{"title":"COMPENSATION AS MORAL REPAIR AND AS MORAL JUSTIFICATION FOR RISKS","authors":"Madeleine Hayenhjelm","doi":"10.21814/EPS.2.1.81","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21814/EPS.2.1.81","url":null,"abstract":"Can compensation repair the moral harm of a previous wrongful act?On the one hand, some define the very function of compensation as one of restoringthe moral balance. On the other hand, the dominant view on compensation is thatit is insufficient to fully repair moral harm unless accompanied by an act ofpunishment or apology. In this paper, I seek to investigate the maximal potentialof compensation. Central to my argument is a distinction between apologeticcompensation and non-apologetic compensation. Apologetic compensation, Iargue, is an act that expresses regret and apology by means of some offer of money,goods, or services. Non-apologetic compensation is an act that seeks to restore lossor harm without expressing regret or apology. In the paper, I defend the view thatacts of compensation can be apologetic and argue that such apologeticcompensation is sufficient for moral repair.","PeriodicalId":191510,"journal":{"name":"Ethics, Politics & Society","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129791613","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"THE ROLE OF LYING IN POLITICS","authors":"Kathrin Bouvot","doi":"10.21814/EPS.2.1.91","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21814/EPS.2.1.91","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of my paper is to discuss the question of whether in the politicalclimate lying is to be seen as a skill, something that an effective politician must do,or whether it is an absolute “no go” realm. Are lying and deception necessary“skills” for achieving success in politics? Is truthfulness in politics a contradictionin itself? Is the political business as such not dirty by nature? When we think aboutthe remarkable number of lies which have been concocted and distributed bypoliticians in the recent past, the impression that politics and lies indeed go handin-hand emerges, and that the ideal image of politics as a rational instrument forthe formulation of generally binding objectives is fraudulent. Should a distinctionbe made between lies that pursue harmful goals and lies that aim to achieve a goodaim? Should politicians be morally justified to lie in order to realise well-meantpolitical objectives?","PeriodicalId":191510,"journal":{"name":"Ethics, Politics & Society","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133742416","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"THE VIRTUE OF COMPROMISE","authors":"Yuval Eylon","doi":"10.21814/EPS.2.1.100","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21814/EPS.2.1.100","url":null,"abstract":"Compromise is the virtue of political agents. This picture of the politicalis as common and familiar: politics is a realm where the reasonable, thecompromising politicians get things done and the unreasonable anduncompromising are doomed to fringes. Thus, it is always right and reasonablemake good compromises. The paper argues that under certain conditions, it isbetter and more effective to have non-compromising politicians. For example, thinkof a political party that every election moves towards the political center tomaximize its chances of winning, but loses the elections at the cost of having thepolitical center move further away from its original positions. If the process repeatsitself, then a series of compromise would be disastrous, much as the considerationsof the self-torturer are disastrous. Thus, there are systematic ways in which thereasonable compromises of a virtuous politician are sometimes (ultimately)unreasonable. Political virtue is all too often self-defeating, and therefore a cursein disguise.","PeriodicalId":191510,"journal":{"name":"Ethics, Politics & Society","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114719977","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A POLITICS WITHOUT COMPROMISE: THE YOUNG HEGELIANS AND POLITICS","authors":"Vivien García","doi":"10.21814/EPS.2.1.95","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21814/EPS.2.1.95","url":null,"abstract":"This article aims at exploring how most of the Young Hegelians came toreject all forms of compromise. It will first show how Young Hegelianism itself wasborn from a process of radicalisation. Then, it will expound some of the theoreticaldevelopments that this process produced and explain why and how all forms ofcompromise came to be rejected. For Young Hegelians, a compromise is an antidialecticalposition. It consists in the adoption of a median posture, which does notcorrespond with a real mediation. It is a way of deflating conflicts and, moreprecisely, to avoid the oppositions at work in history being unveiled in their purity.","PeriodicalId":191510,"journal":{"name":"Ethics, Politics & Society","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124900321","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"CAN HYPOCRISY BE A VIRTUE? HUME ON THE MORALITY OF PRINCES","authors":"Alexandra Abranches","doi":"10.21814/EPS.2.1.89","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21814/EPS.2.1.89","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the moral status of hypocrisy in the moral andpolitical philosophy of David Hume. Its aim will be to try to determine whether,according to Hume, hypocrisy has any positive moral value, or whether, not havingany, Hume should therefore be placed in the same category of political realists suchas Machiavelli, with his sharp distinction between moral and political values. If thelatter is the case, then hypocrisy can be described as an absolute moral vice. But ifthe former is the case, that is, if hypocrisy has any moral value, then Hume doesnot support the sharp separation between what is right from a political and froma moral point of view, which means that there may even be, then, some relationbetween hypocrisy and moral obligation. In other words, hypocrisy may very wellbe virtuous.","PeriodicalId":191510,"journal":{"name":"Ethics, Politics & Society","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122455397","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"EFFORT AS RESPONSIBILITY","authors":"David Jenkins","doi":"10.21814/EPS.2.1.83","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21814/EPS.2.1.83","url":null,"abstract":"John Roemer has created a model by which