{"title":"","authors":"","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"81 3","pages":"1321-1375"},"PeriodicalIF":9.5,"publicationDate":"2026-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148099170","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
KRISTIAN BLICKLE, CECILIA PARLATORE, ANTHONY SAUNDERS
{"title":"Specialization in Banking","authors":"KRISTIAN BLICKLE, CECILIA PARLATORE, ANTHONY SAUNDERS","doi":"10.1111/jofi.70032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.70032","url":null,"abstract":"Using supervisory data on the loan portfolios of large U.S. banks, we document that these banks specialize by concentrating their lending disproportionately in a few industries. This specialization is consistent with banks having industry‐specific knowledge, reflected in reduced risk of loan defaults, lower aggregate charge‐offs, and higher propensity to lend to opaque firms in the preferred industry. Banks attract high‐quality borrowers by offering generous loan terms in their specialized industry, especially to borrowers with alternative options. Banks focus on their preferred industry in times of instability and relatively lower Tier 1 capital as well as after surges in deposits.","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.0,"publicationDate":"2026-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147536223","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Journal of FinancePub Date : 2026-03-30Epub Date: 2025-12-18DOI: 10.1111/jofi.70003
PULAK GHOSH, BORIS VALLEE, YAO ZENG
{"title":"FinTech Lending and Cashless Payments","authors":"PULAK GHOSH, BORIS VALLEE, YAO ZENG","doi":"10.1111/jofi.70003","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.70003","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Borrowers' use of cashless payments improves their access to capital from FinTech lenders and predicts a lower probability of default. These relationships are stronger for cashless technologies providing more precise information, and for outflows. Cashless payment usage complements other signals of borrower quality. We rationalize these empirical findings using a framework in which borrowers signal their lower likelihood of diverting cash flows through payment technology choice, and screening accuracy is further strengthened by informational complementarities. The informational synergy we uncover provides a rationale for the joint rise of cashless payments and FinTech lending, as well as for open banking.</p>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"81 2","pages":"1053-1101"},"PeriodicalIF":9.5,"publicationDate":"2026-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jofi.70003","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145785802","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Journal of FinancePub Date : 2026-03-30Epub Date: 2026-01-08DOI: 10.1111/jofi.70008
LAURA T. STARKS, PARTH VENKAT, QIFEI ZHU
{"title":"Corporate ESG Profiles and Investor Horizons","authors":"LAURA T. STARKS, PARTH VENKAT, QIFEI ZHU","doi":"10.1111/jofi.70008","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.70008","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We find that long-term institutional investors tilt their portfolios toward firms with better Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) profiles, in the cross sections of both institutional investor portfolios and the ownership of firms. We test whether several theoretically motivated mechanisms can explain this relationship. Our results that long-term investors exhibit patience with firms around poor earnings announcements, but quickly sell portfolio firms after negative ES incidents, support the view that long- and short-term investors evaluate information differently. Our evidence shows that limits-to-arbitrage play a role, as we find that investors' ESG tilt weakens following regulatory shocks that shorten their horizon.</p>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"81 2","pages":"603-642"},"PeriodicalIF":9.5,"publicationDate":"2026-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jofi.70008","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145919876","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Journal of FinancePub Date : 2026-03-30Epub Date: 2026-01-22DOI: 10.1111/jofi.70026
Amanda Rae Heitz, Christopher Martin, Alexander Ufier
{"title":"Bank Monitoring with On-Site Inspections","authors":"Amanda Rae Heitz, Christopher Martin, Alexander Ufier","doi":"10.1111/jofi.70026","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.70026","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Using proprietary transaction-level data on nonsyndicated construction loans, we provide some of the first empirical evidence on the drivers and consequences of bank monitoring through on-site inspections. Banks trade off monitoring intensity with favorable origination terms. Monitoring intensity escalates in response to local economic downturns or the bank's financial instability. Borrowers with negative inspection reports have more draw requests denied, suggesting that monitoring outcomes impact credit decisions. Both the occurrence and threat of increased inspection frequency correspond to reduced defaults. Overall, our results provide empirical support for a substantial body of theoretical literature on bank monitoring.</p>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"81 2","pages":"687-737"},"PeriodicalIF":9.5,"publicationDate":"2026-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jofi.70026","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146021874","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Journal of FinancePub Date : 2026-03-30Epub Date: 2026-03-12DOI: 10.1111/jofi.70031
{"title":"Report of the 2026 Annual Membership Meeting","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/jofi.70031","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.70031","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"81 2","pages":"1147-1150"},"PeriodicalIF":9.5,"publicationDate":"2026-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147448461","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Journal of FinancePub Date : 2026-03-30Epub Date: 2026-01-21DOI: 10.1111/jofi.70007
CHRISTOPHER MARTIN, MANJU PURI, ALEXANDER UFIER
{"title":"Deposit Inflows and Outflows in Failing Banks: The Role of Deposit Insurance","authors":"CHRISTOPHER MARTIN, MANJU PURI, ALEXANDER UFIER","doi":"10.1111/jofi.70007","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.70007","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Using unique, daily, account-level data, we investigate deposit outflows and inflows in a distressed bank. We observe an <i>outflow</i> of uninsured depositors following bad regulatory news. Both regular and temporary deposit insurance reduce outflows. We provide important new evidence that, simultaneous with deposit outflows, deposit <i>inflows</i> are first order. Uninsured deposit outflows were largely offset with new insured deposit inflows as the bank approached failure, with the bank increasing term deposit rates. This phenomenon holds in a large sample of banks that faced regulatory action, suggesting that insured deposit inflows are an important mechanism that weakens depositor discipline.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"81 2","pages":"643-685"},"PeriodicalIF":9.5,"publicationDate":"2026-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146005704","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Journal of FinancePub Date : 2026-03-30Epub Date: 2026-01-27DOI: 10.1111/jofi.70023
GABRIEL JIMÉNEZ, DMITRY KUVSHINOV, JOSÉ-LUIS PEYDRÓ, BJÖRN RICHTER
{"title":"Monetary Policy, Inflation, and Crises: Evidence from History and Administrative Data","authors":"GABRIEL JIMÉNEZ, DMITRY KUVSHINOV, JOSÉ-LUIS PEYDRÓ, BJÖRN RICHTER","doi":"10.1111/jofi.70023","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.70023","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We show that a U-shaped monetary rate path increases banking crisis risk, via credit and asset price cycles, analyzing 17 countries over 150 years. Rate hikes (raw or instrumented) increase crisis risk, but only if preceded by prolonged cuts. These patterns are unique to banking crises, unlike noncrisis recessions. Regarding the mechanism, prolonged cuts raise the likelihood of large credit and asset price booms, consistent with higher credit supply and risk-taking. Subsequent hikes strongly reduce credit and asset prices, and increase banks' realized credit risk, rather than interest rate risk. We find consistent results in administrative loan-level data for Spain.</p>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"81 2","pages":"923-970"},"PeriodicalIF":9.5,"publicationDate":"2026-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jofi.70023","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146048675","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"","authors":"","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"81 3","pages":"1531-1572"},"PeriodicalIF":9.5,"publicationDate":"2026-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148099487","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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