Journal of Experimental Psychology: General最新文献

{"title":"The paradox of explaining: When feeling unknowledgeable prevents learners from engaging in effective learning strategies.","authors":"Stav Atir, Jane L Risen","doi":"10.1037/xge0001679","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001679","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>People often need to learn complex information as part of their daily lives. One of the most effective strategies for understanding information is to explain it, for instance to a hypothetical other (Pilots 1 and 2). Yet, we find that learners prefer equally effortful but less effective learning strategies, even when incentivized to perform well (Study 1). Critically, we propose and find that learners' reluctance to explain is tied to their subjective knowledge of the material; learners who feel less knowledgeable about what they learned are most reluctant to explain it, despite the strategy being as effective for them (Study 2). An intervention that increased subjective knowledge (by having learners answer a few easy questions) increased learners' choice to explain, which was mediated by learners believing that explaining would be more pleasant and effective (Study 3). Directly manipulating beliefs about how fun and effective explaining is also boosted learners' willingness to explain (Study 4). Finally, because Studies 1-4 incentivized performance financially, we replicated key results in the classroom with students, finding improved scores on a class quiz (Study 5). The paradoxical implication of these findings is that those who need effective learning strategies the most are the ones least likely to use them. Put together, we find that subjective knowledge plays a key role in learning decisions and that boosting subjective knowledge is a simple intervention that can improve learning-related choices. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2024-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142467135","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Lexical inhibition after semantic violations recruits a domain-general inhibitory control mechanism.","authors":"Héctor O Sánchez-Meléndez, Kristi Hendrickson, Yoojeong Choo, Jan R Wessel","doi":"10.1037/xge0001642","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001642","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Language processing is incremental. As language signals-for example, words in a sentence-unfold, humans predict and activate likely upcoming input to facilitate comprehension. Prediction not only accelerates understanding but also prompts reassessment in the case of prediction error, fostering learning and refining comprehension skills. Therefore, it is paramount to understand what happens when linguistic predictions are violated-for example, when a sentence ends in an unpredicted word. One theory, which we test here, is that the originally predicted word is actively inhibited after semantic violations. Furthermore, we tested whether this purported lexical inhibition process is achieved by a domain-general mechanism-that is, one that also inhibits other processes (e.g., movement). We combined a semantic violation task, in which highly constrained sentences primed specific words but sometimes continued otherwise, with a motoric stop-signal task. Across two experiments, semantic violations significantly impaired simultaneous action-stopping. This implies that lexical and motor inhibition share the same process. In support of this view, multivariate decoding of electroencephalographic recordings showed early overlap in neural processing between action-stopping (motor inhibition) and semantic violations (lexical inhibition). Moreover, a known signature of motor inhibition (the stop-signal P3) was reduced after this initial overlap period, further suggesting the presence of a bottleneck due to shared processing. These findings show that semantic violations trigger inhibitory processing and suggest that this lexical inhibition recruits a domain-general inhibitory control mechanism. This provides a new perspective on long-standing debates in psycholinguistics, extends the range of a well-characterized cognitive control mechanism into the linguistic domain, and offers support for recent neurobiological models of domain-general inhibitory control. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2024-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142467133","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Lexical inhibition after semantic violations recruits a domain-general inhibitory control mechanism.","authors":"Héctor O Sánchez-Meléndez,Kristi Hendrickson,Yoojeong Choo,Jan R Wessel","doi":"10.1037/xge0001642","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001642","url":null,"abstract":"Language processing is incremental. As language signals-for example, words in a sentence-unfold, humans predict and activate likely upcoming input to facilitate comprehension. Prediction not only accelerates understanding but also prompts reassessment in the case of prediction error, fostering learning and refining comprehension skills. Therefore, it is paramount to understand what happens when linguistic predictions are violated-for example, when a sentence ends in an unpredicted word. One theory, which we test here, is that the originally predicted word is actively inhibited after semantic violations. Furthermore, we tested whether this purported lexical inhibition process is achieved by a domain-general mechanism-that is, one that also inhibits other processes (e.g., movement). We combined a semantic violation task, in which highly constrained sentences primed specific words but sometimes continued otherwise, with a motoric stop-signal task. Across two experiments, semantic violations significantly impaired simultaneous action-stopping. This implies that lexical and motor inhibition share the same process. In support of this view, multivariate decoding of electroencephalographic recordings showed early overlap in neural processing between action-stopping (motor inhibition) and semantic violations (lexical inhibition). Moreover, a known signature of motor inhibition (the stop-signal P3) was reduced after this initial overlap period, further suggesting the presence of a bottleneck due to shared processing. These findings show that semantic violations trigger inhibitory processing and suggest that this lexical inhibition recruits a domain-general inhibitory control mechanism. This provides a new perspective on long-standing debates in psycholinguistics, extends the range of a well-characterized cognitive control mechanism into the linguistic domain, and offers support for recent neurobiological models of domain-general inhibitory control. