DIEGO BATTISTON, JORDI BLANES I VIDAL, RAFAEL HORTALA‐VALLVE, DONG LOU
{"title":"The Effect of Advisors' Incentives on Clients' Investments","authors":"DIEGO BATTISTON, JORDI BLANES I VIDAL, RAFAEL HORTALA‐VALLVE, DONG LOU","doi":"10.1111/jofi.70041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.70041","url":null,"abstract":"We use granular data from an investment firm and a credible identification strategy to estimate the effect of financial advisors' incentives on client investments. Exploiting a natural experiment triggered by the 2018 implementation of Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II), we find that clients' investments respond strongly to changes in advisor incentives. Advisors react through multiple mechanisms: (i) inducing existing clients to bring in new money, (ii) channeling it to high‐incentive funds, and (iii) attracting more new clients. We also find that the MiFID II reform generated more balanced incentives, which translated into higher portfolio efficiency through lower average fees and stronger portfolio diversification.","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"75 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.0,"publicationDate":"2026-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147751740","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Funding Black High-Growth Startups","authors":"LISA D. COOK, MATT MARX, EMMANUEL YIMFOR","doi":"10.1111/jofi.70039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.70039","url":null,"abstract":"We classify the race of over 160,000 U.S. founders and investors and study the venture capital (VC) funding gap for Black entrepreneurs. Only 3.1% of VC-funded startups are Black-owned, and they raise half as much VC funding as others. We attribute much of this gap to Black founders having fewer traditional success markers, like patents or entrepreneurial experience. This disparity also affects matching: Black VC partners invest more in Black founders, and these investments have higher successful exit rates. We attribute this outperformance to lower information asymmetries due to network overlap and “screening discrimination,” whereby Black VCs better differentiate among Black founders.","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"88 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.0,"publicationDate":"2026-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147642161","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The (Missing) Relation between Acquisition Announcement Returns and Value Creation","authors":"ITZHAK BEN‐DAVID, UTPAL BHATTACHARYA, RUIDI HUANG, STACEY JACOBSEN","doi":"10.1111/jofi.70038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.70038","url":null,"abstract":"Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) computed around acquisition announcements are widely considered to be market‐based assessments of expected value creation. We show, however, that announcement returns do not correlate with commonly used and new measures of ex post outcomes. A simple characteristics‐based model using standard information known at the announcement date can predict these outcomes reasonably well, yet CAR even fails to capture the predictions from this model. Evidence suggests that information about the stand‐alone acquirer dominates CAR, making it virtually impossible to extract deal‐related information. We conclude that CAR is an unreliable measure of expected value creation.","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"62 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.0,"publicationDate":"2026-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147630711","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ITAMAR DRECHSLER, ALEXI SAVOV, PHILIPP SCHNABL, OLIVIER WANG
{"title":"Deposit Franchise Runs","authors":"ITAMAR DRECHSLER, ALEXI SAVOV, PHILIPP SCHNABL, OLIVIER WANG","doi":"10.1111/jofi.70034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.70034","url":null,"abstract":"The deposit franchise is valuable because banks pay below-market deposit rates. However, if depositors leave, its value vanishes. This can trigger runs by uninsured depositors, even if banks hold fully liquid assets. Because the franchise value increases with interest rates, runs are more harmful, and hence likelier, when rates are high. Banks can deter runs by shortening asset duration, but this risks insolvency if rates fall. Avoiding both runs and insolvency requires capital covering the potential loss of the uninsured deposit franchise. We estimate deposit franchise values and use them to identify vulnerable banks during the 2023 regional bank crisis.","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.0,"publicationDate":"2026-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147626013","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
REINER BRAUN, NILS DORAU, TIM JENKINSON, DANIEL URBAN
{"title":"Size, Returns, and Value: Do Private Equity Firms Allocate Capital According to Manager Skill?","authors":"REINER BRAUN, NILS DORAU, TIM JENKINSON, DANIEL URBAN","doi":"10.1111/jofi.70036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.70036","url":null,"abstract":"Using a novel data set linking private equity (PE) deals to individual managers, we document evidence of manager skill in terms of generating net present value (NPV), a performance measure that captures both scale and returns. PE firms have strong economic incentives to raise larger funds and execute larger deals. While relative returns decline with scale, NPV persists and even increases. Skilled managers are entrusted with more capital and achieve better career outcomes, and approximately 40% of NPV is attributable to internal capital allocation decisions. These findings highlight the role of PE firms in creating value through performance‐based capital deployment.","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.0,"publicationDate":"2026-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147597858","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
DORUK CETEMEN, GONZALO CISTERNAS, AARON KOLB, S. VISWANATHAN
