{"title":"No evidence for unconscious initiation and following of arithmetic rules: A replication study.","authors":"Amir Tal,Liad Mudrik","doi":"10.1037/xge0000622","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0000622","url":null,"abstract":"The field of consciousness studies has yielded various-sometimes contradicting-accounts regarding the function of consciousness, ranging from denying it has such function to claiming that any high-level cognitive function requires consciousness. Empirical findings supporting both accounts were reported, yet some of them have been recently revisited based on failures to replicate. Here, we aimed at replicating a remarkable finding reported by Ric and Muller (2012); participants were able to follow an unseen instruction, integrate it with a subsequently presented pair of unseen digits, and accordingly either add the digits (resulting in a priming effect), or simply represent them. This finding thus demonstrates unconscious task-switching, temporal integration (involving mental chaining), and arithmetic operation. Finding such high-level processes in the absence of awareness is of pivotal importance to our understanding of consciousness, as it challenges prominent theories in the field (e.g., the global neuronal workspace). Accordingly, in light of the self-correction wave in psychological science in general and in the field of consciousness studies in particular, we report here a preregistered replication aimed at testing the reproducibility of this finding, while also better controlling for subjects' awareness of both the instruction and the digits. Across two highly powered experiments, our results failed to replicate the original effect. We, therefore, conclude that the current evidence does not support the claim that arithmetic operations (specifically, addition) can be flexibly initiated without awareness, in line with the current arguments for a more limited scope of unconscious processing. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142174463","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"First impressions or good endings? Preferences depend on when you ask.","authors":"Alyssa H Sinclair,Yuxi C Wang,R Alison Adcock","doi":"10.1037/xge0001638","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001638","url":null,"abstract":"Rewards often unfold over time; we must summarize events in memory to guide future choices. Do first impressions matter most, or is it better to end on a good note? Across nine studies (N = 569), we tested these competing intuitions and found that preferences depend on when rewards occur and when we are asked to evaluate an experience. In our \"garage sale\" task, participants opened boxes containing sequences of objects with values. All boxes were equally valuable, but rewards were either evenly distributed or clustered at the beginning, middle, or end of the sequence. First, we tested preferences and valuation shortly after learning; we consistently found that boxes with rewards at the beginning were strongly preferred and overvalued. Object-value associative memory was impaired in boxes with early rewards, suggesting that value information was linked to the box rather than the objects. However, when tested after an overnight delay, participants equally preferred boxes with any cluster of rewards, whether at the beginning, middle, or end of the experience. Finally, we demonstrated that evaluating shortly after an experience led to lasting preferences for early rewards. Overall, we show that people summarize rewarding experiences in a nonlinear and time-dependent way, unifying prior work on affect, memory, and decision making. We propose that short-term preferences are biased by first impressions. However, when we wait and evaluate an experience after a delay, we summarize rewarding events in memory to inform adaptive longer term preferences. Preferences depend on when rewards occur and when we first evaluate an experience. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142165991","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Julia Marshall, Kellen Mermin-Bunnell, Anton Gollwitzer, Jan Retelsdorf, Paul Bloom
{"title":"Cross-cultural conceptions of third-party intervention across childhood.","authors":"Julia Marshall, Kellen Mermin-Bunnell, Anton Gollwitzer, Jan Retelsdorf, Paul Bloom","doi":"10.1037/xge0001617","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001617","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Third-party intervention is a cornerstone of cooperative societies, yet we know little about how children develop an understanding of this social behavior. The present work generates a cross-cultural and developmental picture of how 6-, 9-, and 12-year-olds (<i>N</i> = 447) across four societies (India, Germany, Uganda, and the United States) reason about third-party intervention. To do so, we measured children's obligation judgments and unstructured descriptions of third-party intervention. Although some cultural differences emerged, 6-year-olds largely considered bystanders as obligated to respond to wrongdoing, regardless of the bystander's social position. In contrast, 9- and 12-year-olds were more likely to exclusively ascribe this social responsibility to people in positions of authority. Despite these age differences, children of all ages generated role-specific descriptions of third-party intervention, with authority figures intervening in distinct ways from peers. For authority figures, children in India and Uganda described third-party intervention as involving corporal punishment or unspecified punishment, whereas children in the United States described such intervention as involving only verbal intervention (i.e., telling someone to stop). For peers, children in all societies described third-party intervention as involving reporting misdeeds to an authority. Collectively, these data show that early conceptualizations of third-party intervention are rooted in shared notions of obligation yet are also subject to cultural and contextual influences. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":"153 9","pages":"2216-2229"},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142140206","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Arianne E Eason, Elizabeth A Enright, Shimeng Weng, Rachel O Horton, Miranda J Sitch, Jessica A Sommerville
