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Too Much, Too Soon, for Too Long: The Dynamics of Competitive Executive Compensation 太多、太快、太久：竞争性高管薪酬的动态
IF 8 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2025-07-30 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13470
GILLES CHEMLA, ALEJANDRO RIVERA, LIYAN SHI
{"title":"Too Much, Too Soon, for Too Long: The Dynamics of Competitive Executive Compensation","authors":"GILLES CHEMLA, ALEJANDRO RIVERA, LIYAN SHI","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13470","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13470","url":null,"abstract":"We examine executive compensation in a general equilibrium model with dynamic moral hazard, where executives' outside options are endogenously determined by equilibrium market compensation. Firms provide incentives through compensation packages featuring deferred payments as “carrots” and termination as “sticks.” Crucially, the effectiveness of termination as an incentive device is undermined by the outside options available to executives. As individual firms fail to internalize the effect of their compensation design on these endogenous outside options, the equilibrium is generally inefficient. Compared to shareholder‐value‐maximizing compensation packages, executives are paid too much, too soon, and keep their jobs for too long.","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"141 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.0,"publicationDate":"2025-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144748203","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Does Saving Cause Borrowing? Implications for the Coholding Puzzle 储蓄会导致借贷吗？对共同持有之谜的启示
IF 8 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2025-07-02 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13466
PAOLINA C. MEDINA, MICHAELA PAGEL
{"title":"Does Saving Cause Borrowing? Implications for the Coholding Puzzle","authors":"PAOLINA C. MEDINA, MICHAELA PAGEL","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13466","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13466","url":null,"abstract":"Using an experiment in which 3.1 million bank customers were encouraged to save, we explore the mechanisms behind coholding liquid savings and credit card debt. Theoretically, we show that the joint responses of spending, saving, and borrowing to the nudge differ across economic models of coholding. Using machine learning techniques, we find that the most responsive individuals reduce spending and increase savings by 4.9% (206 USD PPP per month) while their credit card debt remains unchanged. These individuals' marginal responses to the nudge are consistent with our model of coholding for the purpose of self‐ or partner‐control.","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.0,"publicationDate":"2025-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144547097","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
AMERICAN FINANCE ASSOCIATION 美国金融协会
IF 7.6 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2025-07-01 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13468
{"title":"AMERICAN FINANCE ASSOCIATION","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13468","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13468","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"80 4","pages":"2436-2437"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2025-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jofi.13468","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144520015","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Regulating Over-the-Counter Markets 监管场外交易市场
IF 7.6 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2025-05-30 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13461
TOMY LEE, CHAOJUN WANG
{"title":"Regulating Over-the-Counter Markets","authors":"TOMY LEE,&nbsp;CHAOJUN WANG","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13461","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13461","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Over-the-counter (OTC) trading thrives despite competition from exchanges. We let OTC dealers cream skim from exchanges in an otherwise standard Glosten and Milgrom framework. Restricting the dealer's ability to cream skim induces “cheap substitution”: some traders exit while others with larger gains from trade enter. Cheap substitution implies trading costs, trade volumes, and market shares are poor policy indicators. In a benchmark case, restricting the dealer raises welfare only if trading cost increases, volume falls, and OTC market share is high. By contrast, the restriction improves welfare when adverse selection risk is low. A simple procedure implements the optimal Pigouvian tax.</p>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"80 4","pages":"1929-1962"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2025-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jofi.13461","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144193200","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
What Is the Cost of Privatization for Workers? 私有化对工人的代价是什么？
IF 7.6 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2025-05-30 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13462
MARTIN OLSSON, JOACIM TÅG
{"title":"What Is the Cost of Privatization for Workers?","authors":"MARTIN OLSSON,&nbsp;JOACIM TÅG","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13462","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13462","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Privatization of state-owned enterprises is on the agenda across the globe. Using Swedish data covering two decades, we show that productivity gains and headcount reductions are associated with economic costs for incumbent workers. Workers experience income losses and higher unemployment, but half of the losses are covered by the social safety net. We also find small positive effects on entrepreneurship and cash holdings but no meaningful effects on other labor market, family, health, or household finance outcomes. Productivity improves when the CEO is replaced, and the gains outweigh workers' income declines by a factor of between two and six.</p>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"80 4","pages":"2107-2151"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2025-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jofi.13462","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144193118","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Value of Bank Lending 银行贷款的价值
IF 7.6 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2025-05-28 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13465
THOMAS FLANAGAN
