{"title":"Probing the impact of exposure to diversity on infants' social categorization.","authors":"Bailey A Immel, Zoe Liberman","doi":"10.1037/xge0001517","DOIUrl":"10.1037/xge0001517","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Humans learn about the world through inductive reasoning, generalizing information about an individual to others in the category. Indeed, by infancy, monolingual children expect people who speak the same language (but not people who speak different languages) to be similar in their food preferences (Liberman et al., 2016). Here, we ask whether infants who are exposed to linguistic diversity are more willing to generalize information even across language-group lines. To test this, we ran an inductive inference task and collected data on exposure to linguistic diversity at the interpersonal and neighborhood levels. Infants with more linguistically diverse social networks were more likely to generalize a food preference across speakers of different languages. However, this relationship was not seen for neighborhood diversity. We discuss implications of this work on understanding the development of bias and its malleability based on early social experiences. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":" ","pages":"2977-2984"},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2024-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139471848","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Samuel Murray, Gino Marttelo Carmona Díaz, Laura Sofía Vega-Plazas, William Jiménez-Leal, Santiago Amaya
{"title":"Loyalty from a personal point of view: A cross-cultural prototype study of loyalty.","authors":"Samuel Murray, Gino Marttelo Carmona Díaz, Laura Sofía Vega-Plazas, William Jiménez-Leal, Santiago Amaya","doi":"10.1037/xge0001623","DOIUrl":"10.1037/xge0001623","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Loyalty is considered central to people's moral life, yet little is known about how people think about what it means to be loyal. We used a prototype approach to understand how loyalty is represented in Colombia and the United States and how these representations mediate attributions of loyalty and moral judgments of loyalty violations. Across seven studies (<i>N</i> = 1,984), we found cross-cultural similarities in the associative meaning of loyalty (Study 1) but found differences in the centrality of features associated with loyalty (Study 2) and the latent structure of loyalty representations (Study 3). Colombians represent loyalty in terms of more general moral characteristics, while U.S. participants represent loyalty in terms of interpersonal commitment, both in contrast with current approaches to loyalty. By comparing representations of loyalty and honesty, we establish that differences in loyalty conceptualizations reflect a different way of thinking about loyalty rather than morality more generally (Study 4). Further, Colombians attributed greater loyalty to individuals with general moral characteristics compared to participants from the U.S. sample (Study 5) and were more likely to classify nonloyal values as loyalty-related (Study 6). While the centrality of prototypical features predicts categorizing norm violations as loyalty-related, differences in prototypical structure account for differences in the severity of moral judgment for such violations (Study 7), which suggests that loyalty representations have similar functions, even though these representations differ in structural characteristics. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":" ","pages":"3002-3026"},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2024-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142467134","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Daniela Goya-Tocchetto, Aaron C Kay, B Keith Payne
{"title":"Can selecting the most qualified candidate be unfair? Learning about socioeconomic advantages and disadvantages reduces the perceived fairness of meritocracy and increases support for socioeconomic diversity initiatives in organizations.","authors":"Daniela Goya-Tocchetto, Aaron C Kay, B Keith Payne","doi":"10.1037/xge0001525","DOIUrl":"10.1037/xge0001525","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>While the majority of Americans today endorse meritocracy as fair, we suggest that these perceptions can be shaped by whether or not people learn about the presence of socioeconomic advantages and disadvantages in others' lives. Across five studies (<i>N</i> = 3,318), we find that people are able to attach socioeconomic inequalities in applicants' backgrounds to their evaluation of the fairness of specific merit-based selection processes and outcomes. Learning that one applicant grew up advantaged-while the other grew up disadvantaged-leads both liberals and conservatives to believe that otherwise identical merit-based procedures and outcomes are significantly less fair. Importantly, learning about starting inequalities leads to greater support for policies that promote socioeconomic diversity in organizations. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":" ","pages":"2962-2976"},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2024-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139650887","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Marlou Nadine Perquin, Tobias Heed, Christoph Kayser
{"title":"Variance (un)explained: Experimental conditions and temporal dependencies explain similarly small proportions of reaction time variability in linear models of perceptual and cognitive tasks.","authors":"Marlou Nadine Perquin, Tobias Heed, Christoph Kayser","doi":"10.1037/xge0001630","DOIUrl":"10.1037/xge0001630","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Any series of sensorimotor actions shows fluctuations in speed and accuracy from repetition to repetition, even when the sensory input and motor output requirements remain identical over time. Such fluctuations are particularly prominent in reaction time (RT) series from laboratory neurocognitive tasks. Despite their omnipresent nature, trial-to-trial fluctuations remain poorly understood. Here, we systematically analyzed RT series from various neurocognitive tasks, quantifying how much of the total trial-to-trial RT variance can be explained with general linear models (GLMs) by three sources of variability that are frequently investigated in behavioral and neuroscientific research: (1) experimental