MICHELE BISCEGLIA, ALESSIO PICCOLO, JAN SCHNEEMEIER
{"title":"Externalities of Responsible Investments","authors":"MICHELE BISCEGLIA, ALESSIO PICCOLO, JAN SCHNEEMEIER","doi":"10.1111/jofi.70082","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.70082","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a model to study the efficiency of socially responsible investing (SRI) as a mechanism to control firms' externalities. When SRI is not too popular, responsible investors favor strategies that lead to a concentration of SRI in a subset of firms in the economy. This concentration can mitigate coordination issues in adopting green technologies, but it can also crowd out the green investments of excluded firms and increase the price of green products. In equilibrium, responsible investors continue to favor concentration even as SRI becomes more popular, and concentrate the most when concentration is least desirable.","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"167 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.0,"publicationDate":"2026-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149172513","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
TOBIAS J. MOSKOWITZ, CHASE P. ROSS, SHARON Y. ROSS, KAUSHIK VASUDEVAN
{"title":"Risk, Specialization, and Covered‐Interest Parity","authors":"TOBIAS J. MOSKOWITZ, CHASE P. ROSS, SHARON Y. ROSS, KAUSHIK VASUDEVAN","doi":"10.1111/jofi.70095","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.70095","url":null,"abstract":"Prevailing theories of financial intermediation assume an integrated financial sector with frictionless risk‐sharing. However, we identify substantial risk‐sharing frictions linked to intermediary specialization using currency derivatives markets as a laboratory. Using confidential supervisory data covering $25 trillion in daily bank exposures, we document imperfect hedging in banks' FX‐swap intermediation: banks rarely hedge their synthetic dollar lending with maturity‐matched foreign safe assets. Intermediaries specialize in markets in which they have expertise in managing the associated exposures, giving rise to cross‐market variation in deviations from covered‐interest parity. Our results highlight the importance of intermediary specialization and its impact on risk premia.","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.0,"publicationDate":"2026-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149172514","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ANDREA L. EISFELDT, GREGOR SCHUBERT, MIAO BEN ZHANG, BLEDI TASKA
{"title":"Generative AI and Firm Values","authors":"ANDREA L. EISFELDT, GREGOR SCHUBERT, MIAO BEN ZHANG, BLEDI TASKA","doi":"10.1111/jofi.70089","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.70089","url":null,"abstract":"How do recent advances in Generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) affect firm value? We construct the first measure of <jats:italic>firms' workforce exposures</jats:italic> to Generative AI and show that an “Artificial‐Minus‐Human” portfolio earned 5% in the two weeks following the release of ChatGPT. The labor‐exposure effect is more pronounced for firms with greater data assets and is distinct from the effect of firms' product exposures to AI. We assess whether exposed workforces are substituted or complemented by Generative AI based on whether their exposed tasks are core or supplemental. Examining firms' labor demand and profitability following the release of ChatGPT supports a labor‐technology substitution channel.","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.0,"publicationDate":"2026-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149130314","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Financial Premium","authors":"JENS DICK‐NIELSEN, PETER FELDHÜTTER, DAVID LANDO","doi":"10.1111/jofi.70084","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.70084","url":null,"abstract":"We show that bonds issued by financial firms have higher spreads than bonds issued by industrial firms with the same rating and maturity, a difference that we refer to as the financial premium. Over the period 1987 to 2020, in the United States, this premium is 43 basis points on average, with the premium higher for lower ratings, higher during financial crises, and increasing in bond beta. We derive a model that explains the financial premium: banks hold diversified portfolios of nonfinancial debt, and bank debt therefore reflects more systematic risk than nonfinancial debt.","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"181 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.0,"publicationDate":"2026-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149130316","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Feedback and Contagion through Distressed Competition","authors":"HUI CHEN, WINSTON WEI DOU, HONGYE GUO, YAN JI","doi":"10.1111/jofi.70080","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.70080","url":null,"abstract":"Firms tend to compete more aggressively when facing financial distress. This intensified competition reduces profit margins, pushing them further into distress and adversely affecting their industry peers. To study such feedback and contagion effects, we incorporate strategic competition in a dynamic model with long‐term defaultable debt, exploring various peer interactions such as predation and price wars. The feedback effect represents a novel source of financial distress costs associated with leverage, which helps explain the negative profitability‐leverage relation across industries. Owing to the contagion effect, firms' optimal leverage is often excessively high from an industry perspective, undermining the industry's financial stability.","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"36 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.0,"publicationDate":"2026-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149130315","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Flow‐Driven ESG Returns","authors":"PHILIPPE VAN DER BECK","doi":"10.1111/jofi.70083","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.70083","url":null,"abstract":"I