{"title":"Anti-corruption and corporate investment: Evidence from financial disclosure laws","authors":"Wendi Huang , Ye Peng","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102769","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102769","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate the impact of anti-corruption regulations on corporate investment by leveraging the implementation of global financial disclosure laws. Our findings reveal that, subsequent to the adoption of these laws, there is a reduction in the rate of corporate investment, alongside an enhancement in investment efficiency. This suggests that anti-corruption policies serve to curb firms’ excessive investment, which is often fueled by government subsidies in corrupt environments. Our analysis provides valuable insights into the advantages of anti-corruption laws and carries significant policy implications.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"92 ","pages":"Article 102769"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2025-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143686506","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Predation by stock price manipulation","authors":"Rafael Matta , Sergio H. Rocha , Paulo Vaz","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102770","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102770","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We develop a model in which feedback effects from equity markets allow uninformed traders to profit by short selling a firm’s stock while going long on its product market competitor. As this strategy distorts the investment of the firm targeted by short selling to the benefit of its rival, we label it <em>predation by stock price manipulation</em>. A short selling ban does not prevent manipulation since the speculator can still induce a firm to underinvest by establishing a long position in its rival. Our analysis unveils how competitive interactions among firms expand the scope of manipulation, providing new insights into equity markets and short sales regulation.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"92 ","pages":"Article 102770"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2025-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143686509","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Seeking blessings by doing good: Top executive superstitions and corporate philanthropy","authors":"Xianjun Cai , Lin Liao , Yukun Pan , Kun Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102775","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102775","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Corporate giving is a substantial expenditure for firms. However, understanding the motives behind such spending remains challenging. This study tests the agency motive of corporate philanthropy by investigating top executives' zodiac year superstition, a culturally embedded, time-varying phenomenon. We find that firms led by board chairs in their zodiac years exhibit a significant increase in charitable donations, with the effects being stronger for firms led by board chairs with lower educational attainment and a lack of overseas experience, as well as non–state owned firms, underperforming firms, and firms with weak corporate governance. Furthermore, these increases in charitable donations are temporary and do not translate into long-term philanthropic commitments or improved firm performance, corroborating their agency-driven nature. Overall, our study provides new insights into the role of managerial beliefs and preferences in shaping corporate behavior.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"92 ","pages":"Article 102775"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2025-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143686510","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Divided we fall: Congressional cycles, the stock market and firm performance","authors":"Joshua Livnat , Amir Rubin , Dan Segal","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102776","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102776","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study examines the impact of partisan control of the United States Congress on corporations and the economy. The findings indicate that economic performance is weaker when neither party holds a majority in both chambers of Congress, resulting in a divided Congress. We propose that this outcome may be attributed to a decrease in the level and quality of regulation during divided Congress terms. To analyze the immediate effects of regulation on the economy, we leverage congressional recess periods as a source of exogenous variation. Consistent with the conjecture that the composition of Congress affects the economy through its regulatory activity, we demonstrate that a divided Congress negatively impacts economic performance when Congress is in session but has no significant effect during recesses (when regulation does not occur). In conclusion, congressional cycles and the presence of effective regulation are shown to be crucial factors influencing economic activity.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"92 ","pages":"Article 102776"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2025-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143686508","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Editorial: Ownership and corporate social and sustainable policies","authors":"Morten Bennedsen , Joseph Fan , Stuart Gillan","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102777","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102777","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"93 ","pages":"Article 102777"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2025-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143844192","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Capitalization of operating leases and the cost of Bank loans","authors":"Joanna Golden , Xiaotao Kelvin Liu","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102773","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102773","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study investigates whether the cost of bank loans is associated with the adoption of new lease standards, which mandate firms to recognize operating leases and increase disclosures. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find robust evidence that treatment firms (i.e., borrowers with higher operating leases in the pre-implementation period) are associated with a greater decline in loan spreads. The effect is more pronounced among unrated firms, borrowers with more opaque pre-implementation financial disclosure, and loans syndicated by less sophisticated lenders. We also document that treatment firms are associated with a greater increase in the number of lenders, debt maturity, and credit ratings. Moreover, treatment firms experience a greater reduction in covenant intensity and covenant tightness. Collectively, our evidence suggests that compliance with ASC 842 improves the reporting reliability and disclosure quality of operating leases.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"92 ","pages":"Article 102773"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2025-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143686507","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Adrian Böhm , Christian Eufinger , Igor Kadach , Yuki Sakasai
