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Social Security and Trends in Wealth Inequality 社会保障与财富不平等趋势
IF 7.6 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2025-04-07 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13440
SYLVAIN CATHERINE, MAX MILLER, NATASHA SARIN
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引用次数: 0
Auctions versus Negotiations: The Role of the Payment Structure 拍卖与谈判：支付结构的作用
IF 7.6 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2025-04-07 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13446
FLORIAN HOFFMANN, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROV
{"title":"Auctions versus Negotiations: The Role of the Payment Structure","authors":"FLORIAN HOFFMANN,&nbsp;VLADIMIR VLADIMIROV","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13446","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13446","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We investigate a seller's strategic choice between optimally structured negotiations with fewer bidders and an auction with more competing bidders when payments can have a contingent component, as is common in mergers and acquisitions (M&amp;A), patent licensing, and employee compensation. The key factor favoring negotiations is that it allows the seller to set her preferred payment structure—that is, the revenue-maximizing mix of cash and contingent pay; reserve prices are of secondary importance. Negotiations are more likely to dominate if synergies increase in bidders' productivity types (as with acquirer-target complementarities in M&amp;A). Higher dispersion and magnitude of bidders' private valuations also favor negotiations.</p>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"80 3","pages":"1769-1813"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2025-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jofi.13446","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143789799","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Venture Capital and Startup Agglomeration 风险投资与创业集聚
IF 8 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13451
JUN CHEN, MICHAEL EWENS
{"title":"Venture Capital and Startup Agglomeration","authors":"JUN CHEN, MICHAEL EWENS","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13451","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13451","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines venture capital's (VC) role in the geographic clustering of high-growth startups. We exploit a rule change that disproportionately impacted U.S. regions that historically lacked VC financing via a restriction of banks to invest in the asset class. A one-standard-deviation increase in VCs' exposure to the rule led to a 20% decline in fund size and a 10% decrease in the likelihood of raising a follow-on fund. Startups were not wholly cushioned: financing and valuations declined. Startups also moved out of impacted states after the rule change, likely exacerbating existing geographic disparity in entrepreneurship.","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"148 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.0,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143767126","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
In the Red: Overdrafts, Payday Lending, and the Underbanked 赤字：透支，发薪日贷款和欠银行
IF 7.6 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2025-03-31 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13447
MARCO DI MAGGIO, ANGELA MA, EMILY WILLIAMS
{"title":"In the Red: Overdrafts, Payday Lending, and the Underbanked","authors":"MARCO DI MAGGIO,&nbsp;ANGELA MA,&nbsp;EMILY WILLIAMS","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13447","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13447","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The reordering of transactions from “high-to-low” is a controversial bank practice thought to maximize fees paid by low-income customers on overdrawn accounts. We exploit a series of class-action lawsuits that mandated that some banks cease the practice. Using alternative credit bureau data, we find that after banks cease high-to-low reordering, low-income individuals reduce payday borrowing, increase consumption, realize long-term improvements in financial health, and gain access to lower-cost loans in the traditional financial system. These findings suggest that aggressive bank practices can create demand for alternative financial services and highlight an important link between the traditional and alternative financial systems.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"80 3","pages":"1691-1738"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2025-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143745276","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Collusion in Brokered Markets 经纪市场中的串通行为
IF 7.6 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2025-03-18 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13432
JOHN WILLIAM HATFIELD, SCOTT DUKE KOMINERS, RICHARD LOWERY
{"title":"Collusion in Brokered Markets","authors":"JOHN WILLIAM HATFIELD,&nbsp;SCOTT DUKE KOMINERS,&nbsp;RICHARD LOWERY","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13432","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13432","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>High commissions in the U.S. residential real estate agency market pose a puzzle for economic theory because brokerage is not a concentrated industry. We model brokered markets as a game in which agents post prices for customers and then choose which other agents to work with. We show that there exists an equilibrium in which each agent conditions working with other agents on those agents' posted prices. Prices can therefore be meaningfully higher than the competitive level (for a fixed discount factor), regardless of the number of agents. Thus, brokered markets can remain uncompetitive even with low concentration and easy entry.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"80 3","pages":"1417-1462"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2025-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143653361","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Report of the Editor of The Journal of Finance for the Year 2024 2024 年《金融杂志》编辑报告
IF 7.6 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2025-03-18 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13435
ANTOINETTE SCHOAR
{"title":"Report of the Editor of The Journal of Finance for the Year 2024","authors":"ANTOINETTE SCHOAR","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13435","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13435","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"80 2","pages":"1313-1322"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2025-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143638591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
AMERICAN FINANCE ASSOCIATION 美国金融协会
IF 7.6 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2025-03-18 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13442
{"title":"AMERICAN FINANCE ASSOCIATION","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13442","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13442","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"80 2","pages":"1328-1329"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2025-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jofi.13442","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143638592","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
BRATTLE GROUP AND DIMENSIONAL FUND ADVISORS PRIZES FOR 2024 2024年Brattle集团和dimensional基金顾问奖
IF 7.6 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2025-03-18 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13434
{"title":"BRATTLE GROUP AND DIMENSIONAL FUND ADVISORS PRIZES FOR 2024","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13434","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13434","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"80 2","pages":"655"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2025-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143638701","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Report of the EST and of the 2025 Annual Membership Meeting EST 和 2025 年会员年会报告
IF 7.6 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2025-03-18 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13433
{"title":"Report of the EST and of the 2025 Annual Membership Meeting","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13433","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13433","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"80 2","pages":"1323-1325"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2025-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143638590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Creating Controversy in Proxy Voting Advice 代理投票建议引发争议
IF 8 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2025-03-16 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13438
ANDREY MALENKO, NADYA MALENKO, CHESTER SPATT
{"title":"Creating Controversy in Proxy Voting Advice","authors":"ANDREY MALENKO, NADYA MALENKO, CHESTER SPATT","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13438","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13438","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze how a profit-maximizing proxy advisor designs vote recommendations and research reports. The advisor benefits from producing informative, unbiased reports, but only partially informative recommendations, biased against the a priori likely alternative. Such recommendations induce close votes, increasing controversy and thereby the relevance and value of proxy advice. Our results suggest shifting from an exclusive emphasis on recommendations, highlighting the importance of both reports and recommendations in proxy advisors' information provision. They rationalize the one-size-fits-all approach and help reinterpret empirical patterns of voting behavior, suggesting that proxy advisors' recommendations may not be a suitable benchmark for evaluating shareholders' votes.","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143635275","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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