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":"44 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142486379","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Loyalty from a personal point of view: A cross-cultural prototype study of loyalty.","authors":"Samuel Murray,Gino Marttelo Carmona Díaz,Laura Sofía Vega-Plazas,William Jiménez-Leal,Santiago Amaya","doi":"10.1037/xge0001623","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001623","url":null,"abstract":"Loyalty is considered central to people's moral life, yet little is known about how people think about what it means to be loyal. We used a prototype approach to understand how loyalty is represented in Colombia and the United States and how these representations mediate attributions of loyalty and moral judgments of loyalty violations. Across seven studies (N = 1,984), we found cross-cultural similarities in the associative meaning of loyalty (Study 1) but found differences in the centrality of features associated with loyalty (Study 2) and the latent structure of loyalty representations (Study 3). Colombians represent loyalty in terms of more general moral characteristics, while U.S. participants represent loyalty in terms of interpersonal commitment, both in contrast with current approaches to loyalty. By comparing representations of loyalty and honesty, we establish that differences in loyalty conceptualizations reflect a different way of thinking about loyalty rather than morality more generally (Study 4). Further, Colombians attributed greater loyalty to individuals with general moral characteristics compared to participants from the U.S. sample (Study 5) and were more likely to classify nonloyal values as loyalty-related (Study 6). While the centrality of prototypical features predicts categorizing norm violations as loyalty-related, differences in prototypical structure account for differences in the severity of moral judgment for such violations (Study 7), which suggests that loyalty representations have similar functions, even though these representations differ in structural characteristics. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142486376","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Simulation requires activation of self-knowledge to change self-concept.","authors":"M J Schneider,Jordan Rubin-McGregor,Jacob Elder,Brent L Hughes,Diana I Tamir","doi":"10.1037/xge0001663","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001663","url":null,"abstract":"Simulating other people can shift one's self-concept, an effect known as simulation-induced malleability. How does imagining others shift the self? We propose that the activation of self-knowledge is the key factor by which simulation of others alters one's self-concept. We test this possibility across four studies that each manipulate self-knowledge activation indirectly during simulation and measure the impact on subsequent self-ratings. Results demonstrate that increasing activation of self-knowledge during simulation is associated with increased self-concept change. People experienced greater self-concept change when simulating similar others (Studies 1 and 2). People also generalized simulation-induced changes to aspects of the self-concept that were semantically similar to the simulated content (Study 3). Finally, people who are less likely to recruit self-knowledge (i.e., older adults) during simulation were less susceptible to self-concept change (Study 4). These studies highlight self-knowledge activation as an essential component of the effects of simulation on self-rated change. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142449331","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Moral judgment is sensitive to bargaining power.","authors":"Arthur Le Pargneux,Fiery Cushman","doi":"10.1037/xge0001678","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001678","url":null,"abstract":"For contractualist accounts of morality, actions are moral if they correspond to what rational or reasonable agents would agree to do, were they to negotiate explicitly. This, in turn, often depends on each party's bargaining power, which varies with each party's stakes in the potential agreement and available alternatives in case of disagreement. If there is an asymmetry, with one party enjoying higher bargaining power than another, this party can usually get a better deal, as often happens in real negotiations. A strong test of contractualist accounts of morality, then, is whether moral judgments do take bargaining power into account. We explore this in five preregistered experiments (n = 3,025; U.S.-based Prolific participants). We construct scenarios depicting everyday social interactions between two parties in which one of them can perform a mutually beneficial but unpleasant action. We find that the same actions (asking the other to perform the unpleasant action or explicitly refusing to do it) are perceived as less morally appropriate when performed by the party with lower bargaining power, as compared to the party with higher bargaining power. In other words, participants tend to give more moral leeway to parties with better bargaining positions and to hold disadvantaged parties to stricter moral standards. This effect appears to depend only on the relative bargaining power of each party but not on the magnitude of the bargaining power asymmetry between them. We discuss implications for contractualist theories of moral cognition and the emergence and persistence of unfair norms and inequality. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":"108 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142449330","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Psychological underpinnings of partisan bias in tie formation on social media.","authors":"Mohsen Mosleh,Cameron Martel,David G Rand","doi":"10.1037/xge0001662","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001662","url":null,"abstract":"Individuals preferentially reciprocate connections with copartisans versus counter-partisans online. However, the mechanisms underlying this partisan bias remain unclear. Do individuals simply prefer viewing politically congenial content, or do they additionally prefer socially connecting with copartisans? Is this driven by preference for in-party ties or distaste for out-party ties? In a Twitter (now called X) field experiment, we created bot accounts varying by partisanship and whether they identified as bots or humans. We randomly assigned Twitter users (N = 3,013) to be followed by one of these accounts. We found evidence for social motivation-users were much more likely to reciprocate links to copartisan relative to counter-partisan accounts when the accounts identified as humans versus bots. We also found evidence for both in-party preference and out-party dispreference-users were as likely to follow back copartisan accounts as they were unlikely to followback counter-partisan accounts, compared to politically neutral accounts. A follow-up survey experiment (N = 990) provides further evidence for distinct roles of issue polarization, out-party animosity, and in-party affinity in moderating follow-back decisions online. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142439225","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Contrastive adaptation effects along a voice-nonvoice continuum.","authors":"Zi Gao,Andrew J Oxenham","doi":"10.1037/xge0001672","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001672","url":null,"abstract":"Adaptation to the environment is a universal property of perception across all sensory modalities. It can enhance the salience of new events in an ongoing background and helps maintain perceptual constancy in the face of variable sensory input. Several contrastive adaptation effects have been identified using sounds within the categories of human voice and musical instruments. The present study investigated whether such contrast effects can occur between voice and nonvoice stimulus categories. A 10-step continuum between \"voice\" (/a/, /o/, or /u/ vowels) and \"instrument\" (bassoon, horn, or viola) sounds was generated for each of the nine possible pairs. In each trial, an adaptor, either a voice or instrument, was played four times and was followed by a target from along the appropriate continuum. When trials with voice and instrumental adaptors were grouped into separate blocks, strong contrastive adaptation effects were observed, with the target more likely to be identified as a voice following instrumental adaptors and vice versa (Experiment 1). The effects were not observed for visual image adaptors (Experiment 2). The effects were somewhat larger when the adaptors and the target were presented to the same than to different ears, but significant adaptation was observed in both conditions, suggesting contributions of central mechanisms, following binaural integration (Experiment 3). The effect accumulated when the same type of adaptor was presented consecutively and persisted following the end of the adaptors (Experiment 4). The discovery of voice-nonvoice contrastive pairs opens the possibility of studying perceptual or neuronal voice selectivity while keeping acoustic features constant. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":"58 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142439226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Unclearly immoral: Low self-concept clarity increases moral disengagement.","authors":"Jiaqian Wang,Maferima Touré-Tillery","doi":"10.1037/xge0001654","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001654","url":null,"abstract":"This research examines the effect of self-concept clarity (i.e., having self-beliefs that are clearly and confidently defined, internally consistent, and stable) on moral behavior. Seven preregistered studies (N = 3,373) document that low (vs. high) self-concept clarity decreases moral behavior (e.g., donation, volunteering, tax compliance, honesty in an incentivized game). This effect occurs because low self-concept clarity increases moral disengagement, leading people to behave in morally questionable manners without damaging their self-concept. As evidence for this proposed underlying mechanism, we show that the effect of self-concept clarity on moral behavior is mediated by state moral disengagement and attenuates (a) among people with low trait moral disengagement, (b) among people with high trait moral identity internalization, and (c) in the presence of an honor pledge cueing moral engagement. We then show that the effect holds only when a prosocial act is congruent with personal values. Overall, these findings contribute to the literature on self-concept and moral self-regulation and have implications for how to promote morality and curb unethical behavior in society. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142436386","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Mental simulation of the approximal future: Imagining what might happen next.","authors":"Vannia A Puig,Ruthie Poizner,Katriel Read,Karl K Szpunar","doi":"10.1037/xge0001667","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001667","url":null,"abstract":"In the course of daily life, various events-such as driving in suboptimal weather conditions, going on a first date, or walking home alone at night-evoke cognitions about what might happen next in the context of ongoing experience. Nonetheless, little is currently known about the phenomenological experience of anticipating events that might occur next-or what we refer to as simulation of the approximal future. We present novel evidence from a retrospective survey, a diary study, and an experimental laboratory study indicating that people commonly experience simulations of the approximal future, and that simulations of the approximal future can be reliably distinguished, in terms of their valence and function, from simulations of future events that are expected to occur in spatiotemporal contexts that are distinct from ongoing experience. Simulation of the approximal future represents an understudied mental experience that carries important implications for understanding the nature of constructive perceptual and memory-based processes as they pertain to event cognition, threat detection, individual differences, and psychopathology. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":"30 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142386313","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}