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Bailout Stigma 救市污名
IF 7.6 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2024-08-23 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13386
YEON-KOO CHE, CHONGWOO CHOE, KEEYOUNG RHEE
{"title":"Bailout Stigma","authors":"YEON-KOO CHE,&nbsp;CHONGWOO CHOE,&nbsp;KEEYOUNG RHEE","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13386","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13386","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We develop a model of bailout stigma in which accepting a bailout signals a firm's balance-sheet weakness and reduces its funding prospects. To avoid stigma, high-quality firms withdraw from subsequent financing after receiving bailouts or refuse bailouts altogether to send a favorable signal. The former leads to a short-lived stimulation followed by a market freeze even worse than if there were no bailout. The latter revives the funding market, albeit with delay, to the level achievable without any stigma and implements a constrained optimal outcome. A menu of multiple bailout programs compounds bailout stigma and exacerbates the market freeze.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"79 5","pages":"2993-3039"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2024-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142045807","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Founder-CEO Compensation and Selection into Venture Capital-Backed Entrepreneurship 风险资本支持的创业企业创始人-CEO 薪酬与选拔
IF 7.6 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2024-08-22 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13383
MICHAEL EWENS, RAMANA NANDA, CHRISTOPHER STANTON
{"title":"Founder-CEO Compensation and Selection into Venture Capital-Backed Entrepreneurship","authors":"MICHAEL EWENS,&nbsp;RAMANA NANDA,&nbsp;CHRISTOPHER STANTON","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13383","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13383","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We show theoretically that a critical determinant of the attractiveness of venture capital (VC)-backed entrepreneurship for high-earning potential founders is the expected time to develop a startup's initial product. This is because founder-CEOs' cash compensation increases substantially after product development, alleviating the nondiversifiable risk that founders face at startup birth. Consistent with the model's predictions of where the supply of entrepreneurial talent is likely to be most constrained, we find that technological shocks differentially altering the expected time to product across industries can explain changes in both the rate of entry and characteristics of individuals selecting into VC-backed entrepreneurship.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"79 5","pages":"3361-3405"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2024-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142045457","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Portfolio-Driven Disposition Effect 投资组合驱动的处置效应
IF 7.6 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2024-08-21 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13378
LI AN, JOSEPH ENGELBERG, MATTHEW HENRIKSSON, BAOLIAN WANG, JARED WILLIAMS
{"title":"The Portfolio-Driven Disposition Effect","authors":"LI AN,&nbsp;JOSEPH ENGELBERG,&nbsp;MATTHEW HENRIKSSON,&nbsp;BAOLIAN WANG,&nbsp;JARED WILLIAMS","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13378","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13378","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The disposition effect for a stock significantly weakens if the portfolio is at a gain, but is large when it is at a loss. We find this portfolio-driven disposition effect (PDDE) in four independent settings: U.S. and Chinese archival data, as well as U.S. and Chinese experiments. The PDDE is robust to a variety of controls in regression specifications and is not explained by extreme returns, portfolio rebalancing, tax considerations, or investor heterogeneity. Our evidence suggests that investors form mental frames at both the stock and the portfolio levels and that these frames combine to generate the PDDE.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"79 5","pages":"3459-3495"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2024-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142165725","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Lying to Speak the Truth: Selective Manipulation and Improved Information Transmission 说假话说真话：选择性操纵和改进信息传播
IF 7.6 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2024-08-19 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13375
PAUL POVEL, GÜNTER STROBL
{"title":"Lying to Speak the Truth: Selective Manipulation and Improved Information Transmission","authors":"PAUL POVEL,&nbsp;GÜNTER STROBL","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13375","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13375","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We analyze a principal-agent model in which an effort-averse agent can manipulate a publicly observable performance report. The principal cannot observe the agent's cost of effort, her effort choice, and whether she manipulated the report. An optimal contract links compensation to the realized output and the (possibly manipulated) report. Manipulation can be beneficial to the principal because it can make the report more informative about the agent's effort choice, thereby reducing the agent's information rent. This is achieved through a contract that incentivizes the agent to selectively engage in manipulation based on her effort choice.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"79 6","pages":"4303-4352"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2024-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142045714","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The SOE Premium and Government Support in China's Credit Market 中国信贷市场中的国企溢价和政府支持
IF 7.6 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2024-08-14 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13380
ZHE GENG, JUN PAN
{"title":"The SOE Premium and Government Support in China's Credit Market","authors":"ZHE GENG,&nbsp;JUN PAN","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13380","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13380","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Studying China's credit market using a structural default model that integrates credit risk, liquidity, and bailout, we document improved price discovery and a deepening divide between state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs. Amidst liquidity deterioration, the presence of government bailout helps alleviate the heightened liquidity-driven default, making SOE bonds more valuable and widening the SOE premium. Meanwhile, the increased importance of government support makes SOEs more sensitive to bailout, while the heightened default risk increases non-SOEs' sensitivity to credit quality. Examining the real impact, we find severe performance deteriorations of non-SOEs relative to SOEs, reversing the long-standing trend of non-SOEs outperforming SOEs.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"79 5","pages":"3041-3103"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2024-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142165666","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Firm Performance Pay as Insurance against Promotion Risk 企业绩效薪酬是晋升风险的保险