{"title":"Leader‐Follower Dynamics in Shareholder Activism","authors":"DORUK CETEMEN, GONZALO CISTERNAS, AARON KOLB, S. VISWANATHAN","doi":"10.1111/jofi.70033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.70033","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a theory of coordination and influence among blockholders. Privately informed activists time their trades in sequence to lower acquisition costs, prompting a strategic use of order flows: leader activists create trading gains for their followers, ultimately influencing their willingness to bear greater value‐enhancing intervention costs. Through this channel, informed trades can exhibit predictability, in sharp contrast with Kyle (1985, <jats:italic>Econometrica</jats:italic> 53, 1315–1335). We explain how this novel predictability shapes free‐rider problems affecting governance, and how it produces price abnormalities analogous to those documented empirically. We also uncover how private information interdependence can be a key catalyst for the mechanism studied.","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"37 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.0,"publicationDate":"2026-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147586583","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Corporate M&As and Labor Market Concentration: Efficiency Gains or Power Grabs?","authors":"DAVID CICERO, MO SHEN, JAIDEEP SHENOY","doi":"10.1111/jofi.70035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.70035","url":null,"abstract":"Mergers of firms that share labor markets increase labor market concentration which can lead to labor efficiency gains and/or create labor market power for the merged firms. Using a novel measure based on establishment‐level employment data, we find that merger‐induced increases in labor market concentration explain value creation in a sample of completed U.S. public firm mergers from 1991 to 2016. Analysis of the stock market reactions of rival, supplier, and customer firms, as well as firm‐ and establishment‐level real effects in the merging firms, supports a labor efficiency explanation of these merger gains.","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"20 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.0,"publicationDate":"2026-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147586582","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Journal of FinancePub Date : 2026-03-30Epub Date: 2026-02-22DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13495
MARCO BECHT, JULIAN FRANKS, HANNES F. WAGNER
{"title":"The Benefits of Access: Evidence from Private Meetings with Portfolio Firms","authors":"MARCO BECHT, JULIAN FRANKS, HANNES F. WAGNER","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13495","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13495","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We use large language models to analyze the content of 4,700 private meetings between a large active asset manager and its portfolio firms. The high-level meetings convey mostly soft information about the firm, and little about industry or market. Fund manager meetings focus on business models and financial metrics, while governance specialist meetings focus on environmental, social, and governance risks; 0.4% of meetings discuss material nonpublic information. Trades by fund managers increase with meetings attended by senior management, rated as unusually good or bad, where the tone is significantly positive or negative, or assessed as creating consensus. Meeting-informed portfolios can generate significant outperformance.</p>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"81 2","pages":"739-789"},"PeriodicalIF":9.5,"publicationDate":"2026-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jofi.13495","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146777283","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Voting Premium","authors":"DORON LEVIT, NADYA MALENKO, ERNST MAUG","doi":"10.1111/jofi.70037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.70037","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a unified theory of blockholder governance and the voting premium in a setting without takeovers or controlling shareholders. A voting premium emerges when a minority blockholder can influence shareholder composition by accumulating votes and buying shares from dissenting shareholders. Our theory reconciles conflicting empirical findings by showing that standard measures of the voting premium often misrepresent the true value of voting rights, increased conflicts between the blockholder and small shareholders do not necessarily raise the voting premium, and the voting premium can even turn negative when small shareholders free‐ride on the blockholder's trades.","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"105 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.0,"publicationDate":"2026-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147536224","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Journal of FinancePub Date : 2026-03-30Epub Date: 2026-01-21DOI: 10.1111/jofi.70024
JIAN LI, HAIYUE YU
{"title":"Investor Composition and the Liquidity Component in the U.S. Corporate Bond Market","authors":"JIAN LI, HAIYUE YU","doi":"10.1111/jofi.70024","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.70024","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The link between corporate bond credit spreads and secondary market illiquidity in the cross section has grown stronger since 2005, resulting in a higher liquidity component in credit spreads. Using U.S. investor holdings data, we show that short-term investors (e.g., mutual funds/exchange-traded funds [ETFs]) increase trading activities in the secondary market, amplifying the effect of secondary market frictions on prices. We provide a model featuring heterogeneous investors with different trading needs and heterogeneous bonds to investigate the impact of the rapid-growing mutual fund/ETF sector on the corporate bond market. We find the change in investor composition can quantitatively explain the aggregate trend.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"81 2","pages":"871-922"},"PeriodicalIF":9.5,"publicationDate":"2026-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146021875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}