{"title":"Time-Consistent Individuals, Time-Inconsistent Households","authors":"ANDREW HERTZBERG","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13392","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13392","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>I present a model of consumption and savings for a multiperson household in which members are imperfectly altruistic, derive utility from both private and shared public goods, and share wealth. I show that, despite having standard exponential time preferences, the household is time-inconsistent: Members save too little and overspend on private consumption goods. The household remains time-inconsistent even when members save separately, because the possibility of voluntary transfers or joint contribution to the public good preserves the dynamic commons problem. The household will choose to share wealth when the risk-sharing benefits outweigh the utility cost of overconsumption.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"79 6","pages":"3821-3857"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2024-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142448164","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Liquidity Transformation and Fragility in the U.S. Banking Sector","authors":"QI CHEN, ITAY GOLDSTEIN, ZEQIONG HUANG, RAHUL VASHISHTHA","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13390","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13390","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Liquidity transformation, a key role of banks, is thought to increase fragility, as uninsured depositors face an incentive to withdraw money before others (a so-called panic run). Despite much theoretical work, however, there is little empirical evidence establishing this mechanism. In this paper, we provide the first large-scale evidence of this mechanism. Banks that engage in more liquidity transformation exhibit higher fragility, as captured by stronger sensitivities of uninsured deposit flows to bank performance and greater levels of uninsured deposit outflows when performance is poor. We also explore the effects of deposit insurance and systemic risk.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"79 6","pages":"3985-4036"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2024-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142431368","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Utility Tokens as a Commitment to Competition","authors":"ITAY GOLDSTEIN, DEEKSHA GUPTA, RUSLAN SVERCHKOV","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13389","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13389","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We show that utility tokens can limit the rent-seeking activities of two-sided platforms with market power while preserving efficiency gains due to network effects. We model platforms where buyers and sellers can meet to exchange services. Tokens serve as the sole medium of exchange on a platform and can be traded in a secondary market. Tokenizing a platform commits a firm to give up monopolistic rents associated with the control of the platform, leading to long-run competitive prices. We show how the threat of entrants can incentivize developers to tokenize and discuss cases where regulation is needed to enforce tokenization.</p>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"79 6","pages":"4197-4246"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2024-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jofi.13389","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142405171","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Putting the Price in Asset Pricing","authors":"THUMMIM CHO, CHRISTOPHER POLK","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13391","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13391","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We propose a novel way to estimate a portfolio's <i>abnormal price</i>, the percentage gap between price and the present value of dividends computed with a chosen asset pricing model. Our method, based on a novel identity, resembles the time-series estimator of abnormal returns, avoids the issues in alternative approaches, and clarifies the role of risk and mispricing in long-horizon returns. We apply our techniques to study the cross-section of price levels relative to the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and find that a single characteristic, <i>adjusted value</i>, provides a parsimonious model of CAPM-implied abnormal price.</p>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"79 6","pages":"3943-3984"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2024-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jofi.13391","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142397988","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
HARALD HAU, YI HUANG, CHEN LIN, HONGZHE SHAN, ZIXIA SHENG, LAI WEI
{"title":"FinTech Credit and Entrepreneurial Growth","authors":"HARALD HAU, YI HUANG, CHEN LIN, HONGZHE SHAN, ZIXIA SHENG, LAI WEI","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13384","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13384","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Based on automated credit lines to vendors trading on Alibaba's online retail platform and a discontinuity in the credit decision algorithm, we document that a vendor's access to FinTech credit boosts its sales growth, transaction growth, and the level of customer satisfaction gauged by product, service, and consignment ratings. These effects are more pronounced for vendors characterized by greater information asymmetry about their credit risk and less collateral, which reveals the information advantage of FinTech credit over traditional credit technology.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"79 5","pages":"3309-3359"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2024-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142100787","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Working Capital Credit Multiplier","authors":"HEITOR ALMEIDA, DANIEL CARVALHO, TAEHYUN KIM","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13385","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13385","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We provide novel evidence that funding frictions can limit firms’ short-term investments in receivables and inventories, reducing their production capacity. We propose a credit multiplier driven by these considerations and empirically isolate its importance by comparing how a similar firm responds to shocks differently when these shocks are initiated in their most profitable quarter (“main quarter”). We implement this test using recurring and unpredictable shocks (e.g., oil shocks) and provide extensive evidence supporting our identification strategy. Our results suggest that funding constraints and credit multiplier effects are significant for smaller firms that heavily rely on financing from suppliers.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"79 6","pages":"4247-4302"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2024-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142084690","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ELISE GOURIER, LUDOVIC PHALIPPOU, MARK M. WESTERFIELD
{"title":"Capital Commitment","authors":"ELISE GOURIER, LUDOVIC PHALIPPOU, MARK M. WESTERFIELD","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13382","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13382","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Twelve trillion dollars are allocated to private market funds that require outside investors to commit to transferring capital on demand. We show within a novel dynamic portfolio allocation model that ex-ante commitment has large effects on investors' portfolios and welfare, and we quantify those effects. Investors are underallocated to private market funds and are willing to pay a larger premium to adjust the quantity committed than to eliminate other frictions, like timing uncertainty and limited tradability. Perhaps counterintuitively, commitment risk premiums increase with secondary market liquidity, and they do not disappear when investments are spread over many funds.</p>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"79 5","pages":"3407-3457"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2024-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jofi.13382","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142085577","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Treasury Bill Shortages and the Pricing of Short-Term Assets","authors":"ADRIEN D'AVERNAS, QUENTIN VANDEWEYER","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13376","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13376","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We propose a model of post-Great Financial Crisis (GFC) money markets and monetary policy implementation. In our framework, capital regulation may deter banks from intermediating liquidity derived from holding reserves to shadow banks. Consequently, money markets can be segmented, and the scarcity of Treasury bills available to shadow banks is the main driver of short-term spreads. In this regime, open market operations have an inverse effect on net liquidity provision when swapping ample reserves for scarce T-bills or repos. Our model quantitatively accounts for post-2010 time series for repo rates, T-bill yields, and the Fed's reverse repo facility usage.</p>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"79 6","pages":"4083-4141"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2024-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jofi.13376","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142084691","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Currency Management by International Fixed-Income Mutual Funds","authors":"CLEMENS SIALM, QIFEI ZHU","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13381","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13381","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Investments in international fixed-income securities are exposed to significant currency risks. We collect novel data on currency derivatives used by U.S. international fixed-income funds. We document that while 90% of funds use currency forwards, they hedge, on average, only 18% of their currency exposure. Funds' currency forward positions differ substantially based on risk management demands related to portfolio currency exposure, return-enhancement motives such as currency momentum and carry trade, and strategic considerations related to past performance and fund clientele. Funds that hedge their currency risk exhibit lower return variability, but do not generate inferior abnormal returns.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"79 6","pages":"4037-4081"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2024-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142084656","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}