conditions, employed to induce systematic patterns in variability, (2) short-term temporal dependencies such as the autocorrelation between subsequent trials, and (3) long-term temporal trends over experimental blocks and sessions. Furthermore, we examined to what extent the explained variances by these sources are shared or unique. We analyzed 1913 unique RT series from 30 different cognitive control and perception-based tasks. On average, the three sources together explained ∼8%-17% of the total variance. The experimental conditions explained on average ∼2.5%-3.5% but did not share explained variance with temporal dependencies. Thus, the largest part of the trial-to-trial fluctuations in RT remained unexplained by these three sources. Unexplained fluctuations may take on nonlinear forms that are not picked up by GLMs. They may also be partially attributable to observable endogenous factors, such as fluctuations in brain activity and bodily states. Still, some extent of randomness may be a feature of the neurobiological system rather than just nuisance. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":" ","pages":"3107-3129"},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2024-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142288956","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Early developmental insights into the social construction of race.","authors":"Jamie Amemiya, Daniela Sodré, Gail D Heyman","doi":"10.1037/xge0001670","DOIUrl":"10.1037/xge0001670","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The way that societies assign people to racial categories has far-reaching social, economic, and political consequences. One framework for establishing racial boundaries is based on <i>ancestry</i>, which historically has been leveraged to create rigid racial categories, particularly with respect to being categorized as White. A second framework is based on <i>skin tone</i>, which can vary within families and across the lifespan, and is thus more likely to blur racial boundaries. The persistence of these distinct cultural beliefs about race requires that they be transmitted to each new generation, but there have been few cross-cultural studies on their development during childhood. Participants (5- to 12-year-old children, <i>N</i> = 123) were from the United States, in which the ancestry model has been more prevalent, or from Brazil, in which the skin tone model has been more prevalent. In both countries, 5- to 7-year-olds endorsed the belief that skin tone determines race, for example, by assigning biological siblings with differing skin tones to different racial categories. However, racial concepts diverged among the 10- to 12-year-olds, with children from the United States shifting toward a classification based on ancestry and children in Brazil endorsing a classification based on skin tone even more strongly with age. These differing conceptions were especially evident with reference to White racial categorization: Older children from Brazil persisted in classifying lighter skinned people as White when they had African ancestry, unlike older children from the United States. These findings provide important insights into the developmental and cultural influences on racial classification systems. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":" ","pages":"3062-3073"},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2024-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142545807","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Costly exploration produces stereotypes with dimensions of warmth and competence.","authors":"Xuechunzi Bai, Thomas L Griffiths, Susan T Fiske","doi":"10.1037/xge0001694","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001694","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Traditional explanations for stereotypes assume that they result from deficits in humans (ingroup-favoring motives, cognitive biases) or their environments (majority advantages, real group differences). An alternative explanation recently proposed that stereotypes can emerge when exploration is costly. Even optimal decision makers in an ideal environment can inadvertently form incorrect impressions from arbitrary encounters. However, all these existing theories essentially describe shortcuts that fail to explain the multidimensionality of stereotypes. Stereotypes of social groups have a canonical multidimensional structure, organized along dimensions of warmth and competence. We show that these dimensions and the associated stereotypes can result from <i>feature-based</i> exploration: When individuals make self-interested decisions based on past experiences in an environment where exploring new options carries an implicit cost and when these options share similar attributes, they are more likely to separate groups along multiple dimensions. We formalize this theory via the contextual multiarmed bandit problem, use the resulting model to generate testable predictions, and evaluate those predictions against human behavior. We evaluate this process in incentivized decisions involving as many as 20 real jobs and successfully recover the classic dimensions of warmth and competence. Further experiments show that intervening on the cost of exploration effectively mitigates bias, further demonstrating that exploration cost per se is the operating variable. Future diversity interventions may consider how to reduce exploration cost, in ways that parallel our manipulations. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2024-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142687035","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Mechanistic complexity is fundamental: Evidence from judgments, attention, and memory.","authors":"Tal Boger, Frank C Keil","doi":"10.1037/xge0001691","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001691","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>What makes an object <i>complex</i>? Complexity comes in many different forms. Some objects are <i>visually</i> complex but <i>mechanistically</i> simple (e.g., a hairbrush). Other objects are the opposite; they look simple but work in a complex way (e.g., an iPhone). Is one kind of complexity more fundamental to how we represent, attend to, and remember objects? Although most existing psychological research on complexity focuses on visual complexity, we argue that mechanistic complexity may be more consequential: Across five preregistered experiments (<i>N</i> = 780 adults), we show that mechanistic complexity not only predicts explicit judgments but also drives visual attention and memory. Thus, representations of object complexity-and object representations more broadly-rely on more than just external appearance. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2024-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142686985","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Heida Maria Sigurdardottir, Inga María Ólafsdóttir