show that the recent returns to environmental, social, and governance (ESG) investing are strongly driven by price impact from flows toward ESG portfolios. Using data on trades, I estimate the market's ability to accommodate ESG flows, which is given by the elasticity of substitution between ESG and other stocks. I show that every dollar flowing toward a representative ESG portfolio increases the market value of ESG stocks by $0.8. The growing institutional flows into the ESG portfolio are the main driver of ESG returns and have caused an annual flow‐driven return of 1.9%. In the absence of flows, ESG stocks would not have outperformed the market from 2012 to 2023.","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"245 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.0,"publicationDate":"2026-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149130317","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"When Do Treasuries Earn the Convenience Yield?—A Hedging Perspective","authors":"VIRAL V. ACHARYA, TOOMAS LAARITS","doi":"10.1111/jofi.70085","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.70085","url":null,"abstract":"We document that the convenience yield of U.S. Treasuries exhibits properties consistent with a hedging perspective of safe assets, that is, Treasuries are valued highly if they appreciate with poor aggregate shocks. In particular, the convenience yield tends to be low when the covariance of Treasury returns with the aggregate stock market returns is high. A decomposition of the aggregate stock‐bond covariance into terms corresponding to the convenience yield, the frictionless risk‐free rate, and default risk reveals that the covariance between stock returns and the convenience yield itself drives the effect in a substantive capacity.","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"76 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.0,"publicationDate":"2026-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149092949","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Targeted Philanthropy: Evidence from M&As","authors":"CARA VANSTEENKISTE","doi":"10.1111/jofi.70090","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.70090","url":null,"abstract":"I show how firms optimize the allocation of charitable funds around investments that require external stakeholder support, such as mergers and acquisitions. Acquirers increase donations to target‐related charities before making a takeover offer, but scale funds back after withdrawing from a deal. Firms redistribute funds from nontakeover‐related areas to target insider–affiliated charities, employee communities, and counties with a regulatory presence. Targeted donations that encourage blockholder reciprocity and employee commitment are associated with better deal performance through decreased merger premiums and lower integration costs. Overall, the results highlight firms’ use of philanthropy to manage stakeholder relations in takeover decisions.","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.0,"publicationDate":"2026-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149092850","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Politicization of Social Responsibility","authors":"TODD A. GORMLEY, MANISH JHA, MENG WANG","doi":"10.1111/jofi.70093","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.70093","url":null,"abstract":"Institutional investors are less likely to support shareholder proposals on environmental and social issues for firms headquartered in Republican‐led states. The decline in support has become more pronounced in recent years, aligning with politicians emphasizing companies’ social responsibility efforts, and among firms receiving state‐level subsidies and tax breaks. Investor support also varies with shifts in state leadership, dropping by 12 percentage points in the same state when Republicans are in control instead of Democrats. The findings indicate that institutional investors prioritize maximizing shareholder value and that politicians can influence investor votes by altering the value implications of shareholder proposals.","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"84 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.0,"publicationDate":"2026-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149123358","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
CARLO ALTAVILLA, MIGUEL BOUCINHA, MARTINA JASOVA, JOSÉ‐LUIS PEYDRÓ, FRANK SMETS
{"title":"Supranational Banking Supervision, Credit Supply, and Risk‐Taking: European Evidence from Multi‐Country Credit Registers","authors":"CARLO ALTAVILLA, MIGUEL BOUCINHA, MARTINA JASOVA, JOSÉ‐LUIS PEYDRÓ, FRANK SMETS","doi":"10.1111/jofi.70091","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.70091","url":null,"abstract":"Using a novel data set of multi‐country credit registers and an institutional change from national to supranational supervision, we show that supranational banking supervision can increase credit supply while mitigating excessive risk‐taking. Supranational supervision increases credit supply only in financially stressed countries while reducing the credit supply to the riskiest (zombie) firms. These improved lending effects stem from weaker national institutions, differential national supervisory incentives, lower national supervisory abilities, and weaker national insolvency laws. Moreover, improved access to external finance from wholesale and bond markets as well as lower risk‐weighted assets allow supranationally supervised banks to expand the supply of credit. Overall, despite some supranational supervisory arbitrage, supranational supervision decreases firm‐level credit to the riskiest firms while increasing firm‐level credit availability in stressed countries without reducing it in nonstressed countries.","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"58 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.0,"publicationDate":"2026-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149123278","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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