the luck egalitariandistinction between choice and luck can be used to motivate real policy decisions.By dividing society into ‘types’, Roemer suggests we are able to limit comparisonsmade between different people to that which they are able to control. In so doing,responsible individual action becomes the sole means by which inequalities can bejustified and far more transformative redistributive legislation can be motivated.However, the model relies on two types of comparison – both within and betweentypes – that ultimately flaw Roemer’s claims to be measuring responsible action.The model assumes that it is unproblematic to compare effort across individualswho are situated in radically unequal circumstances; it also assumes that the typecan control for circumstances in a way that ignores the enormous contingency thatconstitutes human life. As a consequence, Roemer’s ambitious proposal fails topractically apply the choice-luck distinction","PeriodicalId":191510,"journal":{"name":"Ethics, Politics & Society","volume":"76 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124672696","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A REACTIONARY FASCINATION: EMIL CIORAN AND JOSEPH DE MAISTRE","authors":"P. Vanini","doi":"10.21814/EPS.2.1.97","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21814/EPS.2.1.97","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this paper is to examine Cioran’s interpretation of Maistre’sreactionary thought. Cioran judges the philosophical work of De Maistre as a usefulinstrument to investigate the Twentieth century ideological debate on Revolution,with specific reference to the issue of the engagement of philosophers in politics.Through the analysis of Maistre’s criticism of revolutionary thought at the time ofthe Enlightenment, Cioran proposes an insightful deconstruction of the ideologicaldichotomy between Reaction and Revolution. Indeed, the paper will show thatCioran’s understanding of De Maistre implies both a radical criticism of Sartre’sexistentialism and an original interpretation of Schmitt’s Political Theology.","PeriodicalId":191510,"journal":{"name":"Ethics, Politics & Society","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132630828","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"WHAT DOES BEING AN “ARISTOTELIAN” REALLY MEAN?","authors":"S. Çelik","doi":"10.21814/EPS.2.1.98","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21814/EPS.2.1.98","url":null,"abstract":"The present paper presents two main arguments: 1) The meanings ofterms like “(neo-) Aristotelian” or “Aristotelianism” have become extremelyambiguous in the present literature of ethics and political philosophy. These termshave even become confusing rather than being descriptive or explanatory. Thefollowing questions seem to have no proper answers: Who is actually“Aristotelian,” or “neo-Aristotelian,” to what extent and for what reasons? Whatdoes “(neo-) Aristotelian” really mean? 2) In order to give some clues to properlyanswer these questions, as its second argument, the present paper attempts todefine the essential methodological characteristics of Aristotelian ethical/politicalexploration. To be called as an “Aristotelian,” a research should start from themethodological peculiarities of Aristotle’s practical philosophy that make aresearch “Aristotelian” rather than “Kantian” or “Hegelian.” In the second part ofthe paper, these peculiarities are defined as methodological prudence and medicaldialectics, which are characteristic aspects of Aristotelian way of inquiry regardingethics and political philosophy.","PeriodicalId":191510,"journal":{"name":"Ethics, Politics & Society","volume":"76 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126221380","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"ENACTING LEVINAS’S INFINITE RESPONSIBILITY AS AN ETHICO-POLITICAL COMPROMISE","authors":"J. Andrade","doi":"10.21814/EPS.2.1.96","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21814/EPS.2.1.96","url":null,"abstract":"Levinas’s work does not offer us an ethical theory but seeks rather todescribe a pre-originary ethical encounter with the other. Within this face-to-faceencounter with the other, my subjectivity is held hostage because of an originaryasymmetry between us. This ethical asymmetry produces an infinite responsibilityto and for the other, in order that the singularity of the other be preserved. In orderto moderate such a demanding position Levinas introduces the third party whorestores justice by permitting ethical calculation. This marks a move from ethics topolitics. Nonetheless, there remains a lacuna between ethics and politics. I arguefor a reading of Levinas’s claim that the third party is an incessant correction ofthe asymmetry of proximity in order to posit infinite responsibility as thecompromise of ethics with politics. I discuss some implications for business ethics,in particular CSR, in light of these findings.","PeriodicalId":191510,"journal":{"name":"Ethics, Politics & Society","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124944332","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"RESCUING POLITICS FROM LYING AND HYPOCRISY: UTILITY AND TRUTH IN JEREMY BENTHAM’S THOUGHT","authors":"Benjamin Bourcier","doi":"10.21814/EPS.2.1.90","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21814/EPS.2.1.90","url":null,"abstract":"As a utilitarian philosopher, Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) devoted mostof his career to create a new institutional setting to promote the greatest happinessof the greatest number on the basis of the principle of utility. In doing so, Benthamcommitted himself not only to the value of utility but also to truth. Truth meantuniversal interest and denouncing all abuses of power and corruptions thatsacrifice the interest of the greatest number. As two opponents of truth, lies andhypocrisy are the symptoms of the sacrifice of the universal interest and directlyoppose the principle of utility. Yet, what is at stake in this opposition? How didBentham value and analyze these two phenomenon? In this paper, I will explainhow Bentham’s commitment against lying and hypocrisy in politics aims tosupport the truth of the utilitarian principle and demonstrates the wrongness ofother moral principles.","PeriodicalId":191510,"journal":{"name":"Ethics, Politics & Society","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129490575","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}