{"title":"The haves and have-nots: Infants use wealth to guide social behavior and evaluation.","authors":"Arianne E Eason, Elizabeth A Enright, Shimeng Weng, Rachel O Horton, Miranda J Sitch, Jessica A Sommerville","doi":"10.1037/xge0001567","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001567","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Biases favoring the wealthy are ubiquitous, and they support and bolster vast resource inequalities across individuals and groups; yet, when these biases are acquired remains unknown. In Experiments 1 through 5 (Total <i>N</i> = 232), using multiple methods, we found that 14- to 18-month-old infants track individuals' wealth (Experiments 1-5), prefer and selectively help rich (vs. poor) individuals (Experiments 2 and 3), and negatively evaluate poor individuals (Experiments 4 and 5). In two subsequent experiments with 11- to 13-month-old infants (Total <i>N</i> = 65), however, we find no evidence of preferences for rich (vs. poor) individuals (Experiment 6) or differential evaluations of rich and poor people (Experiment 7). Together, these results demonstrate that in the second year of life, wealth emerges as a central and robust dimension of evaluation that guides social decision making. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":"153 9","pages":"2239-2257"},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142140210","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Learning from failure: The roles of self-focused feedback, task expectations, and subsequent instruction.","authors":"Sebahat Gok, Emily R Fyfe","doi":"10.1037/xge0001632","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001632","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Previous research indicates that failure feedback leads people to <i>tune out</i> from the task, which is detrimental to their learning (Eskreis-Winkler & Fishbach, 2019; Keith et al., 2022). The current work aims to identify ways to optimize learning from failure feedback. We conducted six preregistered experiments (<i>N</i> = 1,306) to replicate and extend the findings from Eskreis-Winkler and Fishbach (2019) with novel tests of self-focused feedback, task expectations, and subsequent instruction. The detriments of failure feedback were replicated in Studies 1a, 1b, and 1c, which altered the focus of the feedback message to be self-focused (e.g., your answer) or task-focused (e.g., the answer). The detriments of failure feedback were also replicated in Study 2 when the task expectations were manipulated to easy versus hard. These results generally underscored the robustness of the results from the original study. However, Study 3 established boundary conditions. When it was a rule-based task and brief instructions on the rule were provided after feedback, there was no evidence of a detrimental effect of failure, and failure feedback, in some conditions, resulted in even better learning than success feedback for learning new material. We conclude that the <i>tune-out</i> reactions to failure during feedback disappear and may even be reversed when subsequent learning opportunities are provided. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":"153 9","pages":"2328-2344"},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142140209","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Tal Ness, Valerie J Langlois, Jared M Novick, Albert E Kim
{"title":"Theta-band neural oscillations reflect cognitive control during language processing.","authors":"Tal Ness, Valerie J Langlois, Jared M Novick, Albert E Kim","doi":"10.1037/xge0001621","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001621","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>As we interpret language moment by moment, we often encounter conflicting cues in the input that create incompatible representations of sentence meaning, which must be promptly resolved. Although ample evidence suggests that cognitive control aids in the resolution of such conflict, the methods commonly used to assess cognitive control's involvement in language comprehension provide limited information about the time course of its engagement. Here, we show that neural oscillatory activity in the theta-band (∼3-8 Hz), which is associated with cognitive control in nonlinguistic tasks like Stroop and Flanker, provides a real-time index of cognitive control during language processing. We conducted time-frequency analyses of four electroencephalogram data sets, and consistently observed that increased theta-band power was elicited by various kinds of linguistic conflict. Moreover, increases in the degree of conflict within a sentence produced greater increases in theta activity. These effects emerged as early as 300 ms from the onset of the initiating event, indicating rapid cognitive-control recruitment during sentence processing in response to conflicting representations. Crucially, the effect patterns could not be ascribed to processing difficulty that is not due to conflict (e.g., semantic implausibility was neither necessary nor sufficient to elicit theta activity). We suggest that neural oscillations in the theta-band offer a reliable way to test specific hypotheses about cognitive-control engagement during real-time language comprehension. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":"153 9","pages":"2279-2298"},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142140211","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Spontaneous path tracing in task-irrelevant mazes: Spatial affordances trigger dynamic visual routines.","authors":"Kimberly W Wong, Brian J Scholl","doi":"10.1037/xge0001618","DOIUrl":"10.1037/xge0001618","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Given a maze (e.g., in a book of puzzles), you might solve it by drawing out paths with your pencil. But even without a pencil, you might naturally find yourself <i>mentally</i> tracing along various paths. This \"mental path tracing\" may intuitively seem to depend on your (overt, conscious, voluntary) goal of wanting to get out of the maze, but might it also occur spontaneously-as a result of simply <i>seeing</i> the maze, via a kind of dynamic visual routine? Here, observers simply had to compare the visual properties of two probes presented in a maze. The maze itself was entirely task irrelevant, but we predicted that simply <i>seeing</i> the maze's visual structure would \"afford\" incidental mental path tracing (à la Gibson). Across four experiments, observers were slower to compare probes that were further from each other along the paths, even when controlling for lower level properties (such as the probes' brute linear separation, ignoring the maze \"walls\"). These results also generalized beyond mazes to other unfamiliar displays with task-irrelevant circular obstacles. This novel combination of two prominent themes from our field-affordances and visual routines-suggests that at least some visual routines may not require voluntary goals; instead, they may operate in an automatic (incidental, stimulus-driven) fashion, as a part of visual processing itself. