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Privacy and Team Incentives 隐私和团队激励
IF 8 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2025-10-15 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13496
ANDREA M. BUFFA, QING LIU, LUCY WHITE
{"title":"Privacy and Team Incentives","authors":"ANDREA M. BUFFA, QING LIU, LUCY WHITE","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13496","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13496","url":null,"abstract":"Real-world contracts are typically private, observed only by their direct signatories, so agents working together are vulnerable to the principal opportunistically reducing other agents' incentives. The principal can mitigate this commitment problem by giving the most skilled agent a budget and delegating authority to write other agents' contracts. This endogenous hierarchy, never optimal with public contracts, raises effort, output, and compensation but allows rent extraction. The principal prefers it when contracts are opaque enough, skill is sufficiently heterogeneous across agents, and joint output is sensitive enough to effort. Our model provides novel predictions for the structure of banking syndicates.","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"117 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.0,"publicationDate":"2025-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145289187","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Imperfect Intermediation of Money-Like Assets 类货币资产的不完美中介
IF 8 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2025-10-14 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13500
JEREMY C. STEIN, JONATHAN WALLEN
{"title":"The Imperfect Intermediation of Money-Like Assets","authors":"JEREMY C. STEIN, JONATHAN WALLEN","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13500","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13500","url":null,"abstract":"We study supply-and-demand effects in the U.S. Treasury bill market by comparing the returns on T-bills to the policy rate on the Federal Reserve's reverse repurchase (RRP) facility. We develop and test a simple model where the RRP-bill spread is policed both by heterogeneously elastic money funds and by corporate treasurers who derive collateral benefits from holding T-bills. In response to shifts in T-bill supply, money funds act as front-line arbitrageurs. However, when T-bills become extremely scarce, less elastic corporate treasurers become the marginal investors and supply shifts have a larger effect on T-bill rates.","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"95 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.0,"publicationDate":"2025-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145288237","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Value without Employment 没有就业的价值
IF 8 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2025-10-07 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13505
SIMCHA BARKAI, STAVROS PANAGEAS
{"title":"Value without Employment","authors":"SIMCHA BARKAI, STAVROS PANAGEAS","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13505","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13505","url":null,"abstract":"Young firms' contribution to aggregate employment has been underwhelming. We show that a similar trend is not apparent, however, in their contribution to aggregate sales or stock market capitalization, implying that these firms have exhibited a high average-to-marginal revenue product of labor. We study the implications of a gradual shift in the average-to-marginal revenue product of labor within a model of dynamic firm heterogeneity. We show that this shift provides (i) a unified explanation for several aspects of the decline in dynamism and (ii) a possible explanation for why large declines in young-firm employment may have only a moderate effect on aggregate output and consumption.","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"158 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.0,"publicationDate":"2025-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145241953","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Asset Pricing and Risk‐Sharing Implications of Alternative Pension Plan Systems 另类养老金计划体系的资产定价和风险分担影响
IF 8 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2025-10-07 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13507
NUNO COIMBRA, FRANCISCO GOMES, ALEXANDER MICHAELIDES, JIALU SHEN
{"title":"Asset Pricing and Risk‐Sharing Implications of Alternative Pension Plan Systems","authors":"NUNO COIMBRA, FRANCISCO GOMES, ALEXANDER MICHAELIDES, JIALU SHEN","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13507","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13507","url":null,"abstract":"We show that incorporating defined benefit pension funds in an incomplete markets asset pricing model improves its ability to match the historical equity premium and riskless rate and has important risk‐sharing implications. We document the importance of the pension fund's size and asset demands, and a new risk channel arising from fluctuations in the fund's returns. We use our calibrated model to study the implications of a shift to an economy with defined contribution plans. The new steady state is characterized by a higher riskless rate and a lower equity premium. Consumption volatility increases for retirees but decreases for workers.","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"112 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.0,"publicationDate":"2025-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145241992","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
CEO Stress, Aging, and Death 压力、衰老和死亡
IF 8 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2025-10-07 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13497
MARK BORGSCHULTE, MARIUS GUENZEL, CANYAO LIU, ULRIKE MALMENDIER
{"title":"CEO Stress, Aging, and Death","authors":"MARK BORGSCHULTE, MARIUS GUENZEL, CANYAO LIU, ULRIKE MALMENDIER","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13497","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13497","url":null,"abstract":"We assess the long‐term effects of managerial stress on aging and mortality. Using a difference‐in‐differences design, we apply neural network–based machine‐learning techniques to CEOs' facial images and show that exposure to industry distress shocks during the Great Recession produces visible signs of aging. We estimate a one‐year increase in “apparent” age. Moreover, using data on CEOs since the mid‐1970s, we estimate a 1.1‐year decrease in life expectancy after an industry distress shock, but a two‐year increase when antitakeover laws insulate CEOs from market discipline. The estimated health costs are significant, both in absolute terms and relative to other health risks.","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"84 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.0,"publicationDate":"2025-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145241986","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Going for Broke: Bank Reputation and the Performance of Opaque Securities 孤注一掷：银行声誉与不透明证券的表现
