发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

Journal of Finance最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Would Order‐By‐Order Auctions Be Competitive? 按订单拍卖会有竞争力吗？
IF 8 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2025-05-14 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13449
THOMAS ERNST, CHESTER SPATT, JIAN SUN
{"title":"Would Order‐By‐Order Auctions Be Competitive?","authors":"THOMAS ERNST, CHESTER SPATT, JIAN SUN","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13449","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13449","url":null,"abstract":"We model two methods of executing segregated retail orders: brokers' routing, whereby brokers allocate orders using the market maker's overall performance, and order‐by‐order auctions, where market makers bid on individual orders, a recent U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission proposal. Order‐by‐order auctions improve allocative efficiency, but face a winner's curse reducing retail investor welfare, particularly when liquidity is limited. Additional market participants competing for retail orders fail to improve total efficiency and investor welfare when entrants possess information superior to incumbent wholesalers. Our results hold when new entrants are less informed or the information structure differs. We also examine the cross‐subsidization of brokers' routing.","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"55 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143979375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
AMERICAN FINANCE ASSOCIATION
IF 7.6 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2025-05-13 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13460
{"title":"AMERICAN FINANCE ASSOCIATION","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13460","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13460","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"80 3","pages":"1872-1873"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2025-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jofi.13460","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143944422","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Women in Charge: Evidence from Hospitals 妇女负责：来自医院的证据
IF 8 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2025-04-26 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13455
KATHARINA LEWELLEN
{"title":"Women in Charge: Evidence from Hospitals","authors":"KATHARINA LEWELLEN","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13455","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13455","url":null,"abstract":"The paper examines the decision‐making, compensation, and turnover of female CEOs in U.S. hospitals. Contrary to the literature on lower‐ranked executives and directors in public firms, there is no evidence that gender differences in preferences for risk or altruism affect decision‐making of hospital CEOs: corporate policies do not shift when women take (or leave) office, and male and female CEOs respond similarly to a major financial shock. However, female CEOs earn lower salaries, face flatter pay‐for‐performance incentives, and exhibit greater turnover after poor performance. Hospital boards behave as though they perceive female CEOs as less productive.","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.0,"publicationDate":"2025-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143875918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Dynamic Banking and the Value of Deposits 动态银行和存款价值
IF 8 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2025-04-23 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13454
PATRICK BOLTON, YE LI, NENG WANG, JINQIANG YANG
{"title":"Dynamic Banking and the Value of Deposits","authors":"PATRICK BOLTON, YE LI, NENG WANG, JINQIANG YANG","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13454","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13454","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a theory of banking in which banks cannot perfectly control deposit flows. Facing uninsurable loan and deposit shocks, banks dynamically manage lending, wholesale funding, deposits, and equity. Deposits create value by lowering funding costs. However, when the bank is undercapitalized and at risk of breaching leverage requirements, the marginal value of deposits can turn negative as deposit inflows, by raising leverage, increase the likelihood of costly equity issuance. Banks' inability to fully control leverage distinguishes them from nondepository intermediaries. Our model suggests a reevaluation of leverage regulations and offers new perspectives on banking in a low-interest-rate environment.","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.0,"publicationDate":"2025-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143866766","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Is the United States a Lucky Survivor? A Hierarchical Bayesian Approach 美国是幸运的幸存者吗？层次贝叶斯方法
IF 8 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2025-04-16 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13452
JULES VAN BINSBERGEN, SOPHIA HUA, JONAS PEETERS, JESSICA WACHTER
{"title":"Is the United States a Lucky Survivor? A Hierarchical Bayesian Approach","authors":"JULES VAN BINSBERGEN, SOPHIA HUA, JONAS PEETERS, JESSICA WACHTER","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13452","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13452","url":null,"abstract":"Using international data, we quantify the magnitude of survivorship bias in U.S. equity market performance, finding that it explains about one-third of the equity risk premium in the past century. We model the subjective crash belief of an investor who infers the crash risk in the United States by cross-learning from other countries. The U.S. crash probability shows a persistent and widening divergence from the implied global average. We attribute the upward bias in the measured equity premium to crashes that did not occur in-sample and to shocks to valuations resulting from learning about the probability.","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.0,"publicationDate":"2025-04-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143841237","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Raising Capital from Investor Syndicates with Strategic Communication 通过战略沟通从投资者集团筹集资金
IF 7.6 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2025-04-10 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13453
