Money and Banking with Reserves and CBDC

IF 7.6 1区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2024-06-05 DOI:10.1111/jofi.13357

DIRK NIEPELT

引用次数: 0

Abstract

We analyze the role of retail central bank digital currency (CBDC) and reserves when banks exert deposit market power and liquidity transformation entails externalities. Optimal monetary architecture minimizes the social costs of liquidity provision, and optimal monetary policy follows modified Friedman rules. Interest rates on reserves and CBDC should differ. Calibrations robustly suggest that CBDC provides liquidity more efficiently than deposits unless the central bank must refinance banks and this is very costly. Accordingly, the optimal share of CBDC in payments tends to exceed that of deposits.

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货币银行与储备金和 CBDC

我们分析了零售央行数字货币（CBDC）和储备金在银行发挥存款市场力量和流动性转化带来外部性时的作用。最优货币结构会使提供流动性的社会成本最小化，最优货币政策遵循修正的弗里德曼规则。准备金利率和 CBDC 利率应有所不同。校准稳健地表明，除非中央银行必须为银行再融资，而再融资的成本非常高，否则，与存款相比，CBDC 提供流动性的效率更高。因此，CBDC 在支付中的最佳份额往往超过存款。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Journal of Finance Multiple-

CiteScore

12.90

自引率

2.50%

发文量

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