IF 8 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2025-10-06 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13503
ABE DE JONG, TIM KOOIJMANS, PETER KOUDIJS
{"title":"Going for Broke: Bank Reputation and the Performance of Opaque Securities","authors":"ABE DE JONG, TIM KOOIJMANS, PETER KOUDIJS","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13503","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13503","url":null,"abstract":"Can banks’ reputational concerns improve the quality of opaque, off‐balance sheet securities, such as mortgage‐backed securities? We study this question in a uniquely parsimonious setting. In the 1760s, Dutch banking partnerships securitized West‐Indian plantation mortgages that were risky and opaque. High‐reputation banks originated better mortgages and issued securities that, on average, retained 17.5% more of their value during a market collapse. Reputational effects are attenuated when the managing partners were married into wealth or received a large share of profits in the short term, suggesting that bank reputation only works if bankers are personally exposed to (long‐run) reputational losses.","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.0,"publicationDate":"2025-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145241972","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Subtle Discrimination 微妙的歧视
IF 8 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2025-10-06 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13506
ELENA S. PIKULINA, DANIEL FERREIRA
{"title":"Subtle Discrimination","authors":"ELENA S. PIKULINA, DANIEL FERREIRA","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13506","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13506","url":null,"abstract":"We introduce the concept of <jats:italic>subtle discrimination</jats:italic>—biased acts that cannot be objectively ascertained as discriminatory. When candidates compete for promotions by investing in skills, firms' subtle biases induce discriminated candidates to overinvest when promotions are low‐stakes (to distinguish themselves from favored candidates) but underinvest in high‐stakes settings (anticipating low promotion probabilities). This asymmetry implies that subtle discrimination raises profits in low‐productivity firms but lowers them in high‐productivity firms. Although subtle biases are small, they generate large gaps in skills and promotion outcomes. We derive further predictions in contexts such as equity analysis, lending, fund flows, banking careers, and entrepreneurial finance.","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.0,"publicationDate":"2025-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145241950","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Stock Market and Bank Risk‐Taking 股票市场和银行风险承担
IF 8 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2025-10-06 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13502
ANTONIO FALATO, DAVID SCHARFSTEIN
{"title":"The Stock Market and Bank Risk‐Taking","authors":"ANTONIO FALATO, DAVID SCHARFSTEIN","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13502","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13502","url":null,"abstract":"Using confidential supervisory risk ratings, we document that banks increase risk after going public compared to a control group of banks that filed to go public but withdrew their filings for plausibly exogenous reasons. The increase in risk improves short‐term performance at the expense of long‐term performance. We argue that the increase in risk stems from pressure to maximize short‐term stock prices and earnings once the bank is publicly traded. After going public, banks owned by investors that place greater value on short‐term performance increase risk more, and those managed by CEOs with more short‐term compensation also increase risk more.","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.0,"publicationDate":"2025-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145246392","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
ESG News, Future Cash Flows, and Firm Value ESG新闻，未来现金流和公司价值
IF 8 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2025-09-30 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13498
FRANÇOIS DERRIEN, PHILIPP KRÜGER, AUGUSTIN LANDIER, TIANHAO YAO
{"title":"ESG News, Future Cash Flows, and Firm Value","authors":"FRANÇOIS DERRIEN, PHILIPP KRÜGER, AUGUSTIN LANDIER, TIANHAO YAO","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13498","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13498","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the expected consequences of negative environmental, social, and governance (ESG) news on firms' future profits. After learning about negative ESG news, analysts significantly downgrade their forecasts at short and longer horizons. Negative ESG news affects forecasts more strongly at longer horizons than other types of negative corporate news. The negative revisions of earnings forecasts following negative ESG news largely reflect expectations of lower future sales, rather than higher future costs. Quantitatively, forecast revisions can explain most of the negative impacts of ESG news on firm value. Analysts are correct to revise forecasts downward following negative ESG news.","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"74 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.0,"publicationDate":"2025-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145188458","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Anomalies and Their Short‐Sale Costs 异常及其卖空成本
IF 8 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2025-09-30 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13501
DMITRIY MURAVYEV, NEIL D. PEARSON, JOSHUA M. POLLET
{"title":"Anomalies and Their Short‐Sale Costs","authors":"DMITRIY MURAVYEV, NEIL D. PEARSON, JOSHUA M. POLLET","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13501","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13501","url":null,"abstract":"Short‐sale costs eliminate the abnormal returns on asset pricing anomaly portfolios. While many anomalies persist out‐of‐sample before accounting for short‐sale costs, they cannot be exploited with long‐short strategies due to stock borrow fees. Using a comprehensive sample of 162 anomalies, the average long‐short portfolio return is a significant 0.14% per month before short‐sale costs, and the returns are due to the short leg. However, the average is −0.01% once returns are adjusted for borrow fees. Moreover, anomalies are not profitable even before fees if the high‐fee observations, representing 12% of stock dates, are excluded from the analysis.","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"158 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.0,"publicationDate":"2025-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145254703","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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