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":" ","pages":"2230-2238"},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141633603","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Matthew K Robison, Ashley L Miller, Elizabeth A Wiemers, Derek M Ellis, Nash Unsworth, Thomas S Redick, Gene A Brewer
{"title":"What makes working memory work? A multifaceted account of the predictive power of working memory capacity.","authors":"Matthew K Robison, Ashley L Miller, Elizabeth A Wiemers, Derek M Ellis, Nash Unsworth, Thomas S Redick, Gene A Brewer","doi":"10.1037/xge0001629","DOIUrl":"10.1037/xge0001629","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Working memory capacity (WMC) has received a great deal of attention in cognitive psychology partly because WMC correlates broadly with other abilities (e.g., reading comprehension, second-language proficiency, fluid intelligence) and thus seems to be a critical aspect of cognitive ability. However, it is still rigorously debated <i>why</i> such correlations occur. Some theories posit a single ability (e.g., attention control, short-term memory capacity, controlled memory search) as the primary reason behind WMC's predictiveness, whereas others argue that WMC is predictive because it taps into multiple abilities. Here, we tested these single- and multifaceted accounts of WMC with a large-scale (<i>N</i> = 974) individual-differences investigation of WMC and three hypothesized mediators: attention control, primary memory, and secondary memory. We found evidence for a multifaceted account, such that no single ability could fully mediate the relation between WMC and higher order cognition (i.e., reading comprehension and fluid intelligence). Further, such an effect held regardless of whether WMC was measured via complex span or n-back. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":"153 9","pages":"2193-2215"},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142140212","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"When the personal and the collective intersects: Memory, future thinking, and perceived agency during the COVID-19 pandemic.","authors":"Meymune Nur Topçu, William Hirst","doi":"10.1037/xge0001624","DOIUrl":"10.1037/xge0001624","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Do collective crises have an impact on the characteristics of mental time travel for individuals and collectives? The COVID-19 pandemic provides a unique context to address this question due to the intersection it created between the personal and the collective domains. In two studies (<i>N</i> = 273), we examined the valence and perceived agency involved in memory and future thinking for personal and collective domains. The second study also included a longitudinal component with 43 participants completing both studies. In research done prior to the pandemic, a valence-based dissociation between personal and collective events was consistently observed in Western samples. We wanted to see if these patterns changed during different stages of the pandemic. In the first study, participants no longer exhibited the usual positivity bias for the personal future, while in the second study, they did not exhibit the usual negativity bias for the collective future. The second aim of the current article was to assess the agency people attribute to themselves and their nation over events and how that relates to valence. People always attributed more agency to themselves over positive events than negative events in both personal and collective domains. Perceived nation agency, however, was associated with positivity in the collective domain but with negativity in the personal domain. Longitudinal analyses confirmed these patterns. Taken together, these results indicate that a collective crisis that has immediate and profound effects on personal lives can alter the patterns observed for mental time travel, especially for the future. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":" ","pages":"2258-2278"},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141759076","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Chayce R Baldwin, Martha K Berg, Jiayin Yuan, Walter J Sowden, Shinobu Kitayama, Ethan Kross
{"title":"Culture shapes moral reasoning about close others.","authors":"Chayce R Baldwin, Martha K Berg, Jiayin Yuan, Walter J Sowden, Shinobu Kitayama, Ethan Kross","doi":"10.1037/xge0001626","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001626","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Moral norms balance the needs of the group versus individuals, and societies across the globe vary in terms of the norms they prioritize. Extant research indicates that people from Western cultures consistently choose to protect (vs. punish) close others who commit crimes. Might this differ in cultural contexts that prioritize the self less? Prior research presents two compelling alternatives. On the one hand, collectivists may feel more intertwined with and tied to those close to them, thus protecting close others more. On the other hand, they may prioritize society over individuals and thus protect close others less. Four studies (<i>N</i> = 2,688) performed in the United States and Japan provide self-report, narrative, and experimental evidence supporting the latter hypothesis. These findings highlight how personal relationships and culture dynamically interact to shape how we think about important moral decisions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":"153 9","pages":"2345-2358"},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142140207","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}