IF 7.6 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2024-08-12 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13379
ALVIN CHEN
{"title":"Firm Performance Pay as Insurance against Promotion Risk","authors":"ALVIN CHEN","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13379","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13379","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The prevalence of pay based on risky firm outcomes for nonexecutive workers presents a puzzling departure from conventional contract theory, which predicts insurance provision by the firm. When workers at the same firm compete against each other for promotions, the optimal contract features pay based on firm outcomes as insurance against promotion risk. The model's predictions are consistent with many observed phenomena, such as performance-based vesting and overvaluation of equity pay by nonexecutive workers. It also generates novel predictions linking a firm's hierarchy to its workers' pay structure.</p>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"79 5","pages":"3497-3541"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2024-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jofi.13379","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141974288","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Business News and Business Cycles 商业新闻和商业周期
IF 7.6 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2024-08-09 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13377
LELAND BYBEE, BRYAN KELLY, ASAF MANELA, DACHENG XIU
{"title":"Business News and Business Cycles","authors":"LELAND BYBEE,&nbsp;BRYAN KELLY,&nbsp;ASAF MANELA,&nbsp;DACHENG XIU","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13377","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13377","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We propose an approach to measuring the state of the economy via textual analysis of business news. From the full text of 800,000 <i>Wall Street Journal</i> articles for 1984 to 2017, we estimate a topic model that summarizes business news into interpretable topical themes and quantifies the proportion of news attention allocated to each theme over time. News attention closely tracks a wide range of economic activities and can forecast aggregate stock market returns. A text-augmented vector autoregression demonstrates the large incremental role of news text in forecasting macroeconomic dynamics. We retrieve the narratives that underlie these improvements in market and business cycle forecasts.</p>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"79 5","pages":"3105-3147"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2024-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jofi.13377","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141910313","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Mortgage-Cash Premium Puzzle 抵押贷款与现金溢价之谜
IF 7.6 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2024-07-23 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13373
MICHAEL REHER, ROSSEN VALKANOV
{"title":"The Mortgage-Cash Premium Puzzle","authors":"MICHAEL REHER,&nbsp;ROSSEN VALKANOV","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13373","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13373","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>All-cash homebuyers account for one-third of U.S. home purchases between 1980 and 2017. We use multiple data sets and research designs to robustly estimate that mortgaged buyers pay an 11% premium over all-cash buyers to compensate home sellers for mortgage transaction frictions. A dynamic, representative-seller model implies only a 3% premium, which would suggest an 8% puzzle. Accounting for heterogeneity in selling conditions explains half of this difference, but a puzzle holds in conditions with high transaction risk. An experimental survey of U.S. homeowners replicates these patterns and suggests that belief distortions can explain the puzzle in these high-risk states.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"79 5","pages":"3149-3201"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2024-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141754530","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On the Magnification of Small Biases in Hiring 论招聘中微小偏见的放大
IF 7.6 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2024-07-18 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13374
SHAUN WILLIAM DAVIES, EDWARD D. VAN WESEP, BRIAN WATERS
{"title":"On the Magnification of Small Biases in Hiring","authors":"SHAUN WILLIAM DAVIES,&nbsp;EDWARD D. VAN WESEP,&nbsp;BRIAN WATERS","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13374","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13374","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We analyze a setting in which a board must hire a chief executive officer (CEO) after exerting effort to learn about the quality of each candidate. Optimal effort is asymmetric, implying asymmetric likelihoods of each candidate being chosen. If the board has an infinitesimal bias in favor of one candidate, it allocates effort to maximize the likelihood of that candidate being chosen. Even when the board's prior is that its preferred candidate is inferior, she may still be chosen most often. A glass ceiling can also arise whereby the tendency to hire favored candidates increases as the importance of the position increases.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"79 5","pages":"3623-3673"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2024-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141726168","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Anomaly Time 异常时间
IF 7.6 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2024-07-18 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13372
BOONE BOWLES, ADAM V. REED, MATTHEW C. RINGGENBERG, JACOB R. THORNOCK
{"title":"Anomaly Time","authors":"BOONE BOWLES,&nbsp;ADAM V. REED,&nbsp;MATTHEW C. RINGGENBERG,&nbsp;JACOB R. THORNOCK","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13372","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13372","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We examine the timing of returns around the publication of anomaly trading signals. Using a database that captures when information is first publicly released, we show that anomaly returns are concentrated in the first month after information release dates, and these returns decay soon thereafter. We also show that the academic convention of forming portfolios in June underestimates predictability because it uses stale information, which makes some anomalies appear insignificant. In contrast, we show many anomalies do predict returns if portfolios are formed immediately after information releases. Finally, we develop guidance on forming portfolios without using stale information.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"79 5","pages":"3543-3579"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2024-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141726166","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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