{"title":"Utility Tokens as a Commitment to Competition","authors":"ITAY GOLDSTEIN, DEEKSHA GUPTA, RUSLAN SVERCHKOV","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13389","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13389","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We show that utility tokens can limit the rent-seeking activities of two-sided platforms with market power while preserving efficiency gains due to network effects. We model platforms where buyers and sellers can meet to exchange services. Tokens serve as the sole medium of exchange on a platform and can be traded in a secondary market. Tokenizing a platform commits a firm to give up monopolistic rents associated with the control of the platform, leading to long-run competitive prices. We show how the threat of entrants can incentivize developers to tokenize and discuss cases where regulation is needed to enforce tokenization.</p>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"79 6","pages":"4197-4246"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2024-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jofi.13389","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142405171","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Putting the Price in Asset Pricing","authors":"THUMMIM CHO, CHRISTOPHER POLK","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13391","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13391","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We propose a novel way to estimate a portfolio's <i>abnormal price</i>, the percentage gap between price and the present value of dividends computed with a chosen asset pricing model. Our method, based on a novel identity, resembles the time-series estimator of abnormal returns, avoids the issues in alternative approaches, and clarifies the role of risk and mispricing in long-horizon returns. We apply our techniques to study the cross-section of price levels relative to the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and find that a single characteristic, <i>adjusted value</i>, provides a parsimonious model of CAPM-implied abnormal price.</p>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"79 6","pages":"3943-3984"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2024-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jofi.13391","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142397988","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
HARALD HAU, YI HUANG, CHEN LIN, HONGZHE SHAN, ZIXIA SHENG, LAI WEI
{"title":"FinTech Credit and Entrepreneurial Growth","authors":"HARALD HAU, YI HUANG, CHEN LIN, HONGZHE SHAN, ZIXIA SHENG, LAI WEI","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13384","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13384","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Based on automated credit lines to vendors trading on Alibaba's online retail platform and a discontinuity in the credit decision algorithm, we document that a vendor's access to FinTech credit boosts its sales growth, transaction growth, and the level of customer satisfaction gauged by product, service, and consignment ratings. These effects are more pronounced for vendors characterized by greater information asymmetry about their credit risk and less collateral, which reveals the information advantage of FinTech credit over traditional credit technology.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"79 5","pages":"3309-3359"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2024-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142100787","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Working Capital Credit Multiplier","authors":"HEITOR ALMEIDA, DANIEL CARVALHO, TAEHYUN KIM","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13385","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13385","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We provide novel evidence that funding frictions can limit firms’ short-term investments in receivables and inventories, reducing their production capacity. We propose a credit multiplier driven by these considerations and empirically isolate its importance by comparing how a similar firm responds to shocks differently when these shocks are initiated in their most profitable quarter (“main quarter”). We implement this test using recurring and unpredictable shocks (e.g., oil shocks) and provide extensive evidence supporting our identification strategy. Our results suggest that funding constraints and credit multiplier effects are significant for smaller firms that heavily rely on financing from suppliers.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"79 6","pages":"4247-4302"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2024-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142084690","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ELISE GOURIER, LUDOVIC PHALIPPOU, MARK M. WESTERFIELD
{"title":"Capital Commitment","authors":"ELISE GOURIER, LUDOVIC PHALIPPOU, MARK M. WESTERFIELD","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13382","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13382","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Twelve trillion dollars are allocated to private market funds that require outside investors to commit to transferring capital on demand. We show within a novel dynamic portfolio allocation model that ex-ante commitment has large effects on investors' portfolios and welfare, and we quantify those effects. Investors are underallocated to private market funds and are willing to pay a larger premium to adjust the quantity committed than to eliminate other frictions, like timing uncertainty and limited tradability. Perhaps counterintuitively, commitment risk premiums increase with secondary market liquidity, and they do not disappear when investments are spread over many funds.</p>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"79 5","pages":"3407-3457"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2024-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jofi.13382","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142085577","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Treasury Bill Shortages and the Pricing of Short-Term Assets","authors":"ADRIEN D'AVERNAS, QUENTIN VANDEWEYER","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13376","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13376","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We propose a model of post-Great Financial Crisis (GFC) money markets and monetary policy implementation. In our framework, capital regulation may deter banks from intermediating liquidity derived from holding reserves to shadow banks. Consequently, money markets can be segmented, and the scarcity of Treasury bills available to shadow banks is the main driver of short-term spreads. In this regime, open market operations have an inverse effect on net liquidity provision when swapping ample reserves for scarce T-bills or repos. Our model quantitatively accounts for post-2010 time series for repo rates, T-bill yields, and the Fed's reverse repo facility usage.</p>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"79 6","pages":"4083-4141"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2024-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jofi.13376","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142084691","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Currency Management by International Fixed-Income Mutual Funds","authors":"CLEMENS SIALM, QIFEI ZHU","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13381","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13381","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Investments in international fixed-income securities are exposed to significant currency risks. We collect novel data on currency derivatives used by U.S. international fixed-income funds. We document that while 90% of funds use currency forwards, they hedge, on average, only 18% of their currency exposure. Funds' currency forward positions differ substantially based on risk management demands related to portfolio currency exposure, return-enhancement motives such as currency momentum and carry trade, and strategic considerations related to past performance and fund clientele. Funds that hedge their currency risk exhibit lower return variability, but do not generate inferior abnormal returns.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"79 6","pages":"4037-4081"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2024-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142084656","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bailout Stigma","authors":"YEON-KOO CHE, CHONGWOO CHOE, KEEYOUNG RHEE","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13386","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13386","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We develop a model of bailout stigma in which accepting a bailout signals a firm's balance-sheet weakness and reduces its funding prospects. To avoid stigma, high-quality firms withdraw from subsequent financing after receiving bailouts or refuse bailouts altogether to send a favorable signal. The former leads to a short-lived stimulation followed by a market freeze even worse than if there were no bailout. The latter revives the funding market, albeit with delay, to the level achievable without any stigma and implements a constrained optimal outcome. A menu of multiple bailout programs compounds bailout stigma and exacerbates the market freeze.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"79 5","pages":"2993-3039"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2024-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142045807","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Founder-CEO Compensation and Selection into Venture Capital-Backed Entrepreneurship","authors":"MICHAEL EWENS, RAMANA NANDA, CHRISTOPHER STANTON","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13383","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13383","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We show theoretically that a critical determinant of the attractiveness of venture capital (VC)-backed entrepreneurship for high-earning potential founders is the expected time to develop a startup's initial product. This is because founder-CEOs' cash compensation increases substantially after product development, alleviating the nondiversifiable risk that founders face at startup birth. Consistent with the model's predictions of where the supply of entrepreneurial talent is likely to be most constrained, we find that technological shocks differentially altering the expected time to product across industries can explain changes in both the rate of entry and characteristics of individuals selecting into VC-backed entrepreneurship.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"79 5","pages":"3361-3405"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2024-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142045457","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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