{"title":"The Value of Bank Lending","authors":"THOMAS FLANAGAN","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13465","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13465","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Using a novel data set of realized syndicated loan cash flows and a risk-adjustment methodology adapted from the private equity literature, I provide a measure of risk-adjusted returns for bank loan cash flows. Banks, on average, generate 180 basis points in gross risk-adjusted returns and add $75 million of value annually to their loan portfolios. Banks earn higher returns when they lend to financially constrained borrowers, and the risk-adjusted performance of bank loan portfolios exhibits persistence. However, banks require higher risk-adjusted returns when facing their own financing frictions, and shareholders earn nearly zero net risk-adjusted returns once bank staff are compensated for their lending effort. Overall, these findings suggest that banks provide valuable services to mitigate borrowers' financing frictions, and the present value of loan cash flows pays for the costs of providing these services.</p>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"80 4","pages":"2017-2061"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2025-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jofi.13465","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144164807","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Term Structure of Interest Rates in a Heterogeneous Monetary Union 异质货币联盟中的利率期限结构
IF 7.6 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2025-05-28 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13463
JAMES COSTAIN, GALO NUÑO, CARLOS THOMAS
{"title":"The Term Structure of Interest Rates in a Heterogeneous Monetary Union","authors":"JAMES COSTAIN,&nbsp;GALO NUÑO,&nbsp;CARLOS THOMAS","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13463","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13463","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We build an arbitrage-based model of the yield curves in a heterogeneous monetary union with sovereign default risk, which accounts for the asymmetric shifts in euro-area yields during the Covid-19 pandemic. We derive an affine term structure solution, and decompose yields into expectations, term premium, expected default loss, and credit risk premium components. In an extension, we endogenize the peripheral default probability, showing that it decreases with central bank bond holdings. Calibrating the model to Germany and Italy, we show that both the level and the shifts in the sovereign spread are mainly attributable to the credit risk premium.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"80 4","pages":"2389-2434"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2025-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144153784","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Interlocking Directorates and Competition in Banking 联锁首长与银行业竞争
IF 7.6 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2025-05-27 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13464
GUGLIELMO BARONE, FABIANO SCHIVARDI, ENRICO SETTE
{"title":"Interlocking Directorates and Competition in Banking","authors":"GUGLIELMO BARONE,&nbsp;FABIANO SCHIVARDI,&nbsp;ENRICO SETTE","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13464","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13464","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study the effects on corporate loan rates of an unexpected change in the Italian legislation that forbade interlocking directorates between banks. Exploiting multiple firm-bank relationships to fully account for all unobserved heterogeneity, we find that prohibiting interlocks decreased the interest rates of previously interlocked banks by 14 basis points relative to other banks. The effect is stronger for high-quality firms and for loans extended by interlocked banks with a large joint market share. Interest rates on loans from previously interlocked banks become more dispersed. Finally, firms borrowing more from previously interlocked banks expand investment, employment, and sales.</p>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"80 4","pages":"1963-2016"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2025-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jofi.13464","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144153458","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Would Order-By-Order Auctions Be Competitive? 按订单拍卖会有竞争力吗？
IF 7.6 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2025-05-13 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13449
THOMAS ERNST, CHESTER SPATT, JIAN SUN
{"title":"Would Order-By-Order Auctions Be Competitive?","authors":"THOMAS ERNST,&nbsp;CHESTER SPATT,&nbsp;JIAN SUN","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13449","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13449","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We model two methods of executing segregated retail orders: brokers' routing, whereby brokers allocate orders using the market maker's overall performance, and order-by-order auctions, where market makers bid on individual orders, a recent U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission proposal. Order-by-order auctions improve allocative efficiency, but face a winner's curse reducing retail investor welfare, particularly when liquidity is limited. Additional market participants competing for retail orders fail to improve total efficiency and investor welfare when entrants possess information superior to incumbent wholesalers. Our results hold when new entrants are less informed or the information structure differs. We also examine the cross-subsidization of brokers' routing.</p>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"80 4","pages":"1879-1927"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2025-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jofi.13449","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143979375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
AMERICAN FINANCE ASSOCIATION
IF 7.6 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2025-05-13 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13460
{"title":"AMERICAN FINANCE ASSOCIATION","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13460","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13460","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"80 3","pages":"1872-1873"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2025-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jofi.13460","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143944422","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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