DAN LUO
{"title":"Raising Capital from Investor Syndicates with Strategic Communication","authors":"DAN LUO","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13453","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13453","url":null,"abstract":"<p>An entrepreneur makes offers to multiple investors to fund a project that requires a minimum investment. Concerned about other investors' decisions, each investor strategically communicates information about the project to others. When investors have conflicts of interest, those with contractually stronger incentives to invest attempt to persuade others to invest. Depending on the project's ex ante quality, the entrepreneur may promise investors different returns to create conflicts of interest and induce persuasion, or may promise investors an identical return to align their interests and induce truthful communication. The paper illustrates a new motivation for syndication and hierarchy within syndicates.</p>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"80 3","pages":"1815-1869"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2025-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jofi.13453","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143819978","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? Evidence from Corporate Tax Windfalls ceo们会因为运气而得到回报吗？来自企业税收意外之财的证据
IF 8 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2025-04-09 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13448
MARTINA ANDREANI, ATIF ELLAHIE, LAKSHMANAN SHIVAKUMAR
{"title":"Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? Evidence from Corporate Tax Windfalls","authors":"MARTINA ANDREANI, ATIF ELLAHIE, LAKSHMANAN SHIVAKUMAR","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13448","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13448","url":null,"abstract":"Focusing on the one-off tax gains and losses (i.e., windfalls) associated with the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, we reexamine whether CEOs are rewarded for luck. We find that weakly monitored CEOs are compensated for the windfall tax gains but not penalized for the corresponding tax losses. No such pattern is observed for CEOs facing greater pay scrutiny. The pay for windfalls cannot be explained as rewards for CEOs’ efforts, talents, political activities, or as firms sharing their tax gains with all executives. The results are more consistent with rent extraction by CEOs facing weak pay scrutiny.","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"60 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.0,"publicationDate":"2025-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143813909","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Conflicting Priorities: A Theory of Covenants and Collateral 优先权冲突：契约与担保的理论
IF 7.6 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2025-04-09 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13445
JASON RODERICK DONALDSON, DENIS GROMB, GIORGIA PIACENTINO
{"title":"Conflicting Priorities: A Theory of Covenants and Collateral","authors":"JASON RODERICK DONALDSON,&nbsp;DENIS GROMB,&nbsp;GIORGIA PIACENTINO","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13445","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13445","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We develop a theory of secured debt, unsecured debt, and debt with anti-dilution covenants. We assume that, as in practice, covenants convey the right to accelerate if violated, but the new secured debt retains its priority even if issued in violation of covenants. We find that such covenants are nonetheless useful: They provide state-contingent financing flexibility, balancing over- and underinvestment incentives. The optimal debt structure is multilayered, combining secured and unsecured debt with and without covenants. Our results are consistent with observations about debt structure, covenant violations, and waivers. They speak to a policy debate about debt priority.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"80 3","pages":"1739-1768"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2025-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143806085","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How Much Does Racial Bias Affect Mortgage Lending? Evidence from Human and Algorithmic Credit Decisions 种族偏见对抵押贷款有多大影响？来自人类和算法信用决策的证据
IF 7.6 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2025-04-09 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13444
NEIL BHUTTA, AUREL HIZMO, DANIEL RINGO
{"title":"How Much Does Racial Bias Affect Mortgage Lending? Evidence from Human and Algorithmic Credit Decisions","authors":"NEIL BHUTTA,&nbsp;AUREL HIZMO,&nbsp;DANIEL RINGO","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13444","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13444","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We assess racial discrimination in mortgage approvals using confidential data on mortgage applications. Minority applicants tend to have lower credit scores and higher leverage, and are less likely to receive algorithmic approval from race-blind automated underwriting systems (AUS). Observable applicant-risk factors explain most of the racial disparities in lender denials. Further, exploiting the AUS data, we show there are risk factors we do not observe, and these factors at least partially explain the residual 1 to 2 percentage point denial gaps. We conclude that differential treatment plays a more limited role in generating denial disparities than previous research suggests.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"80 3","pages":"1463-1496"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2025-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143814354","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Steven N. Kaplan 史蒂文·n·卡普兰
IF 7.6 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2025-04-07 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13450
{"title":"Steven N. Kaplan","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13450","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13450","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"80 3","pages":"1335-1338"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2025-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143798577","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：481959085
Book学术官方微信