{"title":"Objects, faces, and spaces: Organizational principles of visual object perception as evidenced by individual differences in behavior.","authors":"Heida Maria Sigurdardottir, Inga María Ólafsdóttir","doi":"10.1037/xge0001688","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001688","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>What are the diagnostic dimensions on which objects differ visually? We constructed a two-dimensional object space based on such attributes captured by a deep convolutional neural network. These attributes can be approximated as stubby/spiky and animate-/inanimate-looking. If object space contributes to human visual cognition, this should have a measurable effect on object discrimination abilities. We administered an object foraging task to a large, diverse sample (<i>N</i> = 511). We focused on the stubby animate-looking \"face quadrant\" of object space given known variations in face discrimination abilities. Stimuli were picked out of tens of thousands of images to either match or not match with the coordinates of faces in object space. Results show that individual differences in face perception can to a large part be explained by variability in general object perception abilities (o-factor). However, additional variability in face processing can be attributed to visual similarity with faces as captured by dimensions of object space; people who struggle with telling apart faces also have difficulties with discriminating other objects with the same object space attributes. This study is consistent with a contribution of object space to human visual cognition. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2024-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142686989","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Framing affects postdecision preferences through self-preference inferences (and probably not dissonance).","authors":"Adelle X Yang, Jasper Teow","doi":"10.1037/xge0001651","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001651","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Psychologists have long been intrigued by decision-induced changes in preferences where making a decision strengthens one's relative preference between more and less preferred options. This phenomenon has been explained through two prominent theories: a dissonance account, which suggests that it results from the decision maker's attempt to minimize an unpleasant emotional-motivational state of \"dissonance,\" and an inference account, which posits that it reflects a process of inferring and updating one's \"true\" preferences. In the current research, we investigate whether, how, and why framing a decision as a choice or a rejection influences decision-induced preference modulation. Across 13 preregistered experiments, including seven (<i>N</i> = 6,248 participants from North America and Asia) reported in the main text, we find that reject-framed decisions between attractive options induce greater postdecision preference modulation (i.e., a larger preference gap between options) than choose-framed decisions, all else equal. Supporting the inference account, the effect is moderated by attribute similarity and choice set valence while being mediated consistently by perceived action diagnosticity. In contrast, purported moderators and process measures of the dissonance account received no support when tested. Additionally, we systematically address potential confounds associated with varying levels of \"noise\" in preference expression through decisions, an issue that had encumbered previous paradigms on preference modulation. Our findings suggest that changes in preference induced by ordinary day-to-day decisions primarily stem from an ongoing process of information inference and updating rather than dissonance reduction. This research also provides insights into the previously unforeseen consequences of framing interventions in policy and business. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2024-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142686982","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bypassing versus correcting misinformation: Efficacy and fundamental processes.","authors":"Javier A Granados Samayoa, Dolores Albarracín","doi":"10.1037/xge0001687","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001687","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The standard method for addressing the consequences of misinformation is the provision of a correction in which the misinformation is directly refuted. However, the impact of misinformation may also be successfully addressed by introducing or bolstering alternative beliefs with opposite evaluative implications. Six preregistered experiments clarified important processes influencing the impact of bypassing versus correcting misinformation via negation. First, we find that, following exposure to misinformation, bypassing generally changes people's attitudes and intentions more than correction in the form of a simple negation. Second, this relative advantage is not a function of the depth at which information is processed but rather the degree to which people form attitudes or beliefs when they receive the misinformation. When people form attitudes when they first receive the misinformation, bypassing has no advantage over corrections, likely owing to anchoring. In contrast, when individuals focus on the accuracy of the statements and form beliefs, bypassing is significantly more successful at changing their attitudes because these attitudes are constructed based on expectancy-value principles, while misinformation continues to influence attitudes after correction. Broader implications of this work are discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2024-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142648221","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}