an analysis of the various testimonies and of the Stoic notion of appropriate activity (καθῆκον). This result leads to reconsider the Stoics’ stand within their cultural environment and will hopefully contribute to the debate on their thinking on womanhood. This study is thus structured: firstly, the notion of καθῆκον is presented; next, the evidence of the Stoic use of gender as a parameter in determining καθήκοντα is discussed; then, a reconstruction of the social role the early Stoics assigned to women in their planned constitutions is attempted; finally, the reflection of later Stoics on the role of women in actual societies is addressed.","PeriodicalId":191510,"journal":{"name":"Ethics, Politics & Society","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114152225","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"ANÁLISIS DEL CONCEPTO CANON","authors":"Concepción Escrig Ferrando","doi":"10.21814/eps.4.1.196","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21814/eps.4.1.196","url":null,"abstract":"El canon filosófico actualmente se está viendo cuestionado por la progresiva globalización. Por ello, se está procurando desde el ámbito académico la inclusión tanto de las culturas como de ambos sexos en el mismo. El presente estudio analizará el significado histórico del concepto canon con el objetivo de determinar qué debería incluirse en él, y cómo hacerlo. Así pues, esta investigación se propone (1) reconstruir la historia del concepto canon desde su conformación en el siglo IV hasta la configuración del canon filosófico en el siglo XVIII, (2) elaborar una propuesta actualizada para la realización del canon filosófico, y (3) aplicar tal propuesta para fundamentar la presencia de mujeres en el canon. El objetivo último de esta investigación sería animar a los académicos a extender esta metodología para lograr el deseado reconocimiento de la contribución intelectual realizada por los diferentes colectivos que habitan la Tierra.","PeriodicalId":191510,"journal":{"name":"Ethics, Politics & Society","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131370099","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"JUSTIFICANDO A DESOBEDIÊNCIA CIVIL EM UMA ABORDAGEM POSITIVISTA","authors":"Matheus Colares do Nascimento","doi":"10.21814/eps.4.1.188","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21814/eps.4.1.188","url":null,"abstract":"O objetivo desse trabalho é demostrar como a desobediência civil pode ser tratada no âmbito de uma filosofia do direito de orientação positivista como uma forma de dissenso válida. A princípio, haveria dois obstáculos para isso: o fato de que (1) tal perspectiva seria insensível a acomodar apelos a causas sociais no sistema jurídico e, por isso, (2) a desobediência civil só poderia ser nela compreendida como oferecendo o risco de uma patologia jurídica. Pretendemos mostrar que esses dois pontos são equivocados a partir de conceitos mobilizados por H. L. Hart. Com eles, argumentaremos que as reivindicações feitas através da desobediência civil, na verdade, pressupõem a existência de um sistema jurídico. Por esse motivo, ela não pode apresentar o risco acima.","PeriodicalId":191510,"journal":{"name":"Ethics, Politics & Society","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121857555","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND COERCIVELY ENFORCED BORDERS","authors":"M. James","doi":"10.21814/eps.4.1.185","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21814/eps.4.1.185","url":null,"abstract":"Arash Abizadeh argues that all coercive enforcement of borders is democratically illegitimate, since foreigners do not participate in the creation of border laws. It is irrelevant whether the border laws are substantively just or unjust, whether the state enforcing them is affluent or poor, and whether the individual being coerced autonomously chooses to cross the border or is forced by desperate circumstances to do so. His argument involves (1) a foundational commitment to individual autonomy; (2) a normative premise that coercion requires democratic legitimation; (3) and an empirical premise that border enforcement laws subject all foreigners to state coercion. In this essay, I contest each of these components. I challenge the empirical premise through examples illustrating the empirical limits to state coercion over foreigners. I contest the normative premise by showing that state coercion requires democratic legitimation only for those involuntarily and indefinitely subject to it. Finally, I challenge the commitment to individual autonomy as foundational to political legitimacy by distinguishing political legitimacy from political authority. I conclude by demonstrating how my critique renders a more plausible account of the normative limits of border coercion, one that coheres more readily with stances advanced by Javier Hidalgo and Abizadeh himself.","PeriodicalId":191510,"journal":{"name":"Ethics, Politics & Society","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130601086","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A REPLY TO RONALD DWORKIN’S CRITIQUE OF MORAL SKEPTICISM","authors":"Mateus Matos Tormin","doi":"10.21814/eps.4.1.186","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21814/eps.4.1.186","url":null,"abstract":"This paper focuses on “indeterminacy”, “objectivity” and “truth” in the work of Ronald Dworkin. The text is divided into four parts: first, I will expose the general structure of Dworkin’s conception of objectivity in the moral domain (Section 1). Next, I will present the main critiques Dworkin addresses to two of his most important philosophical enemies, namely the “external skeptic” (Section 2.1) and the “internal skeptic” (Section 2.2). I then intend to address Dworkin’s critiques by presenting counterarguments in defense of moral skepticism (Section 3). In order to clarify the debate and its points, I try to illustrate the arguments with examples whenever possible. In the concluding Section (4), I recapitulate the main points of the text.","PeriodicalId":191510,"journal":{"name":"Ethics, Politics & Society","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121665515","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"POLITICAL PRAGMATISM AND ETHICS IN KAUTYLA’S ARTHASHASTRA: CONTRADICTION OR COMPLEMENTARITY","authors":"S. Bhattacharya, Kankana Saikia","doi":"10.21814/EPS.2.1.87","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21814/EPS.2.1.87","url":null,"abstract":"Is there always an inherent contradiction between political pragmatismand ethics? This paper explores this through the classical Indian realist politicaltreatise, the Arthashastra, written by Kautilya. He was the key advisor to EmperorChandragupta Maurya (c. 317-293 B.C.E), credited with first consolidating theIndian subcontinent into an empire under centralized control. Kautilya is widelyagreed to be a pioneer in developing a ‘science of politics’- a great departure fromthe hitherto existing moralistic, spiritual, ascetic preoccupations and, religiousspeculations of Indian political philosophy. Kautilya blurred the distinctionbetween morality and political utility. Much of political theory tradition remainsoblivious to Kautilya’s contribution to morality in realpolitik and his continuinginfluence in non-Western societies. His treatise is a significant point of entry intoexploring the dilemmas attached to active pursuance of ethical goals while alsobalancing the imperatives underpinning political pragmatism- a concern whichhas carried on to this day.","PeriodicalId":191510,"journal":{"name":"Ethics, Politics & Society","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123727790","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"LYING AND HYPOCRISY IN MORALITY AND POLITICS","authors":"R. Grant","doi":"10.21814/EPS.2.1.86","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21814/EPS.2.1.86","url":null,"abstract":"Hypocrisy is necessary in politics, especially in democracies, but whilehypocrisy can facilitate democratic cooperation, lying tends to undermine it. Thereare two basic alternative possibilities for how to think about political ethics. Thefirst begins with universal moral principles that are then applied to politics as wellas to other areas of life. In the second approach, instead, each activity or type ofrelationship has its own moral requirements. What is it about politics that makeshypocrisy and lying either morally legitimate or morally illegitimate? For the firstapproach, lying and hypocrisy are vices, whereas for the second, they may beconsidered as virtuous under certain circumstances. Hypocrisy is necessarybecause political relationships are relationships of dependence among peoplewhose interests do not exactly coincide. To secure supporters and coalition partnersrequires a certain amount of pretense. The case of lying, however, is quite differentdue to three additional characteristics of political relationships: cooperation overtime requires trust; accountability requires transparency; and consensus requiresa shared sense of reality. Lying undermines all three. Thus, truthfulness is amongthe political virtues even if exceptions sometimes must be made. Today, “post-truth”politics (“New Lying”), threatens to create a dangerous indifference to the truth anda cynical, wholesale acceptance of political lying.","PeriodicalId":191510,"journal":{"name":"Ethics, Politics & Society","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131007954","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"ARGUMENTATIVE HYPOCRISY AND CONSTITUENT DEBATES: THE ITALIAN CASE","authors":"G. Damele","doi":"10.21814/EPS.2.1.92","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21814/EPS.2.1.92","url":null,"abstract":"Jon Elster suggested that even speakers who are not moved “by aconcern for the common good”, but whose concerns are “purely self-interested”,may be still forced or induced “to substitute the language of impartial argument forthe language of self-interest”. This substitution would be the fruit of the civilizingforce of hypocrisy. This argumentative hypocrisy is a key concept forunderstanding a process of negotiation through persuasive strategies typical inconstitutional debates. Particularly, Elster believes that “the most importantrequirement” of a bargaining theory should be “that we are able to specify whatwill happen during a temporary breakdown of cooperation”. The constituents canget out of an impasse caused by a non-cooperative situation resorting toargumentative hypocrisy. The paper will analyse some examples taken from thedebate which led to the final version of the Italian Constitution.","PeriodicalId":191510,"journal":{"name":"Ethics, Politics & Society","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125004230","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A CONTINGÊNCIA DA POLÍTICA E A NECESSIDADE DA HIPOCRISIA EM O PRÍNCIPE DE MAQUIAVEL","authors":"Albano Pina","doi":"10.21814/EPS.2.1.88","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21814/EPS.2.1.88","url":null,"abstract":"In his most famous work, Machiavelli showed how the prince is neverassessed by what he is, but according to what he appears to be. Therefore, thepolitician needs to act as a hypocrite, as a ‘great pretender and dissembler’, tomaintain the support of the people on which his power relies. However, hypocrisydoes not simply mean deception of the ruled by the rulers. Given the social divisionwhich underlies the state, it actually plays a fundamental role in the imaginaryconstitution of a sovereign power capable of imposing unity and stability oncollective life. Our aim is to question the use of hypocrisy in order to emphasize thedistinction introduced by Machiavelli between moral virtue and political ‘virtù’.Furthermore, we will try to demonstrate how it is presented as part of a broaderstrategy against the unpredictable effects of time, symbolized by the metaphor of‘Fortuna’.","PeriodicalId":191510,"journal":{"name":"Ethics, Politics & Society","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123974197","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}