{"title":"Green banking illusion? The influence of “Eco-Conscious” bank shareholders on credit allocation","authors":"Adrian Böhm , Christian Eufinger , Igor Kadach , Yuki Sakasai","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102767","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102767","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Can voluntary market-based initiatives effectively promote greener credit allocation? Our paper addresses this question by assessing the role of self-declared environmentally conscious bank shareholders, specifically those endorsing the UN Principles for Responsible Investment, in shaping the sustainability of bank loan portfolios. For our analysis, we utilize a comprehensive dataset that includes information on syndicated loans, firm-level emissions, and both bank and firm ownership and financial data. Controlling for loan demand, at the bank–firm level, we find no evidence of an association between a higher ownership stake by eco-conscious bank shareholders and shifts in banks’ loan allocation strategies between firms with low and high emissions. At the firm-level, we find that lending relationships with banks characterized by greater eco-conscious ownership are not associated with significantly improved environmental performance among borrower firms. Our analysis reveals that banks are treated differently by investors compared to non-financial firms, likely due to regulatory requirements and their unique governance structures, which might explain the observed lack of influence of eco-conscious bank shareholders. Our findings thus indicate the potential limitations of relying on self-declared eco-conscious bank shareholders to guide banks toward environmentally sustainable credit allocation.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"92 ","pages":"Article 102767"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2025-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143628226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Corporate shutdowns in the time of Covid-19","authors":"Shradha Bindal, Kissan Joseph, Felix Meschke","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102766","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102766","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study examines the factors driving corporate headquarters shutdown decisions among S&P 500 firms during the early months of the Covid-19 pandemic. Using mobile phone data to estimate shutdown timing, we find that financial flexibility and CEO characteristics, such as pay duration, overconfidence, power, age or gender, do not influence shutdown decisions. Instead, work-from-home adaptability, local shelter-in-place mandates, and political alignment emerge as critical drivers. Democratic-leaning firms, particularly those led by Democratic-leaning CEOs, shut down significantly earlier than their counterparts. These findings highlight the importance of political and regulatory dynamics in shaping corporate responses during crises.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"92 ","pages":"Article 102766"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2025-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143686511","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do hedge funds still manipulate stock prices?","authors":"Xinyu Cui , Olga Kolokolova","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102765","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102765","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We find no evidence of stock price manipulation by hedge funds from 2011 to 2019, despite confirming the portfolio-pumping pattern documented between 2000 and 2010. In the more recent period, the magnitude, frequency, and persistence of manipulation by hedge funds appear to have declined. This decrease is linked to reduced rewards, as fund flows no longer react positively to the end-of-quarter returns of hedge fund portfolios. Proactive regulatory actions, measured by SEC litigation cases involving hedge funds, and increased press attention to hedge fund fraud also contribute to reduced manipulation during both periods.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"92 ","pages":"Article 102765"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2025-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143620638","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Government contracts and labor investment efficiency","authors":"Pedro Monteiro , Masim Suleymanov","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102771","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102771","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study investigates the impact of government contracts on labor investment efficiency in U.S. public firms between 2001 and 2019. We find that firms awarded with government contracts exhibit improved labor investment efficiency, characterized by reduced abnormal labor hiring, evident in both overinvestment and underinvestment issues. Government contracts are particularly beneficial for financially constrained firms, enhancing their ability to manage labor resources effectively. Additionally, the regulatory framework associated with government contracts reduces labor overinvestment, although it may exacerbate underinvestment where labor rights are weak. The political sensitivity of contractors also improves labor investment efficiency. However, this effect diminishes with contractors' increased bargaining power. Contrary to expectations, political connections and lobbying activities do not significantly alter the impact of government contracts on labor investment efficiency. This study highlights the nuanced role of government contracts in shaping labor investment practices and unravels the underlying mechanisms driving these outcomes, thus contributing to the literature on government contracts, corporate finance, and labor rights.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"92 ","pages":"Article 102771"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2025-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143620636","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}